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1
Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is
thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly
been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a certain difference
is found among ends; some are activities, others are products apart from
the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart from the
actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities.
Now, as there are many actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are
many; the end of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel,
that of strategy victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts
fall under a single capacity—as bridle-making and the other arts con-
cerned with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this
and every military action under strategy, in the same way other arts fall
under yet others—in all of these the ends of the master arts are to be
preferred to all the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former
that the latter are pursued. It makes no difference whether the activities
themselves are the ends of the actions, or something else apart from the
activities, as in the case of the sciences just mentioned.
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If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its
own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we
do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate
the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty
and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will not the
knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like4/Aristotle
archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is
right? If so, we must try, in outline at least, to determine what it is, and
of which of the sciences or capacities it is the object. It would seem to
belong to the most authoritative art and that which is most truly the
master art. And politics appears to be of this nature; for it is this that
ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and which
each class of citizens should learn and up to what point they should
learn them; and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities to
fall under this, e.g., strategy, economics, rhetoric; now, since politics
uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we
are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must
include those of the others, so that this end must be the good for man.
For even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of
the state seems at all events something greater and more complete whether
to attain or to preserve; though it is worth while to attain the end merely
for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or for
city-states. These, then, are the ends at which our inquiry aims, since it
is political science, in one sense of that term.
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Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the sub-
ject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all
discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts. Now fine
and just actions, which political science investigates, admit of much
variety and fluctuation of opinion, so that they may be thought to exist
only by convention, and not by nature. And goods also give rise to a
similar fluctuation because they bring harm to many people; for before
now men have been undone by reason of their wealth, and others by
reason of their courage. We must be content, then, in speaking of such
subjects and with such premisses to indicate the truth roughly and in
outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part
true and with premisses of the same kind to reach conclusions that are
no better. In the same spirit, therefore, should each type of statement be
received; for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in
each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is
evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathema-
tician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs.
Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he is a
good judge. And so the man who has been educated in a subject is aNicomachean Ethics/5
good judge of that subject, and the man who has received an all-round
education is a good judge in general. Hence a young man is not a proper
hearer of lectures on political science; for he is inexperienced in the
actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are
about these; and, further, since he tends to follow his passions, his study
will be vain and unprofitable, because the end aimed at is not knowledge
but action. And it makes no difference whether he is young in years or
youthful in character; the defect does not depend on time, but on his
living, and pursuing each successive object, as passion directs. For to
such persons, as to the incontinent, knowledge brings no profit; but to
those who desire and act in accordance with a rational principle knowl-
edge about such matters will be of great benefit.
These remarks about the student, the sort of treatment to be ex-
pected, and the purpose of the inquiry, may be taken as our preface.
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Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that all knowl-
edge and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we say politi-
cal science aims at and what is the highest of all goods achievable by
action. Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the general
run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness,
and identify living well and doing well with being happy; but with re-
gard to what happiness is they differ, and the many do not give the same
account as the wise. For the former think it is some plain and obvious
thing, like pleasure, wealth, or honour; they differ, however, from one
another—and often even the same man identifies it with different things,
with health when he is ill, with wealth when he is poor; but, conscious of
their ignorance, they admire those who proclaim some great ideal that is
above their comprehension. Now some thought that apart from these
many goods there is another which is self-subsistent and causes the good-
ness of all these as well. To examine all the opinions that have been held
were perhaps somewhat fruitless; enough to examine those that are most
prevalent or that seem to be arguable.
Let us not fail to notice, however, that there is a difference between
arguments from and those to the first principles. For Plato, too, was
right in raising this question and asking, as he used to do, ‘are we on the
way from or to the first principles?’ There is a difference, as there is in
a race-course between the course from the judges to the turning-point
and the way back. For, while we must begin with what is known, things6/Aristotle
are objects of knowledge in two senses—some to us, some without quali-
fication. Presumably, then, we must begin with things known to us.
Hence any one who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is
noble and just, and generally, about the subjects of political science
must have been brought up in good habits. For the fact is the starting-
point, and if this is sufficiently plain to him, he will not at the start need
the reason as well; and the man who has been well brought up has or can
easily get starting-points. And as for him who neither has nor can get
them, let him hear the words of Hesiod:
Far best is he who knows all things himself;
Good, he that hearkens when men counsel right;
But he who neither knows, nor lays to heart
Another’s wisdom, is a useless wight.
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Let us, however, resume our discussion from the point at which we
digressed. To judge from the lives that men lead, most men, and men of
the most vulgar type, seem (not without some ground) to identify the
good, or happiness, with pleasure; which is the reason why they love the
life of enjoyment. For there are, we may say, three prominent types of
life—that just mentioned, the political, and thirdly the contemplative
life. Now the mass of mankind are evidently quite slavish in their tastes,
preferring a life suitable to beasts, but they get some ground for their
view from the fact that many of those in high places share the tastes of
Sardanapallus. A consideration of the prominent types of life shows
that people of superior refinement and of active disposition identify hap-
piness with honour; for this is, roughly speaking, the end of the political
life. But it seems too superficial to be what we are looking for, since it is
thought to depend on those who bestow honour rather than on him who
receives it, but the good we divine to be something proper to a man and
not easily taken from him. Further, men seem to pursue honour in order
that they may be assured of their goodness; at least it is by men of
practical wisdom that they seek to be honoured, and among those who
know them, and on the ground of their virtue; clearly, then, according to
them, at any rate, virtue is better. And perhaps one might even suppose
this to be, rather than honour, the end of the political life. But even this
appears somewhat incomplete; for possession of virtue seems actually
compatible with being asleep, or with lifelong inactivity, and, further,Nicomachean Ethics/7
with the greatest sufferings and misfortunes; but a man who was living
so no one would call happy, unless he were maintaining a thesis at all
costs. But enough of this; for the subject has been sufficiently treated
even in the current discussions. Third comes the contemplative life, which
we shall consider later.
The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and
wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful
and for the sake of something else. And so one might rather take the
aforenamed objects to be ends; for they are loved for themselves. But it
is evident that not even these are ends; yet many arguments have been
thrown away in support of them. Let us leave this subject, then.
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We had perhaps better consider the universal good and discuss thor-
oughly what is meant by it, although such an inquiry is made an uphill
one by the fact that the Forms have been introduced by friends of our
own. Yet it would perhaps be thought to be better, indeed to be our duty,
for the sake of maintaining the truth even to destroy what touches us
closely, especially as we are philosophers or lovers of wisdom; for, while
both are dear, piety requires us to honour truth above our friends.
The men who introduced this doctrine did not posit Ideas of classes
within which they recognized priority and posteriority (which is the rea-
son why they did not maintain the existence of an Idea embracing all
numbers); but the term ‘good’ is used both in the category of substance
and in that of quality and in that of relation, and that which is per se,
i.e., substance, is prior in nature to the relative (for the latter is like an
off shoot and accident of being); so that there could not be a common
Idea set over all these goods. Further, since ‘good’ has as many senses
as ‘being’ (for it is predicated both in the category of substance, as of
God and of reason, and in quality, i.e., of the virtues, and in quantity,
i.e., of that which is moderate, and in relation, i.e., of the useful, and in
time, i.e., of the right opportunity, and in place, i.e., of the right locality
and the like), clearly it cannot be something universally present in all
cases and single; for then it could not have been predicated in all the
categories but in one only. Further, since of the things answering to one
Idea there is one science, there would have been one science of all the
goods; but as it is there are many sciences even of the things that fall
under one category, e.g., of opportunity, for opportunity in war is stud-
ied by strategics and in disease by medicine, and the moderate in food is8/Aristotle
studied by medicine and in exercise by the science of gymnastics. And
one might ask the question, what in the world they mean by ‘a thing
itself,’ is (as is the case) in ‘man himself’ and in a particular man the
account of man is one and the same. For in so far as they are man, they
will in no respect differ; and if this is so, neither will ‘good itself’ and
particular goods, in so far as they are good. But again it will not be good
any the more for being eternal, since that which lasts long is no whiter
than that which perishes in a day. The Pythagoreans seem to give a more
plausible account of the good, when they place the one in the column of
goods; and it is they that Speusippus seems to have followed.
But let us discuss these matters elsewhere; an objection to what we
have said, however, may be discerned in the fact that the Platonists have
not been speaking about all goods, and that the goods that are pursued
and loved for themselves are called good by reference to a single Form,
while those which tend to produce or to preserve these somehow or to
prevent their contraries are called so by reference to these, and in a
secondary sense. Clearly, then, goods must be spoken of in two ways,
and some must be good in themselves, the others by reason of these. Let
us separate, then, things good in themselves from things useful, and
consider whether the former are called good by reference to a single
Idea. What sort of goods would one call good in themselves? Is it those
that are pursued even when isolated from others, such as intelligence,
sight, and certain pleasures and honours? Certainly, if we pursue these
also for the sake of something else, yet one would place them among
things good in themselves. Or is nothing other than the Idea of good
good in itself? In that case the Form will be empty. But if the things we
have named are also things good in themselves, the account of the good
will have to appear as something identical in them all, as that of white-
ness is identical in snow and in white lead. But of honour, wisdom, and
pleasure, just in respect of their goodness, the accounts are distinct and
diverse. The good, therefore, is not some common element answering to
one Idea.
But what then do we mean by the good? It is surely not like the
things that only chance to have the same name. Are goods one, then, by
being derived from one good or by all contributing to one good, or are
they rather one by analogy? Certainly as sight is in the body, so is rea-
son in the soul, and so on in other cases. But perhaps these subjects had
better be dismissed for the present; for perfect precision about them
would be more appropriate to another branch of philosophy. And simi-Nicomachean Ethics/9
larly with regard to the Idea; even if there is some one good which is
universally predicable of goods or is capable of separate and indepen-
dent existence, clearly it could not be achieved or attained by man; but
we are now seeking something attainable. Perhaps, however, some one
might think it worth while to recognize this with a view to the goods that
are attainable and achievable; for having this as a sort of pattern we
shall know better the goods that are good for us, and if we know them
shall attain them. This argument has some plausibility, but seems to
clash with the procedure of the sciences; for all of these, though they
aim at some good and seek to supply the deficiency of it, leave on one
side the knowledge of the good. Yet that all the exponents of the arts
should be ignorant of, and should not even seek, so great an aid is not
probable. It is hard, too, to see how a weaver or a carpenter will be
benefited in regard to his own craft by knowing this ‘good itself,’ or
how the man who has viewed the Idea itself will be a better doctor or
general thereby. For a doctor seems not even to study health in this way,
but the health of man, or perhaps rather the health of a particular man;
it is individuals that he is healing. But enough of these topics.
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Let us again return to the good we are seeking, and ask what it can be.
It seems different in different actions and arts; it is different in medicine,
in strategy, and in the other arts likewise. What then is the good of each?
Surely that for whose sake everything else is done. In medicine this is
health, in strategy victory, in architecture a house, in any other sphere
something else, and in every action and pursuit the end; for it is for the
sake of this that all men do whatever else they do. Therefore, if there is
an end for all that we do, this will be the good achievable by action, and
if there are more than one, these will be the goods achievable by action.
So the argument has by a different course reached the same point;
but we must try to state this even more clearly. Since there are evidently
more than one end, and we choose some of these (e.g., wealth, flutes,
and in general instruments) for the sake of something else, clearly not
all ends are final ends; but the chief good is evidently something final.
Therefore, if there is only one final end, this will be what we are seek-
ing, and if there are more than one, the most final of these will be what
we are seeking. Now we call that which is in itself worthy of pursuit
more final than that which is worthy of pursuit for the sake of some-
thing else, and that which is never desirable for the sake of something10/Aristotle
else more final than the things that are desirable both in themselves and
for the sake of that other thing, and therefore we call final without quali-
fication that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of
something else.
Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we
choose always for self and never for the sake of something else, but
honour, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for them-
selves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of
them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, judging that
by means of them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no
one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other
than itself.
From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result seems to
follow; for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now by self-
sufficient we do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by himself,
for one who lives a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and
in general for his friends and fellow citizens, since man is born for citi-
zenship. But some limit must be set to this; for if we extend our require-
ment to ancestors and descendants and friends’ friends we are in for an
infinite series. Let us examine this question, however, on another occa-
sion; the self-sufficient we now define as that which when isolated makes
life desirable and lacking in nothing; and such we think happiness to be;
and further we think it most desirable of all things, without being counted
as one good thing among others—if it were so counted it would clearly
be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for
that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater
is always more desirable. Happiness, then, is something final and self-
sufficient, and is the end of action.
Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems
a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is still desired. This might
perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man. For
just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or an artist, and, in general, for all
things that have a function or activity, the good and the ‘well’ is thought
to reside in the function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a
function. Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or
activities, and has man none? Is he born without a function? Or as eye,
hand, foot, and in general each of the parts evidently has a function,
may one lay it down that man similarly has a function apart from all
these? What then can this be? Life seems to be common even to plants,Nicomachean Ethics/11
but we are seeking what is peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore,
the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would be a life of perception,
but it also seems to be common even to the horse, the ox, and every
animal. There remains, then, an active life of the element that has a
rational principle; of this, one part has such a principle in the sense of
being obedient to one, the other in the sense of possessing one and exer-
cising thought. And, as ‘life of the rational element’ also has two mean-
ings, we must state that life in the sense of activity is what we mean; for
this seems to be the more proper sense of the term. Now if the function
of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational prin-
ciple, and if we say ‘so-and-so-and ‘a good so-and-so’ have a function
which is the same in kind, e.g., a lyre, and a good lyre-player, and so
without qualification in all cases, eminence in respect of goodness being
idded to the name of the function (for the function of a lyre-player is to
play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well): if this is the
case, and we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and
this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle,
and the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of
these, and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accor-
dance with the appropriate excellence: if this is the case, human good
turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are
more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete.
But we must add ‘in a complete life.’ For one swallow does not
make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time,
does not make a man blessed and happy.
Let this serve as an outline of the good; for we must presumably
first sketch it roughly, and then later fill in the details. But it would seem
that any one is capable of carrying on and articulating what has once
been well outlined, and that time is a good discoverer or partner in such
a work; to which facts the advances of the arts are due; for any one can
add what is lacking. And we must also remember what has been said
before, and not look for precision in all things alike, but in each class of
things such precision as accords with the subject-matter, and so much
as is appropriate to the inquiry. For a carpenter and a geometer investi-
gate the right angle in different ways; the former does so in so far as the
right angle is useful for his work, while the latter inquires what it is or
what sort of thing it is; for he is a spectator of the truth. We must act in
the same way, then, in all other matters as well, that our main task may
not be subordinated to minor questions. Nor must we demand the cause12/Aristotle
in all matters alike; it is enough in some cases that the fact be well
established, as in the case of the first principles; the fact is the primary
thing or first principle. Now of first principles we see some by induc-
tion, some by perception, some by a certain habituation, and others too
in other ways. But each set of principles we must try to investigate in the
natural way, and we must take pains to state them definitely, since they
have a great influence on what follows. For the beginning is thought to
be more than half of the whole, and many of the questions we ask are
cleared up by it.
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We must consider it, however, in the light not only of our conclusion and
our premisses, but also of what is commonly said about it; for with a
true view all the data harmonize, but with a false one the facts soon
clash. Now goods have been divided into three classes, and some are
described as external, others as relating to soul or to body; we call those
that relate to soul most properly and truly goods, and psychical actions
and activities we class as relating to soul. Therefore our account must
be sound, at least according to this view, which is an old one and agreed
on by philosophers. It is correct also in that we identify the end with
certain actions and activities; for thus it falls among goods of the soul
and not among external goods. Another belief which harmonizes with
our account is that the happy man lives well and does well; for we have
practically defined happiness as a sort of good life and good action. The
characteristics that are looked for in happiness seem also, all of them, to
belong to what we have defined happiness as being. For some identify
happiness with virtue, some with practical wisdom, others with a kind
of philosophic wisdom, others with these, or one of these, accompanied
by pleasure or not without pleasure; while others include also external
prosperity. Now some of these views have been held by many men and
men of old, others by a few eminent persons; and it is not probable that
either of these should be entirely mistaken, but rather that they should
be right in at least some one respect or even in most respects.
With those who identify happiness with virtue or some one virtue
our account is in harmony; for to virtue belongs virtuous activity. But it
makes, perhaps, no small difference whether we place the chief good in
possession or in use, in state of mind or in activity. For the state of mind
may exist without producing any good result, as in a man who is asleep
or in some other way quite inactive, but the activity cannot; for one whoNicomachean Ethics/13
has the activity will of necessity be acting, and acting well. And as in the
Olympic Games it is not the most beautiful and the strongest that are
crowned but those who compete (for it is some of these that are victori-
ous), so those who act win, and rightly win, the noble and good things in
life.
Their life is also in itself pleasant. For pleasure is a state of soul,
and to each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant; e.g.,
not only is a horse pleasant to the lover of horses, and a spectacle to the
lover of sights, but also in the same way just acts are pleasant to the
lover of justice and in general virtuous acts to the lover of virtue. Now
for most men their pleasures are in conflict with one another because
these are not by nature pleasant, but the lovers of what is noble find
pleasant the things that are by nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are
such, so that these are pleasant for such men as well as in their own
nature. Their life, therefore, has no further need of pleasure as a sort of
adventitious charm, but has its pleasure in itself. For, besides what we
have said, the man who does not rejoice in noble actions is not even
good; since no one would call a man just who did not enjoy acting justly,
nor any man liberal who did not enjoy liberal actions; and similarly in
all other cases. If this is so, virtuous actions must be in themselves
pleasant. But they are also good and noble, and have each of these at-
tributes in the highest degree, since the good man judges well about
these attributes; his judgement is such as we have described. Happiness
then is the best, noblest, and most pleasant thing in the world, and these
attributes are not severed as in the inscription at Delos—
Most noble is that which is justest, and best is health;
But pleasantest is it to win what we love.
For all these properties belong to the best activities; and these, or
one—the best—of these, we identify with happiness.
Yet evidently, as we said, it needs the external goods as well; for it is
impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment.
In many actions we use friends and riches and political power as instru-
ments; and there are some things the lack of which takes the lustre from
happiness, as good birth, goodly children, beauty; for the man who is
very ugly in appearance or ill-born or solitary and childless is not very
likely to be happy, and perhaps a man would be still less likely if he had
thoroughly bad children or friends or had lost good children or friends14/Aristotle
by death. As we said, then, happiness seems to need this sort of prosper-
ity in addition; for which reason some identify happiness with good
fortune, though others identify it with virtue.
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For this reason also the question is asked, whether happiness is to be
acquired by learning or by habituation or some other sort of training, or
comes in virtue of some divine providence or again by chance. Now if
there is any gift of the gods to men, it is reasonable that happiness should
be god-given, and most surely god-given of all human things inasmuch
as it is the best. But this question would perhaps be more appropriate to
another inquiry; happiness seems, however, even if it is not god-sent but
comes as a result of virtue and some process of learning or training, to
be among the most godlike things; for that which is the prize and end of
virtue seems to be the best thing in the world, and something godlike and
blessed.
It will also on this view be very generally shared; for all who are not
maimed as regards their potentiality for virtue may win it by a certain
kind of study and care. But if it is better to be happy thus than by
chance, it is reasonable that the facts should be so, since everything that
depends on the action of nature is by nature as good as it can be, and
similarly everything that depends on art or any rational cause, and espe-
cially if it depends on the best of all causes. To entrust to chance what is
greatest and most noble would be a very defective arrangement.
The answer to the question we are asking is plain also from the
definition of happiness; for it has been said to be a virtuous activity of
soul, of a certain kind. Of the remaining goods, some must necessarily
pre-exist as conditions of happiness, and others are naturally co-opera-
tive and useful as instruments. And this will be found to agree with what
we said at the outset; for we stated the end of political science to be the
best end, and political science spends most of its pains on making the
citizens to be of a certain character, viz. good and capable of noble acts.
It is natural, then, that we call neither ox nor horse nor any other of
the animals happy; for none of them is capable of sharing in such activ-
ity. For this reason also a boy is not happy; for he is not yet capable of
such acts, owing to his age; and boys who are called happy are being
congratulated by reason of the hopes we have for them. For there is
required, as we said, not only complete virtue but also a complete life,
since many changes occur in life, and all manner of chances, and theNicomachean Ethics/15
most prosperous may fall into great misfortunes in old age, as is told of
Priam in the Trojan Cycle; and one who has experienced such chances
and has ended wretchedly no one calls happy.
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Must no one at all, then, be called happy while he lives; must we, as
Solon says, see the end? Even if we are to lay down this doctrine, is it
also the case that a man is happy when he is dead? Or is not this quite
absurd, especially for us who say that happiness is an activity? But if
we do not call the dead man happy, and if Solon does not mean this, but
that one can then safely call a man blessed as being at last beyond evils
and misfortunes, this also affords matter for discussion; for both evil
and good are thought to exist for a dead man, as much as for one who is
alive but not aware of them; e.g., honours and dishonours and the good
or bad fortunes of children and in general of descendants. And this also
presents a problem; for though a man has lived happily up to old age
and has had a death worthy of his life, many reverses may befall his
descendants—some of them may be good and attain the life they de-
serve, while with others the opposite may be the case; and clearly too
the degrees of relationship between them and their ancestors may vary
indefinitely. It would be odd, then, if the dead man were to share in these
changes and become at one time happy, at another wretched; while it
would also be odd if the fortunes of the descendants did not for some
time have some effect on the happiness of their ancestors.
But we must return to our first difficulty; for perhaps by a consider-
ation of it our present problem might be solved. Now if we must see the
end and only then call a man happy, not as being happy but as having
been so before, surely this is a paradox, that when he is happy the at-
tribute that belongs to him is not to be truly predicated of him because
we do not wish to call living men happy, on account of the changes that
may befall them, and because we have assumed happiness to be some-
thing permanent and by no means easily changed, while a single man
may suffer many turns of fortune’s wheel. For clearly if we were to keep
pace with his fortunes, we should often call the same man happy and
again wretched, making the happy man out to be chameleon and inse-
curely based. Or is this keeping pace with his fortunes quite wrong?
Success or failure in life does not depend on these, but human life, as we
said, needs these as mere additions, while virtuous activities or their
opposites are what constitute happiness or the reverse.16/Aristotle
The question we have now discussed confirms our definition. For
no function of man has so much permanence as virtuous activities (these
are thought to be more durable even than knowledge of the sciences),
and of these themselves the most valuable are more durable because
those who are happy spend their life most readily and most continuously
in these; for this seems to be the reason why we do not forget them. The
attribute in question, then, will belong to the happy man, and he will be
happy throughout his life; for always, or by preference to everything
else, he will be engaged in virtuous action and contemplation, and he
will bear the chances of life most nobly and altogether decorously, if he
is ‘truly good’ and ‘foursquare beyond reproach’.
Now many events happen by chance, and events differing in impor-
tance; small pieces of good fortune or of its opposite clearly do not
weigh down the scales of life one way or the other, but a multitude of
great events if they turn out well will make life happier (for not only are
they themselves such as to add beauty to life, but the way a man deals
with them may be noble and good), while if they turn out ill they crush
and maim happiness; for they both bring pain with them and hinder
many activities. Yet even in these nobility shines through, when a man
bears with resignation many great misfortunes, not through insensibil-
ity to pain but through nobility and greatness of soul.
If activities are, as we said, what gives life its character, no happy
man can become miserable; for he will never do the acts that are hateful
and mean. For the man who is truly good and wise, we think, bears all
the chances life becomingly and always makes the best of circumstances,
as a good general makes the best military use of the army at his com-
mand and a good shoemaker makes the best shoes out of the hides that
are given him; and so with all other craftsmen. And if this is the case,
the happy man can never become miserable; though he will not reach
blessedness, if he meet with fortunes like those of Priam.
Nor, again, is he many-coloured and changeable; for neither will he
be moved from his happy state easily or by any ordinary misadventures,
but only by many great ones, nor, if he has had many great misadven-
tures, will he recover his happiness in a short time, but if at all, only in
a long and complete one in which he has attained many splendid suc-
cesses.
When then should we not say that he is happy who is active in
accordance with complete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with exter-
nal goods, not for some chance period but throughout a complete life?Nicomachean Ethics/17
Or must we add ‘and who is destined to live thus and die as befits his
life’? Certainly the future is obscure to us, while happiness, we claim, is
an end and something in every way final. If so, we shall call happy those
among living men in whom these conditions are, and are to be, ful-
filled—but happy men. So much for these questions.
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That the fortunes of descendants and of all a man’s friends should not
affect his happiness at all seems a very unfriendly doctrine, and one
opposed to the opinions men hold; but since the events that happen are
numerous and admit of all sorts of difference, and some come more near
to us and others less so, it seems a long—nay, an infinite—task to dis-
cuss each in detail; a general outline will perhaps suffice. If, then, as
some of a man’s own misadventures have a certain weight and influence
on life while others are, as it were, lighter, so too there are differences
among the misadventures of our friends taken as a whole, and it makes
a difference whether the various suffering befall the living or the dead
(much more even than whether lawless and terrible deeds are presup-
posed in a tragedy or done on the stage), this difference also must be
taken into account; or rather, perhaps, the fact that doubt is felt whether
the dead share in any good or evil. For it seems, from these consider-
ations, that even if anything whether good or evil penetrates to them, it
must be something weak and negligible, either in itself or for them, or if
not, at least it must be such in degree and kind as not to make happy
those who are not happy nor to take away their blessedness from those
who are. The good or bad fortunes of friends, then, seem to have some
effects on the dead, but effects of such a kind and degree as neither to
make the happy unhappy nor to produce any other change of the kind.
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These questions having been definitely answered, let us consider whether
happiness is among the things that are praised or rather among the things
that are prized; for clearly it is not to be placed among potentialities.
Everything that is praised seems to be praised because it is of a certain
kind and is related somehow to something else; for we praise the just or
brave man and in general both the good man and virtue itself because of
the actions and functions involved, and we praise the strong man, the
good runner, and so on, because he is of a certain kind and is related in
a certain way to something good and important. This is clear also from18/Aristotle
the praises of the gods; for it seems absurd that the gods should be
referred to our standard, but this is done because praise involves a ref-
erence, to something else. But if if praise is for things such as we have
described, clearly what applies to the best things is not praise, but some-
thing greater and better, as is indeed obvious; for what we do to the gods
and the most godlike of men is to call them blessed and happy. And so
too with good things; no one praises happiness as he does justice, but
rather calls it blessed, as being something more divine and better.
Eudoxus also seems to have been right in his method of advocating
the supremacy of pleasure; he thought that the fact that, though a good,
it is not praised indicated it to be better than the things that are praised,
and that this is what God and the good are; for by reference to these all
other things are judged. Praise is appropriate to virtue, for as a result of
virtue men tend to do noble deeds, but encomia are bestowed on acts,
whether of the body or of the soul. But perhaps nicety in these matters is
more proper to those who have made a study of encomia; to us it is clear
from what has been said that happiness is among the things that are
prized and perfect. It seems to be so also from the fact that it is a first
principle; for it is for the sake of this that we all do all that we do, and
the first principle and cause of goods is, we claim, something prized and
divine.
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Since happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with perfect virtue,
we must consider the nature of virtue; for perhaps we shall thus see
better the nature of happiness. The true student of politics, too, is thought
to have studied virtue above all things; for he wishes to make his fellow
citizens good and obedient to the laws. As an example of this we have
the lawgivers of the Cretans and the Spartans, and any others of the
kind that there may have been. And if this inquiry belongs to political
science, clearly the pursuit of it will be in accordance with our original
plan. But clearly the virtue we must study is human virtue; for the good
we were seeking was human good and the happiness human happiness.
By human virtue we mean not that of the body but that of the soul; and
happiness also we call an activity of soul. But if this is so, clearly the
student of politics must know somehow the facts about soul, as the man
who is to heal the eyes or the body as a whole must know about the eyes
or the body; and all the more since politics is more prized and better
than medicine; but even among doctors the best educated spend muchNicomachean Ethics/19
labour on acquiring knowledge of the body. The student of politics,
then, must study the soul, and must study it with these objects in view,
and do so just to the extent which is sufficient for the questions we are
discussing; for further precision is perhaps something more laborious
than our purposes require.
Some things are said about it, adequately enough, even in the dis-
cussions outside our school, and we must use these; e.g., that one ele-
ment in the soul is irrational and one has a rational principle. Whether
these are separated as the parts of the body or of anything divisible are,
or are distinct by definition but by nature inseparable, like convex and
concave in the circumference of a circle, does not affect the present
question.
Of the irrational element one division seems to be widely distrib-
uted, and vegetative in its nature, I mean that which causes nutrition and
growth; for it is this kind of power of the soul that one must assign to all
nurslings and to embryos, and this same power to fullgrown creatures;
this is more reasonable than to assign some different power to them.
Now the excellence of this seems to be common to all species and not
specifically human; for this part or faculty seems to function most in
sleep, while goodness and badness are least manifest in sleep (whence
comes the saying that the happy are not better off than the wretched for
half their lives; and this happens naturally enough, since sleep is an
inactivity of the soul in that respect in which it is called good or bad),
unless perhaps to a small extent some of the movements actually pen-
etrate to the soul, and in this respect the dreams of good men are better
than those of ordinary people. Enough of this subject, however; let us
leave the nutritive faculty alone, since it has by its nature no share in
human excellence.
There seems to be also another irrational element in the soul-one
which in a sense, however, shares in a rational principle. For we praise
the rational principle of the continent man and of the incontinent, and
the part of their soul that has such a principle, since it urges them aright
and towards the best objects; but there is found in them also another
element naturally opposed to the rational principle, which fights against
and resists that principle. For exactly as paralysed limbs when we in-
tend to move them to the right turn on the contrary to the left, so is it
with the soul; the impulses of incontinent people move in contrary direc-
tions. But while in the body we see that which moves astray, in the soul
we do not. No doubt, however, we must none the less suppose that in the20/Aristotle
soul too there is something contrary to the rational principle, resisting
and opposing it. In what sense it is distinct from the other elements does
not concern us. Now even this seems to have a share in a rational prin-
ciple, as we said; at any rate in the continent man it obeys the rational
principle and presumably in the temperate and brave man it is still more
obedient; for in him it speaks, on all matters, with the same voice as the
rational principle.
Therefore the irrational element also appears to be two-fold. For
the vegetative element in no way shares in a rational principle, but the
appetitive and in general the desiring element in a sense shares in it, in
so far as it listens to and obeys it; this is the sense in which we speak of
‘taking account’ of one’s father or one’s friends, not that in which we
speak of ‘accounting for a mathematical property. That the irrational
element is in some sense persuaded by a rational principle is indicated
also by the giving of advice and by all reproof and exhortation. And if
this element also must be said to have a rational principle, that which
has a rational principle (as well as that which has not) will be twofold,
one subdivision having it in the strict sense and in itself, and the other
having a tendency to obey as one does one’s father.
Virtue too is distinguished into kinds in accordance with this differ-
ence; for we say that some of the virtues are intellectual and others
moral, philosophic wisdom and understanding and practical wisdom
being intellectual, liberality and temperance moral. For in speaking about
a man’s character we do not say that he is wise or has understanding but
that he is good-tempered or temperate; yet we praise the wise man also
with respect to his state of mind; and of states of mind we call those
which merit praise virtues.
BOOK II
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Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual vir-
tue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which
reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes about
as a result of habit, whence also its name (ethike) is one that is formed
by a slight variation from the word ethos (habit). From this it is also
plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing
that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. For in-
stance the stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be habitu-
ated to move upwards, not even if one tries to train it by throwing it upNicomachean Ethics/21
ten thousand times; nor can fire be habituated to move downwards, nor
can anything else that by nature behaves in one way be trained to be-
have in another. Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the
virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and
are made perfect by habit.
Again, of all the things that come to us by nature we first acquire
the potentiality and later exhibit the activity (this is plain in the case of
the senses; for it was not by often seeing or often hearing that we got
these senses, but on the contrary we had them before we used them, and
did not come to have them by using them); but the virtues we get by first
exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well. For the
things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them,
e.g., men become builders by building and lyreplayers by playing the
lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing tem-
perate acts, brave by doing brave acts.
This is confirmed by what happens in states; for legislators make
the citizens good by forming habits in them, and this is the wish of every
legislator, and those who do not effect it miss their mark, and it is in this
that a good constitution differs from a bad one.
Again, it is from the same causes and by the same means that every
virtue is both produced and destroyed, and similarly every art; for it is
from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyre-players are produced.
And the corresponding statement is true of builders and of all the rest;
men will be good or bad builders as a result of building well or badly.
For if this were not so, there would have been no need of a teacher, but
all men would have been born good or bad at their craft. This, then, is
the case with the virtues also; by doing the acts that we do in our trans-
actions with other men we become just or unjust, and by doing the acts
that we do in the presence of danger, and being habituated to feel fear or
confidence, we become brave or cowardly. The same is true of appetites
and feelings of anger; some men become temperate and good-tempered,
others self-indulgent and irascible, by behaving in one way or the other
in the appropriate circumstances. Thus, in one word, states of character
arise out of like activities. This is why the activities we exhibit must be
of a certain kind; it is because the states of character correspond to the
differences between these. It makes no small difference, then, whether
we form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it makes
a very great difference, or rather all the difference.22/Aristotle
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Since, then, the present inquiry does not aim at theoretical knowledge
like the others (for we are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is,
but in order to become good, since otherwise our inquiry would have
been of no use), we must examine the nature of actions, namely how we
ought to do them; for these determine also the nature of the states of
character that are produced, as we have said. Now, that we must act
according to the right rule is a common principle and must be assumed-
it will be discussed later, i.e., both what the right rule is, and how it is
related to the other virtues. But this must be agreed upon beforehand,
that the whole account of matters of conduct must be given in outline
and not precisely, as we said at the very beginning that the accounts we
demand must be in accordance with the subject-matter; matters con-
cerned with conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity,
any more than matters of health. The general account being of this na-
ture, the account of particular cases is yet more lacking in exactness; for
they do not fall under any art or precept but the agents themselves must
in each case consider what is appropriate to the occasion, as happens
also in the art of medicine or of navigation.
But though our present account is of this nature we must give what
help we can. First, then, let us consider this, that it is the nature of such
things to be destroyed by defect and excess, as we see in the case of
strength and of health (for to gain light on things imperceptible we must
use the evidence of sensible things); both excessive and defective exer-
cise destroys the strength, and similarly drink or food which is above or
below a certain amount destroys the health, while that which is propor-
tionate both produces and increases and preserves it. So too is it, then,
in the case of temperance and courage and the other virtues. For the
man who flies from and fears everything and does not stand his ground
against anything becomes a coward, and the man who fears nothing at
all but goes to meet every danger becomes rash; and similarly the man
who indulges in every pleasure and abstains from none becomes self-
indulgent, while the man who shuns every pleasure, as boors do, be-
comes in a way insensible; temperance and courage, then, are destroyed
by excess and defect, and preserved by the mean.
But not only are the sources and causes of their origination and
growth the same as those of their destruction, but also the sphere of
their actualization will be the same; for this is also true of the things
which are more evident to sense, e.g., of strength; it is produced byNicomachean Ethics/23
taking much food and undergoing much exertion, and it is the strong
man that will be most able to do these things. So too is it with the vir-
tues; by abstaining from pleasures we become temperate, and it is when
we have become so that we are most able to abstain from them; and
similarly too in the case of courage; for by being habituated to despise
things that are terrible and to stand our ground against them we become
brave, and it is when we have become so that we shall be most able to
stand our ground against them.
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We must take as a sign of states of character the pleasure or pain that
ensues on acts; for the man who abstains from bodily pleasures and
delights in this very fact is temperate, while the man who is annoyed at
it is self-indulgent, and he who stands his ground against things that are
terrible and delights in this or at least is not pained is brave, while the
man who is pained is a coward. For moral excellence is concerned with
pleasures and pains; it is on account of the pleasure that we do bad
things, and on account of the pain that we abstain from noble ones.
Hence we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our
very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be pained by the
things that we ought; for this is the right education.
Again, if the virtues are concerned with actions and passions, and
every passion and every action is accompanied by pleasure and pain,
for this reason also virtue will be concerned with pleasures and pains.
This is indicated also by the fact that punishment is inflicted by these
means; for it is a kind of cure, and it is the nature of cures to be effected
by contraries.
Again, as we said but lately, every state of soul has a nature relative
to and concerned with the kind of things by which it tends to be made
worse or better; but it is by reason of pleasures and pains that men
become bad, by pursuing and avoiding these—either the pleasures and
pains they ought not or when they ought not or as they ought not, or by
going wrong in one of the other similar ways that may be distinguished.
Hence men even define the virtues as certain states of impassivity and
rest; not well, however, because they speak absolutely, and do not say
‘as one ought’ and ‘as one ought not’ and ‘when one ought or ought
not,’ and the other things that may be added. We assume, then, that this
kind of excellence tends to do what is best with regard to pleasures and
pains, and vice does the contrary.24/Aristotle
The following facts also may show us that virtue and vice are con-
cerned with these same things. There being three objects of choice and
three of avoidance, the noble, the advantageous, the pleasant, and their
contraries, the base, the injurious, the painful, about all of these the
good man tends to go right and the bad man to go wrong, and especially
about pleasure; for this is common to the animals, and also it accompa-
nies all objects of choice; for even the noble and the advantageous ap-
pear pleasant.
Again, it has grown up with us all from our infancy; this is why it is
difficult to rub off this passion, engrained as it is in our life. And we
measure even our actions, some of us more and others less, by the rule
of pleasure and pain. For this reason, then, our whole inquiry must be
about these; for to feel delight and pain rightly or wrongly has no small
effect on our actions.
Again, it is harder to fight with pleasure than with anger, to use
Heraclitus’ phrase,’ but both art and virtue are always concerned with
what is harder; for even the good is better when it is harder. Therefore
for this reason also the whole concern both of virtue and of political
science is with pleasures and pains; for the man who uses these well will
be good, he who uses them badly bad.
That virtue, then, is concerned with pleasures and pains, and that
by the acts from which it arises it is both increased and, if they are done
differently, destroyed, and that the acts from which it arose are those in
which it actualizes itself—let this be taken as said.
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The question might be asked,; what we mean by saying that we must
become just by doing just acts, and temperate by doing temperate acts;
for if men do just and temperate acts, they are already just and temper-
ate, exactly as, if they do what is in accordance with the laws of gram-
mar and of music, they are grammarians and musicians.
Or is this not true even of the arts? It is possible to do something
that is in accordance with the laws of grammar, either by chance or at
the suggestion of another. A man will be a grammarian, then, only when
he has both done something grammatical and done it grammatically;
and this means doing it in accordance with the grammatical knowledge
in himself.
Again, the case of the arts and that of the virtues are not similar; for
the products of the arts have their goodness in themselves, so that it isNicomachean Ethics/25
enough that they should have a certain character, but if the acts that are
in accordance with the virtues have themselves a certain character it
does not follow that they are done justly or temperately. The agent also
must be in a certain condition when he does them; in the first place he
must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose
them for their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a
firm and unchangeable character. These are not reckoned in as condi-
tions of the possession of the arts, except the bare knowledge; but as a
condition of the possession of the virtues knowledge has little or no
weight, while the other conditions count not for a little but for every-
thing, i.e., the very conditions which result from often doing just and
temperate acts.
Actions, then, are called just and temperate when they are such as
the just or the temperate man would do; but it is not the man who does
these that is just and temperate, but the man who also does them as just
and temperate men do them. It is well said, then, that it is by doing just
acts that the just man is produced, and by doing temperate acts the
temperate man; without doing these no one would have even a prospect
of becoming good.
But most people do not do these, but take refuge in theory and think
they are being philosophers and will become good in this way, behaving
somewhat like patients who listen attentively to their doctors, but do
none of the things they are ordered to do. As the latter will not be made
well in body by such a course of treatment, the former will not be made
well in soul by such a course of philosophy.
5
Next we must consider what virtue is. Since things that are found in the
soul are of three kinds—passions, faculties, states of character, virtue
must be one of these. By passions I mean appetite, anger, fear, confi-
dence, envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and
in general the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure or pain; by
faculties the things in virtue of which we are said to be capable of feel-
ing these, e.g., of becoming angry or being pained or feeling pity; by
states of character the things in virtue of which we stand well or badly
with reference to the passions, e.g., with reference to anger we stand
badly if we feel it violently or too weakly, and well if we feel it moder-
ately; and similarly with reference to the other passions.
Now neither the virtues nor the vices are passions, because we are26/Aristotle
not called good or bad on the ground of our passions, but are so called
on the ground of our virtues and our vices, and because we are neither
praised nor blamed for our passions (for the man who feels fear or anger
is not praised, nor is the man who simply feels anger blamed, but the
man who feels it in a certain way), but for our virtues and our vices we
are praised or blamed.
Again, we feel anger and fear without choice, but the virtues are
modes of choice or involve choice. Further, in respect of the passions we
are said to be moved, but in respect of the virtues and the vices we are
said not to be moved but to be disposed in a particular way.
For these reasons also they are not faculties; for we are neither
called good nor bad, nor praised nor blamed, for the simple capacity of
feeling the passions; again, we have the faculties by nature, but we are
not made good or bad by nature; we have spoken of this before. If, then,
the virtues are neither passions nor faculties, all that remains is that they
should be states of character.
Thus we have stated what virtue is in respect of its genus.
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We must, however, not only describe virtue as a state of character, but
also say what sort of state it is. We may remark, then, that every virtue
or excellence both brings into good condition the thing of which it is the
excellence and makes the work of that thing be done well; e.g., the ex-
cellence of the eye makes both the eye and its work good; for it is by the
excellence of the eye that we see well. Similarly the excellence of the
horse makes a horse both good in itself and good at running and at
carrying its rider and at awaiting the attack of the enemy. Therefore, if
this is true in every case, the virtue of man also will be the state of
character which makes a man good and which makes him do his own
work well.
How this is to happen we have stated already, but it will be made
plain also by the following consideration of the specific nature of virtue.
In everything that is continuous and divisible it is possible to take more,
less, or an equal amount, and that either in terms of the thing itself or
relatively to us; and the equal is an intermediate between excess and
defect. By the intermediate in the object I mean that which is equidistant
from each of the extremes, which is one and the same for all men; by the
intermediate relatively to us that which is neither too much nor too little—
and this is not one, nor the same for all. For instance, if ten is many andNicomachean Ethics/27
two is few, six is the intermediate, taken in terms of the object; for it
exceeds and is exceeded by an equal amount; this is intermediate ac-
cording to arithmetical proportion. But the intermediate relatively to us
is not to be taken so; if ten pounds are too much for a particular person
to eat and two too little, it does not follow that the trainer will order six
pounds; for this also is perhaps too much for the person who is to take
it, or too little—too little for Milo, too much for the beginner in athletic
exercises. The same is true of running and wrestling. Thus a master of
any art avoids excess and defect, but seeks the intermediate and chooses
this—the intermediate not in the object but relatively to us.
If it is thus, then, that every art does its work well—by looking to
the intermediate and judgling its works by this standard (so that we
often say of good works of art that it is not possible either to take away
or to add anything, implying that excess and defect destroy the goodness
of works of art, while the mean preserves it; and good artists, as we say,
look to this in their work), and if, further, virtue is more exact and better
than any art, as nature also is, then virtue must have the quality of
aiming at the intermediate. I mean moral virtue; for it is this that is
concerned with passions and actions, and in these there is excess, de-
fect, and the intermediate. For instance, both fear and confidence and
appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt
both too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them
at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right
people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both inter-
mediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue. Similarly with
regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. Now
virtue is concerned with passions and actions, in which excess is a form
of failure, and so is defect, while the intermediate is praised and is a
form of success; and being praised and being successful are both char-
acteristics of virtue. Therefore virtue is a kind of mean, since, as we
have seen, it aims at what is intermediate.
Again, it is possible to fail in many ways (for evil belongs to the
class of the unlimited, as the Pythagoreans conjectured, and good to that
of the limited), while to succeed is possible only in one way (for which
reason also one is easy and the other difficult—to miss the mark easy, to
hit it difficult); for these reasons also, then, excess and defect are char-
acteristic of vice, and the mean of virtue;
For men are good in but one way, but bad in many.
Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a28/Aristotle
mean, i.e., the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational
principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom
would determine it. Now it is a mean between two vices, that which
depends on excess and that which depends on defect; and again it is a
mean because the vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is right
in both passions and actions, while virtue both finds and chooses that
which is intermediate. Hence in respect of its substance and the defini-
tion which states its essence virtue is a mean, with regard to what is best
and right an extreme.
But not every action nor every passion admits of a mean; for some
have names that already imply badness, e.g., spite, shamelessness, envy,
and in the case of actions adultery, theft, murder; for all of these and
suchlike things imply by their names that they are themselves bad, and
not the excesses or deficiencies of them. It is not possible, then, ever to
be right with regard to them; one must always be wrong. Nor does good-
ness or badness with regard to such things depend on committing adul-
tery with the right woman, at the right time, and in the right way, but
simply to do any of them is to go wrong. It would be equally absurd,
then, to expect that in unjust, cowardly, and voluptuous action there
should be a mean, an excess, and a deficiency; for at that rate there
would be a mean of excess and of deficiency, an excess of excess, and a
deficiency of deficiency. But as there is no excess and deficiency of
temperance and courage because what is intermediate is in a sense an
extreme, so too of the actions we have mentioned there is no mean nor
any excess and deficiency, but however they are done they are wrong;
for in general there is neither a mean of excess and deficiency, nor ex-
cess and deficiency of a mean.
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We must, however, not only make this general statement, but also apply
it to the individual facts. For among statements about conduct those
which are general apply more widely, but those which are particular are
more genuine, since conduct has to do with individual cases, and our
statements must harmonize with the facts in these cases. We may take
these cases from our table. With regard to feelings of fear and confi-
dence courage is the mean; of the people who exceed, he who exceeds in
fearlessness has no name (many of the states have no name), while the
man who exceeds in confidence is rash, and he who exceeds in fear and
falls short in confidence is a coward. With regard to pleasures and pains—Nicomachean Ethics/29
not all of them, and not so much with regard to the pains—the mean is
temperance, the excess self-indulgence. Persons deficient with regard to
the pleasures are not often found; hence such persons also have received
no name. But let us call them ‘insensible.’
With regard to giving and taking of money the mean is liberality, the
excess and the defect prodigality and meanness. In these actions people
exceed and fall short in contrary ways; the prodigal exceeds in spending
and falls short in taking, while the mean man exceeds in taking and falls
short in spending. (At present we are giving a mere outline or summary,
and are satisfied with this; later these states will be more exactly deter-
mined.) With regard to money there are also other dispositions—a mean,
magnificence (for the magnificent man differs from the liberal man; the
former deals with large sums, the latter with small ones), an excess,
tastelessness and vulgarity, and a deficiency, niggardliness; these differ
from the states opposed to liberality, and the mode of their difference
will be stated later. With regard to honour and dishonour the mean is
proper pride, the excess is known as a sort of ‘empty vanity,’ and the
deficiency is undue humility; and as we said liberality was related to
magnificence, differing from it by dealing with small sums, so there is a
state similarly related to proper pride, being concerned with small honours
while that is concerned with great. For it is possible to desire honour as
one ought, and more than one ought, and less, and the man who exceeds
in his desires is called ambitious, the man who falls short unambitious,
while the intermediate person has no name. The dispositions also are
nameless, except that that of the ambitious man is called ambition. Hence
the people who are at the extremes lay claim to the middle place; and we
ourselves sometimes call the intermediate person ambitious and some-
times unambitious, and sometimes praise the ambitious man and some-
times the unambitious. The reason of our doing this will be stated in
what follows; but now let us speak of the remaining states according to
the method which has been indicated.
With regard to anger also there is an excess, a deficiency, and a
mean. Although they can scarcely be said to have names, yet since we
call the intermediate person good-tempered let us call the mean good
temper; of the persons at the extremes let the one who exceeds be called
irascible, and his vice irascibility, and the man who falls short an
inirascible sort of person, and the deficiency inirascibility.
There are also three other means, which have a certain likeness to
one another, but differ from one another: for they are all concerned with30/Aristotle
intercourse in words and actions, but differ in that one is concerned with
truth in this sphere, the other two with pleasantness; and of this one kind
is exhibited in giving amusement, the other in all the circumstances of
life. We must therefore speak of these too, that we may the better see
that in all things the mean is praise-worthy, and the extremes neither
praiseworthy nor right, but worthy of blame. Now most of these states
also have no names, but we must try, as in the other cases, to invent
names ourselves so that we may be clear and easy to follow. With re-
gard to truth, then, the intermediate is a truthful sort of person and the
mean may be called truthfulness, while the pretence which exaggerates
is boastfulness and the person characterized by it a boaster, and that
which understates is mock modesty and the person characterized by it
mock-modest. With regard to pleasantness in the giving of amusement
the intermediate person is ready-witted and the disposition ready wit,
the excess is buffoonery and the person characterized by it a buffoon,
while the man who falls short is a sort of boor and his state is boorish-
ness. With regard to the remaining kind of pleasantness, that which is
exhibited in life in general, the man who is pleasant in the right way is
friendly and the mean is friendliness, while the man who exceeds is an
obsequious person if he has no end in view, a flatterer if he is aiming at
his own advantage, and the man who falls short and is unpleasant in all
circumstances is a quarrelsome and surly sort of person.
There are also means in the passions and concerned with the pas-
sions; since shame is not a virtue, and yet praise is extended to the
modest man. For even in these matters one man is said to be intermedi-
ate, and another to exceed, as for instance the bashful man who is ashamed
of everything; while he who falls short or is not ashamed of anything at
all is shameless, and the intermediate person is modest. Righteous in-
dignation is a mean between envy and spite, and these states are con-
cerned with the pain and pleasure that are felt at the fortunes of our
neighbours; the man who is characterized by righteous indignation is
pained at undeserved good fortune, the envious man, going beyond him,
is pained at all good fortune, and the spiteful man falls so far short of
being pained that he even rejoices. But these states there will be an
opportunity of describing elsewhere; with regard to justice, since it has
not one simple meaning, we shall, after describing the other states, dis-
tinguish its two kinds and say how each of them is a mean; and similarly
we shall treat also of the rational virtues.Nicomachean Ethics/31
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There are three kinds of disposition, then, two of them vices, involving
excess and deficiency respectively, and one a virtue, viz. the mean, and
all are in a sense opposed to all; for the extreme states are contrary both
to the intermediate state and to each other, and the intermediate to the
extremes; as the equal is greater relatively to the less, less relatively to
the greater, so the middle states are excessive relatively to the deficien-
cies, deficient relatively to the excesses, both in passions and in actions.
For the brave man appears rash relatively to the coward, and cowardly
relatively to the rash man; and similarly the temperate man appears self-
indulgent relatively to the insensible man, insensible relatively to the
self-indulgent, and the liberal man prodigal relatively to the mean man,
mean relatively to the prodigal. Hence also the people at the extremes
push the intermediate man each over to the other, and the brave man is
called rash by the coward, cowardly by the rash man, and correspond-
ingly in the other cases.
These states being thus opposed to one another, the greatest contra-
riety is that of the extremes to each other, rather than to the intermedi-
ate; for these are further from each other than from the intermediate, as
the great is further from the small and the small from the great than both
are from the equal. Again, to the intermediate some extremes show a
certain likeness, as that of rashness to courage and that of prodigality to
liberality; but the extremes show the greatest unlikeness to each other;
now contraries are defined as the things that are furthest from each
other, so that things that are further apart are more contrary.
To the mean in some cases the deficiency, in some the excess is
more opposed; e.g., it is not rashness, which is an excess, but coward-
ice, which is a deficiency, that is more opposed to courage, and not
insensibility, which is a deficiency, but self-indulgence, which is an ex-
cess, that is more opposed to temperance. This happens from two rea-
sons, one being drawn from the thing itself; for because one extreme is
nearer and liker to the intermediate, we oppose not this but rather its
contrary to the intermediate. E.g., since rashness is thought liker and
nearer to courage, and cowardice more unlike, we oppose rather the
latter to courage; for things that are further from the intermediate are
thought more contrary to it. This, then, is one cause, drawn from the
thing itself; another is drawn from ourselves; for the things to which we
ourselves more naturally tend seem more contrary to the intermediate.
For instance, we ourselves tend more naturally to pleasures, and hence32/Aristotle
are more easily carried away towards self-indulgence than towards pro-
priety. We describe as contrary to the mean, then, rather the directions
in which we more often go to great lengths; and therefore self-indul-
gence, which is an excess, is the more contrary to temperance.
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That moral virtue is a mean, then, and in what sense it is so, and that it
is a mean between two vices, the one involving excess, the other defi-
ciency, and that it is such because its character is to aim at what is
intermediate in passions and in actions, has been sufficiently stated.
Hence also it is no easy task to be good. For in everything it is no easy
task to find the middle, e.g., to find the middle of a circle is not for every
one but for him who knows; so, too, any one can get angry—that is
easy—or give or spend money; but to do this to the right person, to the
right extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in the right way,
that is not for every one, nor is it easy; wherefore goodness is both rare
and laudable and noble.
Hence he who aims at the intermediate must first depart from what
is the more contrary to it, as Calypso advises—
Hold the ship out beyond that surf and spray.
For of the extremes one is more erroneous, one less so; therefore,
since to hit the mean is hard in the extreme, we must as a second best, as
people say, take the least of the evils; and this will be done best in the
way we describe. But we must consider the things towards which we
ourselves also are easily carried away; for some of us tend to one thing,
some to another; and this will be recognizable from the pleasure and the
pain we feel. We must drag ourselves away to the contrary extreme; for
we shall get into the intermediate state by drawing well away from er-
ror, as people do in straightening sticks that are bent.
Now in everything the pleasant or pleasure is most to be guarded
against; for we do not judge it impartially. We ought, then, to feel to-
wards pleasure as the elders of the people felt towards Helen, and in all
circumstances repeat their saying; for if we dismiss pleasure thus we
are less likely to go astray. It is by doing this, then, (to sum the matter
up) that we shall best be able to hit the mean.
But this is no doubt difficult, and especially in individual cases; for
or is not easy to determine both how and with whom and on what provo-Nicomachean Ethics/33
cation and how long one should be angry; for we too sometimes praise
those who fall short and call them good-tempered, but sometimes we
praise those who get angry and call them manly. The man, however,
who deviates little from goodness is not blamed, whether he do so in the
direction of the more or of the less, but only the man who deviates more
widely; for he does not fail to be noticed. But up to what point and to
what extent a man must deviate before he becomes blameworthy it is
not easy to determine by reasoning, any more than anything else that is
perceived by the senses; such things depend on particular facts, and the
decision rests with perception. So much, then, is plain, that the interme-
diate state is in all things to be praised, but that we must incline some-
times towards the excess, sometimes towards the deficiency; for so shall
we most easily hit the mean and what is right.
BOOK III
1
Since virtue is concerned with passions and actions, and on voluntary
passions and actions praise and blame are bestowed, on those that are
involuntary pardon, and sometimes also pity, to distinguish the volun-
tary and the involuntary is presumably necessary for those who are
studying the nature of virtue, and useful also for legislators with a view
to the assigning both of honours and of punishments. Those things, then,
are thought-involuntary, which take place under compulsion or owing
to ignorance; and that is compulsory of which the moving principle is
outside, being a principle in which nothing is contributed by the person
who is acting or is feeling the passion, e.g., if he were to be carried
somewhere by a wind, or by men who had him in their power.
But with regard to the things that are done from fear of greater evils
or for some noble object (e.g., if a tyrant were to order one to do some-
thing base, having one’s parents and children in his power, and if one
did the action they were to be saved, but otherwise would be put to
death), it may be debated whether such actions are involuntary or vol-
untary. Something of the sort happens also with regard to the throwing
of goods overboard in a storm; for in the abstract no one throws goods
away voluntarily, but on condition of its securing the safety of himself
and his crew any sensible man does so. Such actions, then, are mixed,
but are more like voluntary actions; for they are worthy of choice at the
time when they are done, and the end of an action is relative to the
occasion. Both the terms, then, ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary,’ must be34/Aristotle
used with reference to the moment of action. Now the man acts volun-
tarily; for the principle that moves the instrumental parts of the body in
such actions is in him, and the things of which the moving principle is in
a man himself are in his power to do or not to do. Such actions, there-
fore, are voluntary, but in the abstract perhaps involuntary; for no one
would choose any such act in itself.
For such actions men are sometimes even praised, when they en-
dure something base or painful in return for great and noble objects
gained; in the opposite case they are blamed, since to endure the greatest
indignities for no noble end or for a trifling end is the mark of an inferior
person. On some actions praise indeed is not bestowed, but pardon is,
when one does what he ought not under pressure which overstrains hu-
man nature and which no one could withstand. But some acts, perhaps,
we cannot be forced to do, but ought rather to face death after the most
fearful sufferings; for the things that ‘forced’ Euripides Alcmaeon to
slay his mother seem absurd. It is difficult sometimes to determine what
should be chosen at what cost, and what should be endured in return for
what gain, and yet more difficult to abide by our decisions; for as a rule
what is expected is painful, and what we are forced to do is base, whence
praise and blame are bestowed on those who have been compelled or
have not.
What sort of acts, then, should be called compulsory? We answer
that without qualification actions are so when the cause is in the exter-
nal circumstances and the agent contributes nothing. But the things that
in themselves are involuntary, but now and in return for these gains are
worthy of choice, and whose moving principle is in the agent, are in
themselves involuntary, but now and in return for these gains voluntary.
They are more like voluntary acts; for actions are in the class of particu-
lars, and the particular acts here are voluntary. What sort of things are
to be chosen, and in return for what, it is not easy to state; for there are
many differences in the particular cases.
But if some one were to say that pleasant and noble objects have a
compelling power, forcing us from without, all acts would be for him
compulsory; for it is for these objects that all men do everything they
do. And those who act under compulsion and unwillingly act with pain,
but those who do acts for their pleasantness and nobility do them with
pleasure; it is absurd to make external circumstances responsible, and
not oneself, as being easily caught by such attractions, and to make
oneself responsible for noble acts but the pleasant objects responsibleNicomachean Ethics/35
for base acts. The compulsory, then, seems to be that whose moving
principle is outside, the person compelled contributing nothing.
Everything that is done by reason of ignorance is not voluntary; it is
only what produces pain and repentance that is involuntary. For the
man who has done something owing to ignorance, and feels not the least
vexation at his action, has not acted voluntarily, since he did not know
what he was doing, nor yet involuntarily, since he is not pained. Of
people, then, who act by reason of ignorance he who repents is thought
an involuntary agent, and the man who does not repent may, since he is
different, be called a not voluntary agent; for, since he differs from the
other, it is better that he should have a name of his own.
Acting by reason of ignorance seems also to be different from act-
ing in ignorance; for the man who is drunk or in a rage is thought to act
as a result not of ignorance but of one of the causes mentioned, yet not
knowingly but in ignorance.
Now every wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do and what
he ought to abstain from, and it is by reason of error of this kind that
men become unjust and in general bad; but the term ‘involuntary’ tends
to be used not if a man is ignorant of what is to his advantage—for it is
not mistaken purpose that causes involuntary action (it leads rather to
wickedness), nor ignorance of the universal (for that men are blamed),
but ignorance of particulars, i.e., of the circumstances of the action and
the objects with which it is concerned. For it is on these that both pity
and pardon depend, since the person who is ignorant of any of these acts
involuntarily.
Perhaps it is just as well, therefore, to determine their nature and
number. A man may be ignorant, then, of who he is, what he is doing,
what or whom he is acting on, and sometimes also what (e.g., what
instrument) he is doing it with, and to what end (e.g., he may think his
act will conduce to some one’s safety), and how he is doing it (e.g.,
whether gently or violently). Now of all of these no one could be igno-
rant unless he were mad, and evidently also he could not be ignorant of
the agent; for how could he not know himself? But of what he is doing a
man might be ignorant, as for instance people say ‘it slipped out of their
mouths as they were speaking,’ or ‘they did not know it was a secret,’ as
Aeschylus said of the mysteries, or a man might say he ‘let it go off
when he merely wanted to show its working,’ as the man did with the
catapult. Again, one might think one’s son was an enemy, as Merope
did, or that a pointed spear had a button on it, or that a stone was36/Aristotle
pumicestone; or one might give a man a draught to save him, and really
kill him; or one might want to touch a man, as people do in sparring, and
really wound him. The ignorance may relate, then, to any of these things,
i.e., of the circumstances of the action, and the man who was ignorant of
any of these is thought to have acted involuntarily, and especially if he
was ignorant on the most important points; and these are thought to be
the circumstances of the action and its end. Further, the doing of an act
that is called involuntary in virtue of ignorance of this sort must be
painful and involve repentance.
Since that which is done under compulsion or by reason of igno-
rance is involuntary, the voluntary would seem to be that of which the
moving principle is in the agent himself, he being aware of the particu-
lar circumstances of the action. Presumably acts done by reason of an-
ger or appetite are not rightly called involuntary. For in the first place,
on that showing none of the other animals will act voluntarily, nor will
children; and secondly, is it meant that we do not do voluntarily any of
the acts that are due to appetite or anger, or that we do the noble acts
voluntarily and the base acts involuntarily? Is not this absurd, when one
and the same thing is the cause? But it would surely be odd to describe
as involuntary the things one ought to desire; and we ought both to be
angry at certain things and to have an appetite for certain things, e.g.,
for health and for learning. Also what is involuntary is thought to be
painful, but what is in accordance with appetite is thought to be pleas-
ant. Again, what is the difference in respect of involuntariness between
errors committed upon calculation and those committed in anger? Both
are to be avoided, but the irrational passions are thought not less human
than reason is, and therefore also the actions which proceed from anger
or appetite are the man’s actions. It would be odd, then, to treat them as
involuntary.
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Both the voluntary and the involuntary having been delimited, we must
next discuss choice; for it is thought to be most closely bound up with
virtue and to discriminate characters better than actions do.
Choice, then, seems to be voluntary, but not the same thing as the
voluntary; the latter extends more widely. For both children and the
lower animals share in voluntary action, but not in choice, and acts done
on the spur of the moment we describe as voluntary, but not as chosen.
Those who say it is appetite or anger or wish or a kind of opinion doNicomachean Ethics/37
not seem to be right. For choice is not common to irrational creatures as
well, but appetite and anger are. Again, the incontinent man acts with
appetite, but not with choice; while the continent man on the contrary
acts with choice, but not with appetite. Again, appetite is contrary to
choice, but not appetite to appetite. Again, appetite relates to the pleas-
ant and the painful, choice neither to the painful nor to the pleasant.
Still less is it anger; for acts due to anger are thought to be less than
any others objects of choice.
But neither is it wish, though it seems near to it; for choice cannot
relate to impossibles, and if any one said he chose them he would be
thought silly; but there may be a wish even for impossibles, e.g., for
immortality. And wish may relate to things that could in no way be
brought about by one’s own efforts, e.g., that a particular actor or ath-
lete should win in a competition; but no one chooses such things, but
only the things that he thinks could be brought about by his own efforts.
Again, wish relates rather to the end, choice to the means; for instance,
we wish to be healthy, but we choose the acts which will make us healthy,
and we wish to be happy and say we do, but we cannot well say we
choose to be so; for, in general, choice seems to relate to the things that
are in our own power.
For this reason, too, it cannot be opinion; for opinion is thought to
relate to all kinds of things, no less to eternal things and impossible
things than to things in our own power; and it is distinguished by its
falsity or truth, not by its badness or goodness, while choice is distin-
guished rather by these.
Now with opinion in general perhaps no one even says it is identi-
cal. But it is not identical even with any kind of opinion; for by choosing
what is good or bad we are men of a certain character, which we are not
by holding certain opinions. And we choose to get or avoid something
good or bad, but we have opinions about what a thing is or whom it is
good for or how it is good for him; we can hardly be said to opine to get
or avoid anything. And choice is praised for being related to the right
object rather than for being rightly related to it, opinion for being truly
related to its object. And we choose what we best know to be good, but
we opine what we do not quite know; and it is not the same people that
are thought to make the best choices and to have the best opinions, but
some are thought to have fairly good opinions, but by reason of vice to
choose what they should not. If opinion precedes choice or accompanies
it, that makes no difference; for it is not this that we are considering, but38/Aristotle
whether it is identical with some kind of opinion.
What, then, or what kind of thing is it, since it is none of the things
we have mentioned? It seems to be voluntary, but not all that is volun-
tary to be an object of choice. Is it, then, what has been decided on by
previous deliberation? At any rate choice involves a rational principle
and thought. Even the name seems to suggest that it is what is chosen
before other things.
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Do we deliberate about everything, and is everything a possible subject
of deliberation, or is deliberation impossible about some things? We
ought presumably to call not what a fool or a madman would deliberate
about, but what a sensible man would deliberate about, a subject of
deliberation. Now about eternal things no one deliberates, e.g., about
the material universe or the incommensurability of the diagonal and the
side of a square. But no more do we deliberate about the things that
involve movement but always happen in the same way, whether of ne-
cessity or by nature or from any other cause, e.g., the solstices and the
risings of the stars; nor about things that happen now in one way, now in
another, e.g., droughts and rains; nor about chance events, like the find-
ing of treasure. But we do not deliberate even about all human affairs;
for instance, no Spartan deliberates about the best constitution for the
Scythians. For none of these things can be brought about by our own
efforts.
We deliberate about things that are in our power and can be done;
and these are in fact what is left. For nature, necessity, and chance are
thought to be causes, and also reason and everything that depends on
man. Now every class of men deliberates about the things that can be
done by their own efforts. And in the case of exact and self-contained
sciences there is no deliberation, e.g., about the letters of the alphabet
(for we have no doubt how they should be written); but the things that
are brought about by our own efforts, but not always in the same way,
are the things about which we deliberate, e.g., questions of medical treat-
ment or of money-making. And we do so more in the case of the art of
navigation than in that of gymnastics, inasmuch as it has been less ex-
actly worked out, and again about other things in the same ratio, and
more also in the case of the arts than in that of the sciences; for we have
more doubt about the former. Deliberation is concerned with things that
happen in a certain way for the most part, but in which the event isNicomachean Ethics/39
obscure, and with things in which it is indeterminate. We call in others
to aid us in deliberation on important questions, distrusting ourselves as
not being equal to deciding.
We deliberate not about ends but about means. For a doctor does
not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall per-
suade, nor a statesman whether he shall produce law and order, nor does
any one else deliberate about his end. They assume the end and consider
how and by what means it is to be attained; and if it seems to be pro-
duced by several means they consider by which it is most easily and best
produced, while if it is achieved by one only they consider how it will be
achieved by this and by what means this will be achieved, till they come
to the first cause, which in the order of discovery is last. For the person
who deliberates seems to investigate and analyse in the way described
as though he were analysing a geometrical construction (not all investi-
gation appears to be deliberation—for instance mathematical investiga-
tions—but all deliberation is investigation), and what is last in the order
of analysis seems to be first in the order of becoming. And if we come
on an impossibility, we give up the search, e.g., if we need money and
this cannot be got; but if a thing appears possible we try to do it. By
‘possible’ things I mean things that might be brought about by our own
efforts; and these in a sense include things that can be brought about by
the efforts of our friends, since the moving principle is in ourselves. The
subject of investigation is sometimes the instruments, sometimes the use
of them; and similarly in the other cases—sometimes the means, some-
times the mode of using it or the means of bringing it about. It seems,
then, as has been said, that man is a moving principle of actions; now
deliberation is about the things to be done by the agent himself, and
actions are for the sake of things other than themselves. For the end
cannot be a subject of deliberation, but only the means; nor indeed can
the particular facts be a subject of it, as whether this is bread or has
been baked as it should; for these are matters of perception. If we are to
be always deliberating, we shall have to go on to infinity.
The same thing is deliberated upon and is chosen, except that the
object of choice is already determinate, since it is that which has been
decided upon as a result of deliberation that is the object of choice. For
every one ceases to inquire how he is to act when he has brought the
moving principle back to himself and to the ruling part of himself; for
this is what chooses. This is plain also from the ancient constitutions,
which Homer represented; for the kings announced their choices to the40/Aristotle
people. The object of choice being one of the things in our own power
which is desired after deliberation, choice will be deliberate desire of
things in our own power; for when we have decided as a result of delib-
eration, we desire in accordance with our deliberation.
We may take it, then, that we have described choice in outline, and
stated the nature of its objects and the fact that it is concerned with
means.
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That wish is for the end has already been stated; some think it is for the
good, others for the apparent good. Now those who say that the good is
the object of wish must admit in consequence that that which the man
who does not choose aright wishes for is not an object of wish (for if it
is to be so, it must also be good; but it was, if it so happened, bad); while
those who say the apparent good is the object of wish must admit that
there is no natural object of wish, but only what seems good to each
man. Now different things appear good to different people, and, if it so
happens, even contrary things.
If these consequences are unpleasing, are we to say that absolutely
and in truth the good is the object of wish, but for each person the
apparent good; that that which is in truth an object of wish is an object
of wish to the good man, while any chance thing may be so the bad man,
as in the case of bodies also the things that are in truth wholesome are
wholesome for bodies which are in good condition, while for those that
are diseased other things are wholesome—or bitter or sweet or hot or
heavy, and so on; since the good man judges each class of things rightly,
and in each the truth appears to him? For each state of character has its
own ideas of the noble and the pleasant, and perhaps the good man
differs from others most by seeing the truth in each class of things,
being as it were the norm and measure of them. In most things the error
seems to be due to pleasure; for it appears a good when it is not. We
therefore choose the pleasant as a good, and avoid pain as an evil.
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The end, then, being what we wish for, the means what we deliberate
about and choose, actions concerning means must be according to choice
and voluntary. Now the exercise of the virtues is concerned with means.
Therefore virtue also is in our own power, and so too vice. For where it
is in our power to act it is also in our power not to act, and vice versa; soNicomachean Ethics/41
that, if to act, where this is noble, is in our power, not to act, which will
be base, will also be in our power, and if not to act, where this is noble,
is in our power, to act, which will be base, will also be in our power.
Now if it is in our power to do noble or base acts, and likewise in our
power not to do them, and this was what being good or bad meant, then
it is in our power to be virtuous or vicious.
The saying that ‘no one is voluntarily wicked nor involuntarily happy’
seems to be partly false and partly true; for no one is involuntarily happy,
but wickedness is voluntary. Or else we shall have to dispute what has
just been said, at any rate, and deny that man is a moving principle or
begetter of his actions as of children. But if these facts are evident and
we cannot refer actions to moving principles other than those in our-
selves, the acts whose moving principles are in us must themselves also
be in our power and voluntary.
Witness seems to be borne to this both by individuals in their pri-
vate capacity and by legislators themselves; for these punish and take
vengeance on those who do wicked acts (unless they have acted under
compulsion or as a result of ignorance for which they are not themselves
responsible), while they honour those who do noble acts, as though they
meant to encourage the latter and deter the former. But no one is encour-
aged to do the things that are neither in our power nor voluntary; it is
assumed that there is no gain in being persuaded not to be hot or in pain
or hungry or the like, since we shall experience these feelings none the
less. Indeed, we punish a man for his very ignorance, if he is thought
responsible for the ignorance, as when penalties are doubled in the case
of drunkenness; for the moving principle is in the man himself, since he
had the power of not getting drunk and his getting drunk was the cause
of his ignorance. And we punish those who are ignorant of anything in
the laws that they ought to know and that is not difficult, and so too in
the case of anything else that they are thought to be ignorant of through
carelessness; we assume that it is in their power not to be ignorant, since
they have the power of taking care.
But perhaps a man is the kind of man not to take care. Still they are
themselves by their slack lives responsible for becoming men of that
kind, and men make themselves responsible for being unjust or self-
indulgent, in the one case by cheating and in the other by spending their
time in drinking bouts and the like; for it is activities exercised on par-
ticular objects that make the corresponding character. This is plain from
the case of people training for any contest or action; they practise the42/Aristotle
activity the whole time. Now not to know that it is from the exercise of
activities on particular objects that states of character are produced is
the mark of a thoroughly senseless person. Again, it is irrational to sup-
pose that a man who acts unjustly does not wish to be unjust or a man
who acts self-indulgently to be self-indulgent. But if without being igno-
rant a man does the things which will make him unjust, he will be unjust
voluntarily. Yet it does not follow that if he wishes he will cease to be
unjust and will be just. For neither does the man who is ill become well
on those terms. We may suppose a case in which he is ill voluntarily,
through living incontinently and disobeying his doctors. In that case it
was then open to him not to be ill, but not now, when he has thrown
away his chance, just as when you have let a stone go it is too late to
recover it; but yet it was in your power to throw it, since the moving
principle was in you. So, too, to the unjust and to the self-indulgent man
it was open at the beginning not to become men of this kind, and so they
are unjust and selfindulgent voluntarily; but now that they have become
so it is not possible for them not to be so.
But not only are the vices of the soul voluntary, but those of the
body also for some men, whom we accordingly blame; while no one
blames those who are ugly by nature, we blame those who are so owing
to want of exercise and care. So it is, too, with respect to weakness and
infirmity; no one would reproach a man blind from birth or by disease
or from a blow, but rather pity him, while every one would blame a man
who was blind from drunkenness or some other form of self-indulgence.
Of vices of the body, then, those in our own power are blamed, those not
in our power are not. And if this be so, in the other cases also the vices
that are blamed must be in our own power.
Now some one may say that all men desire the apparent good, but
have no control over the appearance, but the end appears to each man in
a form answering to his character. We reply that if each man is some-
how responsible for his state of mind, he will also be himself somehow
responsible for the appearance; but if not, no one is responsible for his
own evildoing, but every one does evil acts through ignorance of the
end, thinking that by these he will get what is best, and the aiming at the
end is not self-chosen but one must be born with an eye, as it were, by
which to judge rightly and choose what is truly good, and he is well
endowed by nature who is well endowed with this. For it is what is
greatest and most noble, and what we cannot get or learn from another,
but must have just such as it was when given us at birth, and to be wellNicomachean Ethics/43
and nobly endowed with this will be perfect and true excellence of natu-
ral endowment. If this is true, then, how will virtue be more voluntary
than vice? To both men alike, the good and the bad, the end appears and
is fixed by nature or however it may be, and it is by referring everything
else to this that men do whatever they do.
Whether, then, it is not by nature that the end appears to each man
such as it does appear, but something also depends on him, or the end is
natural but because the good man adopts the means voluntarily virtue is
voluntary, vice also will be none the less voluntary; for in the case of the
bad man there is equally present that which depends on himself in his
actions even if not in his end. If, then, as is asserted, the virtues are
voluntary (for we are ourselves somehow partly responsible for our
states of character, and it is by being persons of a certain kind that we
assume the end to be so and so), the vices also will be voluntary; for the
same is true of them.
With regard to the virtues in general we have stated their genus in
outline, viz. that they are means and that they are states of character,
and that they tend, and by their own nature, to the doing of the acts by
which they are produced, and that they are in our power and voluntary,
and act as the right rule prescribes. But actions and states of character
are not voluntary in the same way; for we are masters of our actions
from the beginning right to the end, if we know the particular facts, but
though we control the beginning of our states of character the gradual
progress is not obvious any more than it is in illnesses; because it was in
our power, however, to act in this way or not in this way, therefore the
states are voluntary.
Let us take up the several virtues, however, and say which they are
and what sort of things they are concerned with and how they are con-
cerned with them; at the same time it will become plain how many they
are. And first let us speak of courage.
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That it is a mean with regard to feelings of fear and confidence has
already been made evident; and plainly the things we fear are terrible
things, and these are, to speak without qualification, evils; for which
reason people even define fear as expectation of evil. Now we fear all
evils, e.g., disgrace, poverty, disease, friendlessness, death, but the brave
man is not thought to be concerned with all; for to fear some things is
even right and noble, and it is base not to fear them—e.g., disgrace; he44/Aristotle
who fears this is good and modest, and he who does not is shameless. He
is, however, by some people called brave, by a transference of the word
to a new meaning; for he has in him something which is like the brave
man, since the brave man also is a fearless person. Poverty and disease
we perhaps ought not to fear, nor in general the things that do not pro-
ceed from vice and are not due to a man himself. But not even the man
who is fearless of these is brave. Yet we apply the word to him also in
virtue of a similarity; for some who in the dangers of war are cowards
are liberal and are confident in face of the loss of money. Nor is a man
a coward if he fears insult to his wife and children or envy or anything
of the kind; nor brave if he is confident when he is about to be flogged.
With what sort of terrible things, then, is the brave man concerned?
Surely with the greatest; for no one is more likely than he to stand his
ground against what is awe-inspiring. Now death is the most terrible of
all things; for it is the end, and nothing is thought to be any longer either
good or bad for the dead. But the brave man would not seem to be
concerned even with death in all circumstances, e.g., at sea or in dis-
ease. In what circumstances, then? Surely in the noblest. Now such
deaths are those in battle; for these take place in the greatest and noblest
danger. And these are correspondingly honoured in city-states and at the
courts of monarchs. Properly, then, he will be called brave who is fear-
less in face of a noble death, and of all emergencies that involve death;
and the emergencies of war are in the highest degree of this kind. Yet at
sea also, and in disease, the brave man is fearless, but not in the same
way as the seaman; for he has given up hope of safety, and is disliking
the thought of death in this shape, while they are hopeful because of
their experience. At the same time, we show courage in situations where
there is the opportunity of showing prowess or where death is noble; but
in these forms of death neither of these conditions is fulfilled.
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What is terrible is not the same for all men; but we say there are things
terrible even beyond human strength. These, then, are terrible to every
one—at least to every sensible man; but the terrible things that are not
beyond human strength differ in magnitude and degree, and so too do
the things that inspire confidence. Now the brave man is as dauntless as
man may be. Therefore, while he will fear even the things that are not
beyond human strength, he will face them as he ought and as the rule
directs, for honour’s sake; for this is the end of virtue. But it is possibleNicomachean Ethics/45
to fear these more, or less, and again to fear things that are not terrible
as if they were. Of the faults that are committed one consists in fearing
what one should not, another in fearing as we should not, another in
fearing when we should not, and so on; and so too with respect to the
things that inspire confidence. The man, then, who faces and who fears
the right things and from the right motive, in the right way and from the
right time, and who feels confidence under the corresponding condi-
tions, is brave; for the brave man feels and acts according to the merits
of the case and in whatever way the rule directs. Now the end of every
activity is conformity to the corresponding state of character. This is
true, therefore, of the brave man as well as of others. But courage is
noble. Therefore the end also is noble; for each thing is defined by its
end. Therefore it is for a noble end that the brave man endures and acts
as courage directs.
Of those who go to excess he who exceeds in fearlessness has no
name (we have said previously that many states of character have no
names), but he would be a sort of madman or insensible person if he
feared nothing, neither earthquakes nor the waves, as they say the Celts
do not; while the man who exceeds in confidence about what really is
terrible is rash. The rash man, however, is also thought to be boastful
and only a pretender to courage; at all events, as the brave man is with
regard to what is terrible, so the rash man wishes to appear; and so he
imitates him in situations where he can. Hence also most of them are a
mixture of rashness and cowardice; for, while in these situations they
display confidence, they do not hold their ground against what is really
terrible. The man who exceeds in fear is a coward; for he fears both
what he ought not and as he ought not, and all the similar characteriza-
tions attach to him. He is lacking also in confidence; but he is more
conspicuous for his excess of fear in painful situations. The coward,
then, is a despairing sort of person; for he fears everything. The brave
man, on the other hand, has the opposite disposition; for confidence is
the mark of a hopeful disposition. The coward, the rash man, and the
brave man, then, are concerned with the same objects but are differently
disposed towards them; for the first two exceed and fall short, while the
third holds the middle, which is the right, position; and rash men are
precipitate, and wish for dangers beforehand but draw back when they
are in them, while brave men are keen in the moment of action, but quiet
beforehand.
As we have said, then, courage is a mean with respect to things that46/Aristotle
inspire confidence or fear, in the circumstances that have been stated;
and it chooses or endures things because it is noble to do so, or because
it is base not to do so. But to die to escape from poverty or love or
anything painful is not the mark of a brave man, but rather of a coward;
for it is softness to fly from what is troublesome, and such a man en-
dures death not because it is noble but to fly from evil.
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Courage, then, is something of this sort, but the name is also applied to
five other kinds.
First comes the courage of the citizen-soldier; for this is most like
true courage. Citizen-soldiers seem to face dangers because of the pen-
alties imposed by the laws and the reproaches they would otherwise
incur, and because of the honours they win by such action; and therefore
those peoples seem to be bravest among whom cowards are held in
dishonour and brave men in honour. This is the kind of courage that
Homer depicts, e.g., in Diomede and in Hector:
First will Polydamas be to heap reproach on me then; and
For Hector one day ‘mid the Trojans shall utter his vaulting harangue:
Afraid was Tydeides, and fled from my face.
This kind of courage is most like to that which we described earlier,
because it is due to virtue; for it is due to shame and to desire of a noble
object (i.e., honour) and avoidance of disgrace, which is ignoble. One
might rank in the same class even those who are compelled by their
rulers; but they are inferior, inasmuch as they do what they do not from
shame but from fear, and to avoid not what is disgraceful but what is
painful; for their masters compel them, as Hector does:
But if I shall spy any dastard that cowers far from the fight,
Vainly will such an one hope to escape from the dogs.
And those who give them their posts, and beat them if they retreat,
do the same, and so do those who draw them up with trenches or some-
thing of the sort behind them; all of these apply compulsion. But one
ought to be brave not under compulsion but because it is noble to be so.
(2) Experience with regard to particular facts is also thought to be
courage; this is indeed the reason why Socrates thought courage wasNicomachean Ethics/47
knowledge. Other people exhibit this quality in other dangers, and pro-
fessional soldiers exhibit it in the dangers of war; for there seem to be
many empty alarms in war, of which these have had the most compre-
hensive experience; therefore they seem brave, because the others do
not know the nature of the facts. Again, their experience makes them
most capable in attack and in defence, since they can use their arms and
have the kind that are likely to be best both for attack and for defence;
therefore they fight like armed men against unarmed or like trained ath-
letes against amateurs; for in such contests too it is not the bravest men
that fight best, but those who are strongest and have their bodies in the
best condition. Professional soldiers turn cowards, however, when the
danger puts too great a strain on them and they are inferior in numbers
and equipment; for they are the first to fly, while citizen-forces die at
their posts, as in fact happened at the temple of Hermes. For to the latter
flight is disgraceful and death is preferable to safety on those terms;
while the former from the very beginning faced the danger on the as-
sumption that they were stronger, and when they know the facts they fly,
fearing death more than disgrace; but the brave man is not that sort of
person.
(3) Passion also is sometimes reckoned as courage; those who act
from passion, like wild beasts rushing at those who have wounded them,
are thought to be brave, because brave men also are passionate; for
passion above all things is eager to rush on danger, and hence Homer’s
‘put strength into his passion’ and ‘aroused their spirit and passion and
‘hard he breathed panting’ and ‘his blood boiled’. For all such expres-
sions seem to indicate the stirring and onset of passion. Now brave men
act for honour’s sake, but passion aids them; while wild beasts act un-
der the influence of pain; for they attack because they have been wounded
or because they are afraid, since if they are in a forest they do not come
near one. Thus they are not brave because, driven by pain and passion,
they rush on danger without foreseeing any of the perils, since at that
rate even asses would be brave when they are hungry; for blows will not
drive them from their food; and lust also makes adulterers do many
daring things. (Those creatures are not brave, then, which are driven on
to danger by pain or passion.) The ‘courage’ that is due to passion
seems to be the most natural, and to be courage if choice and motive be
added.
Men, then, as well as beasts, suffer pain when they are angry, and
are pleased when they exact their revenge; those who fight for these48/Aristotle
reasons, however, are pugnacious but not brave; for they do not act for
honour’s sake nor as the rule directs, but from strength of feeling; they
have, however, something akin to courage.
(4) Nor are sanguine people brave; for they are confident in danger
only because they have conquered often and against many foes. Yet they
closely resemble brave men, because both are confident; but brave men
are confident for the reasons stated earlier, while these are so because
they think they are the strongest and can suffer nothing. (Drunken men
also behave in this way; they become sanguine). When their adventures
do not succeed, however, they run away; but it was the mark of a brave
man to face things that are, and seem, terrible for a man, because it is
noble to do so and disgraceful not to do so. Hence also it is thought the
mark of a braver man to be fearless and undisturbed in sudden alarms
than to be so in those that are foreseen; for it must have proceeded more
from a state of character, because less from preparation; acts that are
foreseen may be chosen by calculation and rule, but sudden actions
must be in accordance with one’s state of character.
(5) People who are ignorant of the danger also appear brave, and
they are not far removed from those of a sanguine temper, but are infe-
rior inasmuch as they have no self-reliance while these have. Hence also
the sanguine hold their ground for a time; but those who have been
deceived about the facts fly if they know or suspect that these are differ-
ent from what they supposed, as happened to the Argives when they fell
in with the Spartans and took them for Sicyonians.
We have, then, described the character both of brave men and of
those who are thought to be brave.
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Though courage is concerned with feelings of confidence and of fear, it
is not concerned with both alike, but more with the things that inspire
fear; for he who is undisturbed in face of these and bears himself as he
should towards these is more truly brave than the man who does so
towards the things that inspire confidence. It is for facing what is pain-
ful, then, as has been said, that men are called brave. Hence also cour-
age involves pain, and is justly praised; for it is harder to face what is
painful than to abstain from what is pleasant.
Yet the end which courage sets before it would seem to be pleasant,
but to be concealed by the attending circumstances, as happens also in
athletic contests; for the end at which boxers aim is pleasant—the crownNicomachean Ethics/49
and the honours—but the blows they take are distressing to flesh and
blood, and painful, and so is their whole exertion; and because the blows
and the exertions are many the end, which is but small, appears to have
nothing pleasant in it. And so, if the case of courage is similar, death
and wounds will be painful to the brave man and against his will, but he
will face them because it is noble to do so or because it is base not to do
so. And the more he is possessed of virtue in its entirety and the happier
he is, the more he will be pained at the thought of death; for life is best
worth living for such a man, and he is knowingly losing the greatest
goods, and this is painful. But he is none the less brave, and perhaps all
the more so, because he chooses noble deeds of war at that cost. It is not
the case, then, with all the virtues that the exercise of them is pleasant,
except in so far as it reaches its end. But it is quite possible that the best
soldiers may be not men of this sort but those who are less brave but
have no other good; for these are ready to face danger, and they sell their
life for trifling gains.
So much, then, for courage; it is not difficult to grasp its nature in
outline, at any rate, from what has been said.
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After courage let us speak of temperance; for these seem to be the vir-
tues of the irrational parts. We have said that temperance is a mean with
regard to pleasures (for it is less, and not in the same way, concerned
with pains); self-indulgence also is manifested in the same sphere. Now,
therefore, let us determine with what sort of pleasures they are con-
cerned. We may assume the distinction between bodily pleasures and
those of the soul, such as love of honour and love of learning; for the
lover of each of these delights in that of which he is a lover, the body
being in no way affected, but rather the mind; but men who are con-
cerned with such pleasures are called neither temperate nor self-indul-
gent. Nor, again, are those who are concerned with the other pleasures
that are not bodily; for those who are fond of hearing and telling stories
and who spend their days on anything that turns up are called gossips,
but not self-indulgent, nor are those who are pained at the loss of money
or of friends.
Temperance must be concerned with bodily pleasures, but not all
even of these; for those who delight in objects of vision, such as colours
and shapes and painting, are called neither temperate nor self-indulgent;
yet it would seem possible to delight even in these either as one should50/Aristotle
or to excess or to a deficient degree.
And so too is it with objects of hearing; no one calls those who
delight extravagantly in music or acting self-indulgent, nor those who
do so as they ought temperate.
Nor do we apply these names to those who delight in odour, unless
it be incidentally; we do not call those self-indulgent who delight in the
odour of apples or roses or incense, but rather those who delight in the
odour of unguents or of dainty dishes; for self-indulgent people delight
in these because these remind them of the objects of their appetite. And
one may see even other people, when they are hungry, delighting in the
smell of food; but to delight in this kind of thing is the mark of the self-
indulgent man; for these are objects of appetite to him.
Nor is there in animals other than man any pleasure connected with
these senses, except incidentally. For dogs do not delight in the scent of
hares, but in the eating of them, but the scent told them the hares were
there; nor does the lion delight in the lowing of the ox, but in eating it;
but he perceived by the lowing that it was near, and therefore appears to
delight in the lowing; and similarly he does not delight because he sees
‘a stag or a wild goat,’ but because he is going to make a meal of it.
Temperance and self-indulgence, however, are concerned with the kind
of pleasures that the other animals share in, which therefore appear
slavish and brutish; these are touch and taste. But even of taste they
appear to make little or no use; for the business of taste is the discrimi-
nating of flavours, which is done by winetasters and people who season
dishes; but they hardly take pleasure in making these discriminations, or
at least self-indulgent people do not, but in the actual enjoyment, which
in all cases comes through touch, both in the case of food and in that of
drink and in that of sexual intercourse. This is why a certain gourmand
prayed that his throat might become longer than a crane’s, implying that
it was the contact that he took pleasure in. Thus the sense with which
self-indulgence is connected is the most widely shared of the senses; and
self-indulgence would seem to be justly a matter of reproach, because it
attaches to us not as men but as animals. To delight in such things, then,
and to love them above all others, is brutish. For even of the pleasures
of touch the most liberal have been eliminated, e.g., those produced in
the gymnasium by rubbing and by the consequent heat; for the contact
characteristic of the self-indulgent man does not affect the whole body
but only certain parts.Nicomachean Ethics/51
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Of the appetites some seem to be common, others to be peculiar to indi-
viduals and acquired; e.g., the appetite for food is natural, since every
one who is without it craves for food or drink, and sometimes for both,
and for love also (as Homer says) if he is young and lusty; but not every
one craves for this or that kind of nourishment or love, nor for the same
things. Hence such craving appears to be our very own. Yet it has of
course something natural about it; for different things are pleasant to
different kinds of people, and some things are more pleasant to every
one than chance objects. Now in the natural appetites few go wrong,
and only in one direction, that of excess; for to eat or drink whatever
offers itself till one is surfeited is to exceed the natural amount, since
natural appetite is the replenishment of one’s deficiency. Hence these
people are called belly-gods, this implying that they fill their belly be-
yond what is right. It is people of entirely slavish character that become
like this. But with regard to the pleasures peculiar to individuals many
people go wrong and in many ways. For while the people who are ‘fond
of so and so’ are so called because they delight either in the wrong
things, or more than most people do, or in the wrong way, the self-
indulgent exceed in all three ways; they both delight in some things that
they ought not to delight in (since they are hateful), and if one ought to
delight in some of the things they delight in, they do so more than one
ought and than most men do.
Plainly, then, excess with regard to pleasures is self-indulgence and
is culpable; with regard to pains one is not, as in the case of courage,
called temperate for facing them or self-indulgent for not doing so, but
the selfindulgent man is so called because he is pained more than he
ought at not getting pleasant things (even his pain being caused by plea-
sure), and the temperate man is so called because he is not pained at the
absence of what is pleasant and at his abstinence from it.
The self-indulgent man, then, craves for all pleasant things or those
that are most pleasant, and is led by his appetite to choose these at the
cost of everything else; hence he is pained both when he fails to get them
and when he is merely craving for them (for appetite involves pain); but
it seems absurd to be pained for the sake of pleasure. People who fall
short with regard to pleasures and delight in them less than they should
are hardly found; for such insensibility is not human. Even the other
animals distinguish different kinds of food and enjoy some and not oth-
ers; and if there is any one who finds nothing pleasant and nothing more52/Aristotle
attractive than anything else, he must be something quite different from
a man; this sort of person has not received a name because he hardly
occurs. The temperate man occupies a middle position with regard to
these objects. For he neither enjoys the things that the self-indulgent
man enjoys most-but rather dislikes them-nor in general the things that
he should not, nor anything of this sort to excess, nor does he feel pain
or craving when they are absent, or does so only to a moderate degree,
and not more than he should, nor when he should not, and so on; but the
things that, being pleasant, make for health or for good condition, he
will desire moderately and as he should, and also other pleasant things if
they are not hindrances to these ends, or contrary to what is noble, or
beyond his means. For he who neglects these conditions loves such plea-
sures more than they are worth, but the temperate man is not that sort of
person, but the sort of person that the right rule prescribes.
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Self-indulgence is more like a voluntary state than cowardice. For the
former is actuated by pleasure, the latter by pain, of which the one is to
be chosen and the other to be avoided; and pain upsets and destroys the
nature of the person who feels it, while pleasure does nothing of the sort.
Therefore self-indulgence is more voluntary. Hence also it is more a
matter of reproach; for it is easier to become accustomed to its objects,
since there are many things of this sort in life, and the process of habitu-
ation to them is free from danger, while with terrible objects the reverse
is the case. But cowardice would seem to be voluntary in a different
degree from its particular manifestations; for it is itself painless, but in
these we are upset by pain, so that we even throw down our arms and
disgrace ourselves in other ways; hence our acts are even thought to be
done under compulsion. For the self-indulgent man, on the other hand,
the particular acts are voluntary (for he does them with craving and
desire), but the whole state is less so; for no one craves to be self-indul-
gent.
The name self-indulgence is applied also to childish faults; for they
bear a certain resemblance to what we have been considering. Which is
called after which, makes no difference to our present purpose; plainly,
however, the later is called after the earlier. The transference of the
name seems not a bad one; for that which desires what is base and
which develops quickly ought to be kept in a chastened condition, and
these characteristics belong above all to appetite and to the child, sinceNicomachean Ethics/53
children in fact live at the beck and call of appetite, and it is in them that
the desire for what is pleasant is strongest. If, then, it is not going to be
obedient and subject to the ruling principle, it will go to great lengths;
for in an irrational being the desire for pleasure is insatiable even if it
tries every source of gratification, and the exercise of appetite increases
its innate force, and if appetites are strong and violent they even expel
the power of calculation. Hence they should be moderate and few, and
should in no way oppose the rational principle—and this is what we call
an obedient and chastened state—and as the child should live according
to the direction of his tutor, so the appetitive element should live accord-
ing to rational principle. Hence the appetitive element in a temperate
man should harmonize with the rational principle; for the noble is the
mark at which both aim, and the temperate man craves for the things be
ought, as he ought, as when he ought; and when he ought; and this is
what rational principle directs.
Here we conclude our account of temperance.
BOOK IV
1
Let us speak next of liberality. It seems to be the mean with regard to
wealth; for the liberal man is praised not in respect of military matters,
nor of those in respect of which the temrate man is praised, nor of judi-
cial decisions, but with regard to the giving and taking of wealth, and
especially in respect of giving. Now by ‘wealth’ we mean all the things
whose value is measured by money. Further, prodigality and meanness
are excesses and defects with regard to wealth; and meanness we al-
ways impute to those who care more than they ought for wealth, but we
sometimes apply the word ‘prodigality’ in a complex sense; for we call
those men prodigals who are incontinent and spend money on self-in-
dulgence. Hence also they are thought the poorest characters; for they
combine more vices than one. Therefore the application of the word to
them is not its proper use; for a ‘prodigal’ means a man who has a single
evil quality, that of wasting his substance; since a prodigal is one who is
being ruined by his own fault, and the wasting of substance is thought to
be a sort of ruining of oneself, life being held to depend on possession of
substance.
This, then, is the sense in which we take the word ‘prodigality’.
Now the things that have a use may be used either well or badly; and
riches is a useful thing; and everything is used best by the man who has54/Aristotle
the virtue concerned with it; riches, therefore, will be used best by the
man who has the virtue concerned with wealth; and this is the liberal
man. Now spending and giving seem to be the using of wealth; taking
and keeping rather the possession of it. Hence it is more the mark of the
liberal man to give to the right people than to take from the right sources
and not to take from the wrong. For it is more characteristic of virtue to
do good than to have good done to one, and more characteristic to do
what is noble than not to do what is base; and it is not hard to see that
giving implies doing good and doing what is noble, and taking implies
having good done to one or not acting basely. And gratitude is felt to-
wards him who gives, not towards him who does not take, and praise
also is bestowed more on him. It is easier, also, not to take than to give;
for men are apter to give away their own too little than to take what is
another’s. Givers, too, are called liberal; but those who do not take are
not praised for liberality but rather for justice; while those who take are
hardly praised at all. And the liberal are almost the most loved of all
virtuous characters, since they are useful; and this depends on their
giving.
Now virtuous actions are noble and done for the sake of the noble.
Therefore the liberal man, like other virtuous men, will give for the sake
of the noble, and rightly; for he will give to the right people, the right
amounts, and at the right time, with all the other qualifications that
accompany right giving; and that too with pleasure or without pain; for
that which is virtuous is pleasant or free from pain-least of all will it be
painful. But he who gives to the wrong people or not for the sake of the
noble but for some other cause, will be called not liberal but by some
other name. Nor is he liberal who gives with pain; for he would prefer
the wealth to the noble act, and this is not characteristic of a liberal man.
But no more will the liberal man take from wrong sources; for such
taking is not characteristic of the man who sets no store by wealth. Nor
will he be a ready asker; for it is not characteristic of a man who confers
benefits to accept them lightly. But he will take from the right sources,
e.g., from his own possessions, not as something noble but as a neces-
sity, that he may have something to give. Nor will he neglect his own
property, since he wishes by means of this to help others. And he will
refrain from giving to anybody and everybody, that he may have some-
thing to give to the right people, at the right time, and where it is noble
to do so. It is highly characteristic of a liberal man also to go to excess
in giving, so that he leaves too little for himself; for it is the nature of aNicomachean Ethics/55
liberal man not to look to himself. The term ‘liberality’ is used relatively
to a man’s substance; for liberality resides not in the multitude of the
gifts but in the state of character of the giver, and this is relative to the
giver’s substance. There is therefore nothing to prevent the man who
gives less from being the more liberal man, if he has less to give those
are thought to be more liberal who have not made their wealth but inher-
ited it; for in the first place they have no experience of want, and sec-
ondly all men are fonder of their own productions, as are parents and
poets. It is not easy for the liberal man to be rich, since he is not apt
either at taking or at keeping, but at giving away, and does not value
wealth for its own sake but as a means to giving. Hence comes the
charge that is brought against fortune, that those who deserve riches
most get it least. But it is not unreasonable that it should turn out so; for
he cannot have wealth, any more than anything else, if he does not take
pains to have it. Yet he will not give to the wrong people nor at the
wrong time, and so on; for he would no longer be acting in accordance
with liberality, and if he spent on these objects he would have nothing to
spend on the right objects. For, as has been said, he is liberal who spends
according to his substance and on the right objects; and he who exceeds
is prodigal. Hence we do not call despots prodigal; for it is thought not
easy for them to give and spend beyond the amount of their possessions.
Liberality, then, being a mean with regard to giving and taking of wealth,
the liberal man will both give and spend the right amounts and on the
right objects, alike in small things and in great, and that with pleasure;
he will also take the right amounts and from the right sources. For, the
virtue being a mean with regard to both, he will do both as he ought;
since this sort of taking accompanies proper giving, and that which is
not of this sort is contrary to it, and accordingly the giving and taking
that accompany each other are present together in the same man, while
the contrary kinds evidently are not. But if he happens to spend in a
manner contrary to what is right and noble, he will be pained, but mod-
erately and as he ought; for it is the mark of virtue both to be pleased
and to be pained at the right objects and in the right way. Further, the
liberal man is easy to deal with in money matters; for he can be got the
better of, since he sets no store by money, and is more annoyed if he has
not spent something that he ought than pained if he has spent something
that he ought not, and does not agree with the saying of Simonides.
The prodigal errs in these respects also; for he is neither pleased nor
pained at the right things or in the right way; this will be more evident as56/Aristotle
we go on. We have said that prodigality and meanness are excesses and
deficiencies, and in two things, in giving and in taking; for we include
spending under giving. Now prodigality exceeds in giving and not tak-
ing, while meanness falls short in giving, and exceeds in taking, except
in small things.
The characteristics of prodigality are not often combined; for it is
not easy to give to all if you take from none; private persons soon ex-
haust their substance with giving, and it is to these that the name of
prodigals is applied—though a man of this sort would seem to be in no
small degree better than a mean man. For he is easily cured both by age
and by poverty, and thus he may move towards the middle state. For he
has the characteristics of the liberal man, since he both gives and re-
frains from taking, though he does neither of these in the right manner or
well. Therefore if he were brought to do so by habituation or in some
other way, he would be liberal; for he will then give to the right people,
and will not take from the wrong sources. This is why he is thought to
have not a bad character; it is not the mark of a wicked or ignoble man
to go to excess in giving and not taking, but only of a foolish one. The
man who is prodigal in this way is thought much better than the mean
man both for the aforesaid reasons and because he benefits many while
the other benefits no one, not even himself.
But most prodigal people, as has been said, also take from the wrong
sources, and are in this respect mean. They become apt to take because
they wish to spend and cannot do this easily; for their possessions soon
run short. Thus they are forced to provide means from some other source.
At the same time, because they care nothing for honour, they take reck-
lessly and from any source; for they have an appetite for giving, and
they do not mind how or from what source. Hence also their giving is
not liberal; for it is not noble, nor does it aim at nobility, nor is it done in
the right way; sometimes they make rich those who should be poor, and
will give nothing to people of respectable character, and much to flatter-
ers or those who provide them with some other pleasure. Hence also
most of them are self-indulgent; for they spend lightly and waste money
on their indulgences, and incline towards pleasures because they do not
live with a view to what is noble.
The prodigal man, then, turns into what we have described if he is
left untutored, but if he is treated with care he will arrive at the interme-
diate and right state. But meanness is both incurable (for old age and
every disability is thought to make men mean) and more innate in menNicomachean Ethics/57
than prodigality; for most men are fonder of getting money than of giv-
ing. It also extends widely, and is multiform, since there seem to be
many kinds of meanness.
For it consists in two things, deficiency in giving and excess in
taking, and is not found complete in all men but is sometimes divided;
some men go to excess in taking, others fall short in giving. Those who
are called by such names as ‘miserly,’ ‘close,’ ‘stingy,’ all fall short in
giving, but do not covet the possessions of others nor wish to get them.
In some this is due to a sort of honesty and avoidance of what is dis-
graceful (for some seem, or at least profess, to hoard their money for
this reason, that they may not some day be forced to do something dis-
graceful; to this class belong the cheeseparer and every one of the sort;
he is so called from his excess of unwillingness to give anything); while
others again keep their hands off the property of others from fear, on the
ground that it is not easy, if one takes the property of others oneself, to
avoid having one’s own taken by them; they are therefore content nei-
ther to take nor to give.
Others again exceed in respect of taking by taking anything and
from any source, e.g., those who ply sordid trades, pimps and all such
people, and those who lend small sums and at high rates. For all of these
take more than they ought and from wrong sources. What is common to
them is evidently sordid love of gain; they all put up with a bad name for
the sake of gain, and little gain at that. For those who make great gains
but from wrong sources, and not the right gains, e.g., despots when they
sack cities and spoil temples, we do not call mean but rather wicked,
impious, and unjust. But the gamester and the footpad (and the high-
wayman) belong to the class of the mean, since they have a sordid love
of gain. For it is for gain that both of them ply their craft and endure the
disgrace of it, and the one faces the greatest dangers for the sake of the
booty, while the other makes gain from his friends, to whom he ought to
be giving. Both, then, since they are willing to make gain from wrong
sources, are sordid lovers of gain; therefore all such forms of taking are
mean.
And it is natural that meanness is described as the contrary of liber-
ality; for not only is it a greater evil than prodigality, but men err more
often in this direction than in the way of prodigality as we have de-
scribed it.
So much, then, for liberality and the opposed vices.58/Aristotle
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It would seem proper to discuss magnificence next. For this also seems
to be a virtue concerned with wealth; but it does not like liberality ex-
tend to all the actions that are concerned with wealth, but only to those
that involve expenditure; and in these it surpasses liberality in scale.
For, as the name itself suggests, it is a fitting expenditure involving
largeness of scale. But the scale is relative; for the expense of equipping
a trireme is not the same as that of heading a sacred embassy. It is what
is fitting, then, in relation to the agent, and to the circumstances and the
object. The man who in small or middling things spends according to
the merits of the case is not called magnificent (e.g., the man who can
say ‘many a gift I gave the wanderer’), but only the man who does so in
great things. For the magnificent man is liberal, but the liberal man is
not necessarily magnificent. The deficiency of this state of character is
called niggardliness, the excess vulgarity, lack of taste, and the like,
which do not go to excess in the amount spent on right objects, but by
showy expenditure in the wrong circumstances and the wrong manner;
we shall speak of these vices later.
The magnificent man is like an artist; for he can see what is fitting
and spend large sums tastefully. For, as we said at the begining, a state
of character is determined by its activities and by its objects. Now the
expenses of the magnificent man are large and fitting. Such, therefore,
are also his results; for thus there will be a great expenditure and one
that is fitting to its result. Therefore the result should be worthy of the
expense, and the expense should be worthy of the result, or should even
exceed it. And the magnificent man will spend such sums for honour’s
sake; for this is common to the virtues. And further he will do so gladly
and lavishly; for nice calculation is a niggardly thing. And he will con-
sider how the result can be made most beautiful and most becoming
rather than for how much it can be produced and how it can be produced
most cheaply. It is necessary, then, that the magnificent man be also
liberal. For the liberal man also will spend what he ought and as he
ought; and it is in these matters that the greatness implied in the name of
the magnificent man-his bigness, as it were-is manifested, since liberal-
ity is concerned with these matters; and at an equal expense he will
produce a more magnificent work of art. For a possession and a work of
art have not the same excellence. The most valuable possession is that
which is worth most, e.g., gold, but the most valuable work of art is that
which is great and beautiful (for the contemplation of such a work in-Nicomachean Ethics/59
spires admiration, and so does magnificence); and a work has an excel-
lence-viz. magnificence-which involves magnitude. Magnificence is an
attribute of expenditures of the kind which we call honourable, e.g.,
those connected with the gods—votive offerings, buildings, and sacri-
fices—and similarly with any form of religious worship, and all those
that are proper objects of public-spirited ambition, as when people think
they ought to equip a chorus or a trireme, or entertain the city, in a
brilliant way. But in all cases, as has been said, we have regard to the
agent as well and ask who he is and what means he has; for the expen-
diture should be worthy of his means, and suit not only the result but
also the producer. Hence a poor man cannot be magnificent, since he
has not the means with which to spend large sums fittingly; and he who
tries is a fool, since he spends beyond what can be expected of him and
what is proper, but it is right expenditure that is virtuous. But great
expenditure is becoming to those who have suitable means to start with,
acquired by their own efforts or from ancestors or connexions, and to
people of high birth or reputation, and so on; for all these things bring
with them greatness and prestige. Primarily, then, the magnificent man
is of this sort, and magnificence is shown in expenditures of this sort, as
has been said; for these are the greatest and most honourable. Of private
occasions of expenditure the most suitable are those that take place
once for all, e.g., a wedding or anything of the kind, or anything that
interests the whole city or the people of position in it, and also the re-
ceiving of foreign guests and the sending of them on their way, and gifts
and counter-gifts; for the magnificent man spends not on himself but on
public objects, and gifts bear some resemblance to votive offerings. A
magnificent man will also furnish his house suitably to his wealth (for
even a house is a sort of public ornament), and will spend by preference
on those works that are lasting (for these are the most beautiful), and on
every class of things he will spend what is becoming; for the same things
are not suitable for gods and for men, nor in a temple and in a tomb.
And since each expenditure may be great of its kind, and what is most
magnificent absolutely is great expenditure on a great object, but what
is magnificent here is what is great in these circumstances, and great-
ness in the work differs from greatness in the expense (for the most
beautiful ball or bottle is magnificent as a gift to a child, but the price of
it is small and mean),—therefore it is characteristic of the magnificent
man, whatever kind of result he is producing, to produce it magnifi-
cently (for such a result is not easily surpassed) and to make it worthy60/Aristotle
of the expenditure.
Such, then, is the magnificent man; the man who goes to excess and
is vulgar exceeds, as has been said, by spending beyond what is right.
For on small objects of expenditure he spends much and displays a
tasteless showiness; e.g., he gives a club dinner on the scale of a wed-
ding banquet, and when he provides the chorus for a comedy he brings
them on to the stage in purple, as they do at Megara. And all such things
he will do not for honour’s sake but to show off his wealth, and because
he thinks he is admired for these things, and where he ought to spend
much he spends little and where little, much. The niggardly man on the
other hand will fall short in everything, and after spending the greatest
sums will spoil the beauty of the result for a trifle, and whatever he is
doing he will hesitate and consider how he may spend least, and lament
even that, and think he is doing everything on a bigger scale than he
ought.
These states of character, then, are vices; yet they do not bring dis-
grace because they are neither harmful to one’s neighbour nor very un-
seemly.
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Pride seems even from its name to be concerned with great things; what
sort of great things, is the first question we must try to answer. It makes
no difference whether we consider the state of character or the man
characterized by it. Now the man is thought to be proud who thinks
himself worthy of great things, being worthy of them; for he who does
so beyond his deserts is a fool, but no virtuous man is foolish or silly.
The proud man, then, is the man we have described. For he who is
worthy of little and thinks himself worthy of little is temperate, but not
proud; for pride implies greatness, as beauty implies a goodsized body,
and little people may be neat and well-proportioned but cannot be beau-
tiful. On the other hand, he who thinks himself worthy of great things,
being unworthy of them, is vain; though not every one who thinks him-
self worthy of more than he really is worthy of in vain. The man who
thinks himself worthy of worthy of less than he is really worthy of is
unduly humble, whether his deserts be great or moderate, or his deserts
be small but his claims yet smaller. And the man whose deserts are great
would seem most unduly humble; for what would he have done if they
had been less? The proud man, then, is an extreme in respect of the
greatness of his claims, but a mean in respect of the rightness of them;Nicomachean Ethics/61
for he claims what is accordance with his merits, while the others go to
excess or fall short.
If, then, he deserves and claims great things, and above all the great
things, he will be concerned with one thing in particular. Desert is rela-
tive to external goods; and the greatest of these, we should say, is that
which we render to the gods, and which people of position most aim at,
and which is the prize appointed for the noblest deeds; and this is honour;
that is surely the greatest of external goods. Honours and dishonours,
therefore, are the objects with respect to which the proud man is as he
should be. And even apart from argument it is with honour that proud
men appear to be concerned; for it is honour that they chiefly claim, but
in accordance with their deserts. The unduly humble man falls short
both in comparison with his own merits and in comparison with the
proud man’s claims. The vain man goes to excess in comparison with
his own merits, but does not exceed the proud man’s claims.
Now the proud man, since he deserves most, must be good in the
highest degree; for the better man always deserves more, and the best
man most. Therefore the truly proud man must be good. And greatness
in every virtue would seem to be characteristic of a proud man. And it
would be most unbecoming for a proud man to fly from danger, swing-
ing his arms by his sides, or to wrong another; for to what end should he
do disgraceful acts, he to whom nothing is great? If we consider him
point by point we shall see the utter absurdity of a proud man who is not
good. Nor, again, would he be worthy of honour if he were bad; for
honour is the prize of virtue, and it is to the good that it is rendered.
Pride, then, seems to be a sort of crown of the virtues; for it makes them
greater, and it is not found without them. Therefore it is hard to be truly
proud; for it is impossible without nobility and goodness of character. It
is chiefly with honours and dishonours, then, that the proud man is con-
cerned; and at honours that are great and conferred by good men he will
be moderately Pleased, thinking that he is coming by his own or even
less than his own; for there can be no honour that is worthy of perfect
virtue, yet he will at any rate accept it since they have nothing greater to
bestow on him; but honour from casual people and on trifling grounds
he will utterly despise, since it is not this that he deserves, and dishonour
too, since in his case it cannot be just. In the first place, then, as has
been said, the proud man is concerned with honours; yet he will also
bear himself with moderation towards wealth and power and all good or
evil fortune, whatever may befall him, and will be neither over-joyed by62/Aristotle
good fortune nor over-pained by evil. For not even towards honour does
he bear himself as if it were a very great thing. Power and wealth are
desirable for the sake of honour (at least those who have them wish to
get honour by means of them); and for him to whom even honour is a
little thing the others must be so too. Hence proud men are thought to be
disdainful.
The goods of fortune also are thought to contribute towards pride.
For men who are well-born are thought worthy of honour, and so are
those who enjoy power or wealth; for they are in a superior position,
and everything that has a superiority in something good is held in greater
honour. Hence even such things make men prouder; for they are honoured
by some for having them; but in truth the good man alone is to be
honoured; he, however, who has both advantages is thought the more
worthy of honour. But those who without virtue have such goods are
neither justified in making great claims nor entitled to the name of ‘proud’;
for these things imply perfect virtue. Disdainful and insolent, however,
even those who have such goods become. For without virtue it is not
easy to bear gracefully the goods of fortune; and, being unable to bear
them, and thinking themselves superior to others, they despise others
and themselves do what they please. They imitate the proud man with-
out being like him, and this they do where they can; so they do not act
virtuously, but they do despise others. For the proud man despises justly
(since he thinks truly), but the many do so at random.
He does not run into trifling dangers, nor is he fond of danger, be-
cause he honours few things; but he will face great dangers, and when
he is in danger he is unsparing of his life, knowing that there are condi-
tions on which life is not worth having. And he is the sort of man to
confer benefits, but he is ashamed of receiving them; for the one is the
mark of a superior, the other of an inferior. And he is apt to confer
greater benefits in return; for thus the original benefactor besides being
paid will incur a debt to him, and will be the gainer by the transaction.
They seem also to remember any service they have done, but not those
they have received (for he who receives a service is inferior to him who
has done it, but the proud man wishes to be superior), and to hear of the
former with pleasure, of the latter with displeasure; this, it seems, is
why Thetis did not mention to Zeus the services she had done him, and
why the Spartans did not recount their services to the Athenians, but
those they had received. It is a mark of the proud man also to ask for
nothing or scarcely anything, but to give help readily, and to be digni-Nicomachean Ethics/63
fied towards people who enjoy high position and good fortune, but un-
assuming towards those of the middle class; for it is a difficult and lofty
thing to be superior to the former, but easy to be so to the latter, and a
lofty bearing over the former is no mark of ill-breeding, but among
humble people it is as vulgar as a display of strength against the weak.
Again, it is characteristic of the proud man not to aim at the things
commonly held in honour, or the things in which others excel; to be
sluggish and to hold back except where great honour or a great work is
at stake, and to be a man of few deeds, but of great and notable ones. He
must also be open in his hate and in his love (for to conceal one’s feel-
ings, i.e., to care less for truth than for what people will think, is a
coward’s part), and must speak and act openly; for he is free of speech
because he is contemptuous, and he is given to telling the truth, except
when he speaks in irony to the vulgar. He must be unable to make his
life revolve round another, unless it be a friend; for this is slavish, and
for this reason all flatterers are servile and people lacking in self-respect
are flatterers. Nor is he given to admiration; for nothing to him is great.
Nor is he mindful of wrongs; for it is not the part of a proud man to have
a long memory, especially for wrongs, but rather to overlook them. Nor
is he a gossip; for he will speak neither about himself nor about another,
since he cares not to be praised nor for others to be blamed; nor again is
he given to praise; and for the same reason he is not an evil-speaker,
even about his enemies, except from haughtiness. With regard to neces-
sary or small matters he is least of all me given to lamentation or the
asking of favours; for it is the part of one who takes such matters seri-
ously to behave so with respect to them. He is one who will possess
beautiful and profitless things rather than profitable and useful ones;
for this is more proper to a character that suffices to itself.
Further, a slow step is thought proper to the proud man, a deep
voice, and a level utterance; for the man who takes few things seriously
is not likely to be hurried, nor the man who thinks nothing great to be
excited, while a shrill voice and a rapid gait are the results of hurry and
excitement.
Such, then, is the proud man; the man who falls short of him is
unduly humble, and the man who goes beyond him is vain. Now even
these are not thought to be bad (for they are not malicious), but only
mistaken. For the unduly humble man, being worthy of good things,
robs himself of what he deserves, and to have something bad about him
from the fact that he does not think himself worthy of good things, and64/Aristotle
seems also not to know himself; else he would have desired the things he
was worthy of, since these were good. Yet such people are not thought
to be fools, but rather unduly retiring. Such a reputation, however, seems
actually to make them worse; for each class of people aims at what
corresponds to its worth, and these people stand back even from noble
actions and undertakings, deeming themselves unworthy, and from ex-
ternal goods no less. Vain people, on the other hand, are fools and igno-
rant of themselves, and that manifestly; for, not being worthy of them,
they attempt honourable undertakings, and then are found out; and they
adorn themselves with clothing and outward show and such things, and
wish their strokes of good fortune to be made public, and speak about
them as if they would be honoured for them. But undue humility is more
opposed to pride than vanity is; for it is both commoner and worse.
Pride, then, is concerned with honour on the grand scale, as has
been said.
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There seems to be in the sphere of honour also, as was said in our first
remarks on the subject, a virtue which would appear to be related to
pride as liberality is to magnificence. For neither of these has anything
to do with the grand scale, but both dispose us as is right with regard to
middling and unimportant objects; as in getting and giving of wealth
there is a mean and an excess and defect, so too honour may be desired
more than is right, or less, or from the right sources and in the right way.
We blame both the ambitious man as am at honour more than is right
and from wrong sources, and the unambitious man as not willing to be
honoured even for noble reasons. But sometimes we praise the ambi-
tious man as being manly and a lover of what is noble, and the unambi-
tious man as being moderate and self-controlled, as we said in our first
treatment of the subject. Evidently, since ‘fond of such and such an
object’ has more than one meaning, we do not assign the term ‘ambi-
tion’ or ‘love of honour’ always to the same thing, but when we praise
the quality we think of the man who loves honour more than most people,
and when we blame it we think of him who loves it more than is right.
The mean being without a name, the extremes seem to dispute for its
place as though that were vacant by default. But where there is excess
and defect, there is also an intermediate; now men desire honour both
more than they should and less; therefore it is possible also to do so as
one should; at all events this is the state of character that is praised,Nicomachean Ethics/65
being an unnamed mean in respect of honour. Relatively to ambition it
seems to be unambitiousness, and relatively to unambitiousness it seems
to be ambition, while relatively to both severally it seems in a sense to
be both together. This appears to be true of the other virtues also. But in
this case the extremes seem to be contradictories because the mean has
not received a name.
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Good temper is a mean with respect to anger; the middle state being
unnamed, and the extremes almost without a name as well, we place
good temper in the middle position, though it inclines towards the defi-
ciency, which is without a name. The excess might called a sort of ‘iras-
cibility.’ For the passion is anger, while its causes are many and diverse.
The man who is angry at the right things and with the right people,
and, further, as he ought, when he ought, and as long as he ought, is
praised. This will be the good-tempered man, then, since good temper is
praised. For the good-tempered man tends to be unperturbed and not to
be led by passion, but to be angry in the manner, at the things, and for
the length of time, that the rule dictates; but he is thought to err rather in
the direction of deficiency; for the good-tempered man is not revenge-
ful, but rather tends to make allowances.
The deficiency, whether it is a sort of ‘inirascibility’ or whatever it
is, is blamed. For those who are not angry at the things they should be
angry at are thought to be fools, and so are those who are not angry in
the right way, at the right time, or with the right persons; for such a man
is thought not to feel things nor to be pained by them, and, since he does
not get angry, he is thought unlikely to defend himself; and to endure
being insulted and put up with insult to one’s friends is slavish.
The excess can be manifested in all the points that have been named
(for one can be angry with the wrong persons, at the wrong things, more
than is right, too quickly, or too long); yet all are not found in the same
person. Indeed they could not; for evil destroys even itself, and if it is
complete becomes unbearable. Now hot-tempered people get angry
quickly and with the wrong persons and at the wrong things and more
than is right, but their anger ceases quickly-which is the best point about
them. This happens to them because they do not restrain their anger but
retaliate openly owing to their quickness of temper, and then their anger
ceases. By reason of excess choleric people are quick-tempered and
ready to be angry with everything and on every occasion; whence their66/Aristotle
name. Sulky people are hard to appease, and retain their anger long; for
they repress their passion. But it ceases when they retaliate; for revenge
relieves them of their anger, producing in them pleasure instead of pain.
If this does not happen they retain their burden; for owing to its not
being obvious no one even reasons with them, and to digest one’s anger
in oneself takes time. Such people are most troublesome to themselves
and to their dearest friends. We call had-tempered those who are angry
at the wrong things, more than is right, and longer, and cannot be ap-
peased until they inflict vengeance or punishment.
To good temper we oppose the excess rather than the defect; for not
only is it commoner since revenge is the more human), but bad-tem-
pered people are worse to live with.
What we have said in our earlier treatment of the subject is plain
also from what we are now saying; viz., that it is not easy to define how,
with whom, at what, and how long one should be angry, and at what
point right action ceases and wrong begins. For the man who strays a
little from the path, either towards the more or towards the less, is not
blamed; since sometimes we praise those who exhibit the deficiency,
and call them good-tempered, and sometimes we call angry people manly,
as being capable of ruling. How far, therefore, and how a man must
stray before he becomes blameworthy, it is not easy to state in words;
for the decision depends on the particular facts and on perception. But
so much at least is plain, that the middle state is praiseworthy—that in
virtue of which we are angry with the right people, at the right things, in
the right way, and so on, while the excesses and defects are blamewor-
thy—slightly so if they are present in a low degree, more if in a higher
degree, and very much if in a high degree. Evidently, then, we must
cling to the middle state.—Enough of the states relative to anger.
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In gatherings of men, in social life and the interchange of words and
deeds, some men are thought to be obsequious, viz. those who to give
pleasure praise everything and never oppose, but think it their duty ‘to
give no pain to the people they meet’; while those who, on the contrary,
oppose everything and care not a whit about giving pain are called churl-
ish and contentious. That the states we have named are culpable is plain
enough, and that the middle state is laudable—that in virtue of which a
man will put up with, and will resent, the right things and in the right
way; but no name has been assigned to it, though it most resemblesNicomachean Ethics/67
friendship. For the man who corresponds to this middle state is very
much what, with affection added, we call a good friend. But the state in
question differs from friendship in that it implies no passion or affection
for one’s associates; since it is not by reason of loving or hating that
such a man takes everything in the right way, but by being a man of a
certain kind. For he will behave so alike towards those he knows and
those he does not know, towards intimates and those who are not so,
except that in each of these cases he will behave as is befitting; for it is
not proper to have the same care for intimates and for strangers, nor
again is it the same conditions that make it right to give pain to them.
Now we have said generally that he will associate with people in the
right way; but it is by reference to what is honourable and expedient that
he will aim at not giving pain or at contributing pleasure. For he seems
to be concerned with the pleasures and pains of social life; and wherever
it is not honourable, or is harmful, for him to contribute pleasure, he
will refuse, and will choose rather to give pain; also if his acquiescence
in another’s action would bring disgrace, and that in a high degree, or
injury, on that other, while his opposition brings a little pain, he will not
acquiesce but will decline. He will associate differently with people in
high station and with ordinary people, with closer and more distant ac-
quaintances, and so too with regard to all other differences, rendering to
each class what is befitting, and while for its own sake he chooses to
contribute pleasure, and avoids the giving of pain, he will be guided by
the consequences, if these are greater, i.e., honour and expediency. For
the sake of a great future pleasure, too, he will inflict small pains.
The man who attains the mean, then, is such as we have described,
but has not received a name; of those who contribute pleasure, the man
who aims at being pleasant with no ulterior object is obsequious, but the
man who does so in order that he may get some advantage in the direc-
tion of money or the things that money buys is a flatterer; while the man
who quarrels with everything is, as has been said, churlish and conten-
tious. And the extremes seem to be contradictory to each other because
the mean is without a name.
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The mean opposed to boastfulness is found in almost the same sphere;
and this also is without a name. It will be no bad plan to describe these
states as well; for we shall both know the facts about character better if
we go through them in detail, and we shall be convinced that the virtues68/Aristotle
are means if we see this to be so in all cases. In the field of social life
those who make the giving of pleasure or pain their object in associating
with others have been described; let us now describe those who pursue
truth or falsehood alike in words and deeds and in the claims they put
forward. The boastful man, then, is thought to be apt to claim the things
that bring glory, when he has not got them, or to claim more of them
than he has, and the mock-modest man on the other hand to disclaim
what he has or belittle it, while the man who observes the mean is one
who calls a thing by its own name, being truthful both in life and in
word, owning to what he has, and neither more nor less. Now each of
these courses may be adopted either with or without an object. But each
man speaks and acts and lives in accordance with his character, if he is
not acting for some ulterior object. And falsehood is in itself mean and
culpable, and truth noble and worthy of praise. Thus the truthful man is
another case of a man who, being in the mean, is worthy of praise, and
both forms of untruthful man are culpable, and particularly the boastful
man.
Let us discuss them both, but first of all the truthful man. We are
not speaking of the man who keeps faith in his agreements, i.e., in the
things that pertain to justice or injustice (for this would belong to an-
other virtue), but the man who in the matters in which nothing of this
sort is at stake is true both in word and in life because his character is
such. But such a man would seem to be as a matter of fact equitable.
For the man who loves truth, and is truthful where nothing is at stake,
will still more be truthful where something is at stake; he will avoid
falsehood as something base, seeing that he avoided it even for its own
sake; and such a man is worthy of praise. He inclines rather to under-
state the truth; for this seems in better taste because exaggerations are
wearisome.
He who claims more than he has with no ulterior object is a con-
temptible sort of fellow (otherwise he would not have delighted in false-
hood), but seems futile rather than bad; but if he does it for an object, he
who does it for the sake of reputation or honour is (for a boaster) not
very much to be blamed, but he who does it for money, or the things that
lead to money, is an uglier character (it is not the capacity that makes
the boaster, but the purpose; for it is in virtue of his state of character
and by being a man of a certain kind that he is boaster); as one man is a
liar because he enjoys the lie itself, and another because he desires repu-
tation or gain. Now those who boast for the sake of reputation claimNicomachean Ethics/69
such qualities as will praise or congratulation, but those whose object is
gain claim qualities which are of value to one’s neighbours and one’s
lack of which is not easily detected, e.g., the powers of a seer, a sage, or
a physician. For this reason it is such things as these that most people
claim and boast about; for in them the above-mentioned qualities are
found.
Mock-modest people, who understate things, seem more attractive
in character; for they are thought to speak not for gain but to avoid
parade; and here too it is qualities which bring reputation that they dis-
claim, as Socrates used to do. Those who disclaim trifling and obvious
qualities are called humbugs and are more contemptible; and sometimes
this seems to be boastfulness, like the Spartan dress; for both excess and
great deficiency are boastful. But those who use understatement with
moderation and understate about matters that do not very much force
themselves on our notice seem attractive. And it is the boaster that seems
to be opposed to the truthful man; for he is the worse character.
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Since life includes rest as well as activity, and in this is included leisure
and amusement, there seems here also to be a kind of intercourse which
is tasteful; there is such a thing as saying—and again listening to—
what one should and as one should. The kind of people one is speaking
or listening to will also make a difference. Evidently here also there is
both an excess and a deficiency as compared with the mean. Those who
carry humour to excess are thought to be vulgar buffoons, striving after
humour at all costs, and aiming rather at raising a laugh than at saying
what is becoming and at avoiding pain to the object of their fun; while
those who can neither make a joke themselves nor put up with those
who do are thought to be boorish and unpolished. But those who joke in
a tasteful way are called ready-witted, which implies a sort of readiness
to turn this way and that; for such sallies are thought to be movements
of the character, and as bodies are discriminated by their movements, so
too are characters. The ridiculous side of things is not far to seek, how-
ever, and most people delight more than they should in amusement and
in jestinly. and so even buffoons are called ready-witted because they
are found attractive; but that they differ from the ready-witted man, and
to no small extent, is clear from what has been said.
To the middle state belongs also tact; it is the mark of a tactful man
to say and listen to such things as befit a good and well-bred man; for70/Aristotle
there are some things that it befits such a man to say and to hear by way
of jest, and the well-bred man’s jesting differs from that of a vulgar
man, and the joking of an educated man from that of an uneducated.
One may see this even from the old and the new comedies; to the authors
of the former indecency of language was amusing, to those of the latter
innuendo is more so; and these differ in no small degree in respect of
propriety. Now should we define the man who jokes well by his saying
what is not unbecoming to a well-bred man, or by his not giving pain, or
even giving delight, to the hearer? Or is the latter definition, at any rate,
itself indefinite, since different things are hateful or pleasant to different
people? The kind of jokes he will listen to will be the same; for the kind
he can put up with are also the kind he seems to make. There are, then,
jokes he will not make; for the jest is a sort of abuse, and there are things
that lawgivers forbid us to abuse; and they should, perhaps, have for-
bidden us even to make a jest of such. The refined and well-bred man,
therefore, will be as we have described, being as it were a law to him-
self.
Such, then, is the man who observes the mean, whether he be called
tactful or ready-witted. The buffoon, on the other hand, is the slave of
his sense of humour, and spares neither himself nor others if he can raise
a laugh, and says things none of which a man of refinement would say,
and to some of which he would not even listen. The boor, again, is
useless for such social intercourse; for he contributes nothing and finds
fault with everything. But relaxation and amusement are thought to be a
necessary element in life.
The means in life that have been described, then, are three in num-
ber, and are all concerned with an interchange of words and deeds of
some kind. They differ, however, in that one is concerned with truth;
and the other two with pleasantness. Of those concerned with pleasure,
one is displayed in jests, the other in the general social intercourse of
life.
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Shame should not be described as a virtue; for it is more like a feeling
than a state of character. It is defined, at any rate, as a kind of fear of
dishonour, and produces an effect similar to that produced by fear of
danger; for people who feel disgraced blush, and those who fear death
turn pale. Both, therefore, seem to be in a sense bodily conditions, which
is thought to be characteristic of feeling rather than of a state of charac-Nicomachean Ethics/71
ter.
The feeling is not becoming to every age, but only to youth. For we
think young people should be prone to the feeling of shame because they
live by feeling and therefore commit many errors, but are restrained by
shame; and we praise young people who are prone to this feeling, but an
older person no one would praise for being prone to the sense of dis-
grace, since we think he should not do anything that need cause this
sense. For the sense of disgrace is not even characteristic of a good man,
since it is consequent on bad actions (for such actions should not be
done; and if some actions are disgraceful in very truth and others only
according to common opinion, this makes no difference; for neither class
of actions should be done, so that no disgrace should be felt); and it is a
mark of a bad man even to be such as to do any disgraceful action. To
be so constituted as to feel disgraced if one does such an action, and for
this reason to think oneself good, is absurd; for it is for voluntary ac-
tions that shame is felt, and the good man will never voluntarily do bad
actions. But shame may be said to be conditionally a good thing; if a
good man does such actions, he will feel disgraced; but the virtues are
not subject to such a qualification. And if shamelessness—not to be
ashamed of doing base actions—is bad, that does not make it good to be
ashamed of doing such actions. Continence too is not virtue, but a mixed




With regards to justice and injustice we must (1) consider what kind of
actions they are concerned with, (2) what sort of mean justice is, and (3)
between what extremes the just act is intermediate. Our investigation
shall follow the same course as the preceding discussions.
We see that all men mean by justice that kind of state of character
which makes people disposed to do what is just and makes them act
justly and wish for what is just; and similarly by injustice that state
which makes them act unjustly and wish for what is unjust. Let us too,
then, lay this down as a general basis. For the same is not true of the
sciences and the faculties as of states of character. A faculty or a sci-
ence which is one and the same is held to relate to contrary objects, but
a state of character which is one of two contraries does not produce the
contrary results; e.g., as a result of health we do not do what is the72/Aristotle
opposite of healthy, but only what is healthy; for we say a man walks
healthily, when he walks as a healthy man would.
Now often one contrary state is recognized from its contrary, and
often states are recognized from the subjects that exhibit them; for (A) if
good condition is known, bad condition also becomes known, and (B)
good condition is known from the things that are in good condition, and
they from it. If good condition is firmness of flesh, it is necessary both
that bad condition should be flabbiness of flesh and that the wholesome
should be that which causes firmness in flesh. And it follows for the
most part that if one contrary is ambiguous the other also will be am-
biguous; e.g., if ‘just’ is so, that ‘unjust’ will be so too.
Now ‘justice’ and ‘injustice’ seem to be ambiguous, but because
their different meanings approach near to one another the ambiguity
escapes notice and is not obvious as it is, comparatively, when the mean-
ings are far apart, e.g., (for here the difference in outward form is great)
as the ambiguity in the use of kleis for the collar-bone of an animal and
for that with which we lock a door. Let us take as a starting-point, then,
the various meanings of ‘an unjust man.’ Both the lawless man and the
grasping and unfair man are thought to be unjust, so that evidently both
the law-abiding and the fair man will be just. The just, then, is the law-
ful and the fair, the unjust the unlawful and the unfair.
Since the unjust man is grasping, he must be concerned with goods-
not all goods, but those with which prosperity and adversity have to do,
which taken absolutely are always good, but for a particular person are
not always good. Now men pray for and pursue these things; but they
should not, but should pray that the things that are good absolutely may
also be good for them, and should choose the things that are good for
them. The unjust man does not always choose the greater, but also the
less—in the case of things bad absolutely; but because the lesser evil is
itself thought to be in a sense good, and graspingness is directed at the
good, therefore he is thought to be grasping. And he is unfair; for this
contains and is common to both.
Since the lawless man was seen to be unjust and the law-abiding
man just, evidently all lawful acts are in a sense just acts; for the acts
laid down by the legislative art are lawful, and each of these, we say, is
just. Now the laws in their enactments on all subjects aim at the com-
mon advantage either of all or of the best or of those who hold power, or
something of the sort; so that in one sense we call those acts just that
tend to produce and preserve happiness and its components for the po-Nicomachean Ethics/73
litical society. And the law bids us do both the acts of a brave man (e.g.,
not to desert our post nor take to flight nor throw away our arms), and
those of a temperate man (e.g., not to commit adultery nor to gratify
one’s lust), and those of a good-tempered man (e.g., not to strike an-
other nor to speak evil), and similarly with regard to the other virtues
and forms of wickedness, commanding some acts and forbidding oth-
ers; and the rightly-framed law does this rightly, and the hastily con-
ceived one less well. This form of justice, then, is complete virtue, but
not absolutely, but in relation to our neighbour. And therefore justice is
often thought to be the greatest of virtues, and ‘neither evening nor morn-
ing star’ is so wonderful; and proverbially ‘in justice is every virtue
comprehended’. And it is complete virtue in its fullest sense, because it
is the actual exercise of complete virtue. It is complete because he who
possesses it can exercise his virtue not only in himself but towards his
neighbour also; for many men can exercise virtue in their own affairs,
but not in their relations to their neighbour. This is why the saying of
Bias is thought to be true, that ‘rule will show the man’; for a ruler is
necessarily in relation to other men and a member of a society. For this
same reason justice, alone of the virtues, is thought to be ‘another’s
good,’ because it is related to our neighbour; for it does what is advan-
tageous to another, either a ruler or a copartner. Now the worst man is
he who exercises his wickedness both towards himself and towards his
friends, and the best man is not he who exercises his virtue towards
himself but he who exercises it towards another; for this is a difficult
task. Justice in this sense, then, is not part of virtue but virtue entire, nor
is the contrary injustice a part of vice but vice entire. What the differ-
ence is between virtue and justice in this sense is plain from what we
have said; they are the same but their essence is not the same; what, as
a relation to one’s neighbour, is justice is, as a certain kind of state
without qualification, virtue.
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But at all events what we are investigating is the justice which is a part
of virtue; for there is a justice of this kind, as we maintain. Similarly it
is with injustice in the particular sense that we are concerned.
That there is such a thing is indicated by the fact that while the man
who exhibits in action the other forms of wickedness acts wrongly in-
deed, but not graspingly (e.g., the man who throws away his shield
through cowardice or speaks harshly through bad temper or fails to help74/Aristotle
a friend with money through meanness), when a man acts graspingly he
often exhibits none of these vices,-no, nor all together, but certainly
wickedness of some kind (for we blame him) and injustice. There is,
then, another kind of injustice which is a part of injustice in the wide
sense, and a use of the word ‘unjust’ which answers to a part of what is
unjust in the wide sense of ‘contrary to the law’. Again if one man
commits adultery for the sake of gain and makes money by it, while
another does so at the bidding of appetite though he loses money and is
penalized for it, the latter would be held to be self-indulgent rather than
grasping, but the former is unjust, but not self-indulgent; evidently, there-
fore, he is unjust by reason of his making gain by his act. Again, all
other unjust acts are ascribed invariably to some particular kind of wick-
edness, e.g., adultery to self-indulgence, the desertion of a comrade in
battle to cowardice, physical violence to anger; but if a man makes gain,
his action is ascribed to no form of wickedness but injustice. Evidently,
therefore, there is apart from injustice in the wide sense another, ‘par-
ticular,’ injustice which shares the name and nature of the first, because
its definition falls within the same genus; for the significance of both
consists in a relation to one’s neighbour, but the one is concerned with
honour or money or safety—or that which includes all these, if we had
a single name for it—and its motive is the pleasure that arises from
gain; while the other is concerned with all the objects with which the
good man is concerned.
It is clear, then, that there is more than one kind of justice, and that
there is one which is distinct from virtue entire; we must try to grasp its
genus and differentia.
The unjust has been divided into the unlawful and the unfair, and
the just into the lawful and the fair. To the unlawful answers the afore-
mentioned sense of injustice. But since unfair and the unlawful are not
the same, but are different as a part is from its whole (for all that is
unfair is unlawful, but not all that is unlawful is unfair), the unjust and
injustice in the sense of the unfair are not the same as but different from
the former kind, as part from whole; for injustice in this sense is a part
of injustice in the wide sense, and similarly justice in the one sense of
justice in the other. Therefore we must speak also about particular jus-
tice and particular and similarly about the just and the unjust. The jus-
tice, then, which answers to the whole of virtue, and the corresponding
injustice, one being the exercise of virtue as a whole, and the other that
of vice as a whole, towards one’s neighbour, we may leave on one side.Nicomachean Ethics/75
And how the meanings of ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ which answer to these are
to be distinguished is evident; for practically the majority of the acts
commanded by the law are those which are prescribed from the point of
view of virtue taken as a whole; for the law bids us practise every virtue
and forbids us to practise any vice. And the things that tend to produce
virtue taken as a whole are those of the acts prescribed by the law which
have been prescribed with a view to education for the common good.
But with regard to the education of the individual as such, which makes
him without qualification a good man, we must determine later whether
this is the function of the political art or of another; for perhaps it is not
the same to be a good man and a good citizen of any state taken at
random.
Of particular justice and that which is just in the corresponding
sense, (A) one kind is that which is manifested in distributions of honour
or money or the other things that fall to be divided among those who
have a share in the constitution (for in these it is possible for one man to
have a share either unequal or equal to that of another), and (B) one is
that which plays a rectifying part in transactions between man and man.
Of this there are two divisions; of transactions (1) some are voluntary
and (2) others involuntary—voluntary such transactions as sale, pur-
chase, loan for consumption, pledging, loan for use, depositing, letting
(they are called voluntary because the origin of these transactions is
voluntary), while of the involuntary (a) some are clandestine, such as
theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, enticement of slaves, assassina-
tion, false witness, and (b) others are violent, such as assault, imprison-
ment, murder, robbery with violence, mutilation, abuse, insult.
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(A) We have shown that both the unjust man and the unjust act are
unfair or unequal; now it is clear that there is also an intermediate be-
tween the two unequals involved in either case. And this is the equal; for
in any kind of action in which there’s a more and a less there is also
what is equal. If, then, the unjust is unequal, just is equal, as all men
suppose it to be, even apart from argument. And since the equal is inter-
mediate, the just will be an intermediate. Now equality implies at least
two things. The just, then, must be both intermediate and equal and
relative (i.e., for certain persons). And since the equall intermediate it
must be between certain things (which are respectively greater and less);
equal, it involves two things; qua just, it is for certain people. The just,76/Aristotle
therefore, involves at least four terms; for the persons for whom it is in
fact just are two, and the things in which it is manifested, the objects
distributed, are two. And the same equality will exist between the per-
sons and between the things concerned; for as the latter the things con-
cerned—are related, so are the former; if they are not equal, they will
not have what is equal, but this is the origin of quarrels and complaints—
when either equals have and are awarded unequal shares, or unequals
equal shares. Further, this is plain from the fact that awards should be
‘according to merit’; for all men agree that what is just in distribution
must be according to merit in some sense, though they do not all specify
the same sort of merit, but democrats identify it with the status of free-
man, supporters of oligarchy with wealth (or with noble birth), and sup-
porters of aristocracy with excellence.
The just, then, is a species of the proportionate (proportion being
not a property only of the kind of number which consists of abstract
units, but of number in general). For proportion is equality of ratios,
and involves four terms at least (that discrete proportion involves four
terms is plain, but so does continuous proportion, for it uses one term as
two and mentions it twice; e.g., ‘as the line A is to the line B, so is the
line B to the line C’; the line B, then, has been mentioned twice, so that
if the line B be assumed twice, the proportional terms will be four); and
the just, too, involves at least four terms, and the ratio between one pair
is the same as that between the other pair; for there is a similar distinc-
tion between the persons and between the things. As the term A, then, is
to B, so will C be to D, and therefore, alternando, as A is to C, B will be
to D. Therefore also the whole is in the same ratio to the whole; and this
coupling the distribution effects, and, if the terms are so combined, ef-
fects justly. The conjunction, then, of the term A with C and of B with D
is what is just in distribution, and this species of the just is intermediate,
and the unjust is what violates the proportion; for the proportional is
intermediate, and the just is proportional. (Mathematicians call this kind
of proportion geometrical; for it is in geometrical proportion that it fol-
lows that the whole is to the whole as either part is to the corresponding
part.) This proportion is not continuous; for we cannot get a single term
standing for a person and a thing.
This, then, is what the just is—the proportional; the unjust is what
violates the proportion. Hence one term becomes too great, the other too
small, as indeed happens in practice; for the man who acts unjustly has
too much, and the man who is unjustly treated too little, of what is good.Nicomachean Ethics/77
In the case of evil the reverse is true; for the lesser evil is reckoned a
good in comparison with the greater evil, since the lesser evil is rather to
be chosen than the greater, and what is worthy of choice is good, and
what is worthier of choice a greater good.
This, then, is one species of the just.
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(B) The remaining one is the rectificatory, which arises in connexion
with transactions both voluntary and involuntary. This form of the just
has a different specific character from the former. For the justice which
distributes common possessions is always in accordance with the kind
of proportion mentioned above (for in the case also in which the distri-
bution is made from the common funds of a partnership it will be ac-
cording to the same ratio which the funds put into the business by the
partners bear to one another); and the injustice opposed to this kind of
justice is that which violates the proportion. But the justice in transac-
tions between man and man is a sort of equality indeed, and the injustice
a sort of inequality; not according to that kind of proportion, however,
but according to arithmetical proportion. For it makes no difference
whether a good man has defrauded a bad man or a bad man a good one,
nor whether it is a good or a bad man that has committed adultery; the
law looks only to the distinctive character of the injury, and treats the
parties as equal, if one is in the wrong and the other is being wronged,
and if one inflicted injury and the other has received it. Therefore, this
kind of injustice being an inequality, the judge tries to equalize it; for in
the case also in which one has received and the other has inflicted a
wound, or one has slain and the other been slain, the suffering and the
action have been unequally distributed; but the judge tries to equalize by
means of the penalty, taking away from the gain of the assailant. For the
term ‘gain’ is applied generally to such cases, even if it be not a term
appropriate to certain cases, e.g., to the person who inflicts a woundand
‘loss’ to the sufferer; at all events when the suffering has been esti-
mated, the one is called loss and the other gain. Therefore the equal is
intermediate between the greater and the less, but the gain and the loss
are respectively greater and less in contrary ways; more of the good and
less of the evil are gain, and the contrary is loss; intermediate between
them is, as we saw, equal, which we say is just; therefore corrective
justice will be the intermediate between loss and gain. This is why, when
people dispute, they take refuge in the judge; and to go to the judge is to78/Aristotle
go to justice; for the nature of the judge is to be a sort of animate justice;
and they seek the judge as an intermediate, and in some states they call
judges mediators, on the assumption that if they get what is intermediate
they will get what is just. The just, then, is an intermediate, since the
judge is so. Now the judge restores equality; it is as though there were a
line divided into unequal parts, and he took away that by which the
greater segment exceeds the half, and added it to the smaller segment.
And when the whole has been equally divided, then they say they have
‘their own’-i.e., when they have got what is equal. The equal is interme-
diate between the greater and the lesser line according to arithmetical
proportion. It is for this reason also that it is called just (sikaion), be-
cause it is a division into two equal parts (sicha), just as if one were to
call it sichaion; and the judge (sikastes) is one who bisects (sichastes).
For when something is subtracted from one of two equals and added to
the other, the other is in excess by these two; since if what was taken
from the one had not been added to the other, the latter would have been
in excess by one only. It therefore exceeds the intermediate by one, and
the intermediate exceeds by one that from which something was taken.
By this, then, we shall recognize both what we must subtract from that
which has more, and what we must add to that which has less; we must
add to the latter that by which the intermediate exceeds it, and subtract
from the greatest that by which it exceeds the intermediate. Let the lines
AA,’ BB,’ CC’ be equal to one another; from the line AA’ let the seg-
ment AE have been subtracted, and to the line CC’ let the segment Cd
have been added, so that the whole line DCC’ exceeds the line EA’ by
the segment CD and the segment CF; therefore it exceeds the line Bb’
by the segment CD. (See diagram.)
These names, both loss and gain, have come from voluntary ex-
change; for to have more than one’s own is called gaining, and to have
less than one’s original share is called losing, e.g., in buying and selling
and in all other matters in which the law has left people free to make
their own terms; but when they get neither more nor less but just what
belongs to themselves, they say that they have their own and that they
neither lose nor gain.
Therefore the just is intermediate between a sort of gain and a sort
of loss, viz. those which are involuntary; it consists in having an equal
amount before and after the transaction.Nicomachean Ethics/79
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Some think that reciprocity is without qualification just, as the
Pythagoreans said; for they defined justice without qualification as reci-
procity. Now ‘reciprocity’ fits neither distributive nor rectificatory jus-
tice-yet people want even the justice of Rhadamanthus to mean this:
Should a man suffer what he did, right justice would be done—for
in many cases reciprocity and rectificatory justice are not in accord;
e.g., (1) if an official has inflicted a wound, he should not be wounded in
return, and if some one has wounded an official, he ought not to be
wounded only but punished in addition. Further (2) there is a great dif-
ference between a voluntary and an involuntary act. But in associations
for exchange this sort of justice does hold men together—reciprocity in
accordance with a proportion and not on the basis of precisely equal
return. For it is by proportionate requital that the city holds together.
Men seek to return either evil for evil—and if they cana not do so, think
their position mere slavery—or good for good—and if they cannot do
so there is no exchange, but it is by exchange that they hold together.
This is why they give a prominent place to the temple of the Graces—to
promote the requital of services; for this is characteristic of grace—we
should serve in return one who has shown grace to us, and should an-
other time take the initiative in showing it.
Now proportionate return is secured by cross-conjunction. Let A be
a builder, B a shoemaker, C a house, D a shoe. The builder, then, must
get from the shoemaker the latter’s work, and must himself give him in
return his own. If, then, first there is proportionate equality of goods,
and then reciprocal action takes place, the result we mention will be
effected. If not, the bargain is not equal, and does not hold; for there is
nothing to prevent the work of the one being better than that of the other;
they must therefore be equated. (And this is true of the other arts also;
for they would have been destroyed if what the patient suffered had not
been just what the agent did, and of the same amount and kind.) For it is
not two doctors that associate for exchange, but a doctor and a farmer,
or in general people who are different and unequal; but these must be
equated. This is why all things that are exchanged must be somehow
comparable. It is for this end that money has been introduced, and it
becomes in a sense an intermediate; for it measures all things, and there-
fore the excess and the defect-how many shoes are equal to a house or to
a given amount of food. The number of shoes exchanged for a house (or
for a given amount of food) must therefore correspond to the ratio of80/Aristotle
builder to shoemaker. For if this be not so, there will be no exchange and
no intercourse. And this proportion will not be effected unless the goods
are somehow equal. All goods must therefore be measured by some one
thing, as we said before. Now this unit is in truth demand, which holds
all things together (for if men did not need one another’s goods at all, or
did not need them equally, there would be either no exchange or not the
same exchange); but money has become by convention a sort of repre-
sentative of demand; and this is why it has the name ‘money’ (nomisma)—
because it exists not by nature but by law (nomos) and it is in our power
to change it and make it useless. There will, then, be reciprocity when
the terms have been equated so that as farmer is to shoemaker, the amount
of the shoemaker’s work is to that of the farmer’s work for which it
exchanges. But we must not bring them into a figure of proportion when
they have already exchanged (otherwise one extreme will have both ex-
cesses), but when they still have their own goods. Thus they are equals
and associates just because this equality can be effected in their case.
Let A be a farmer, C food, B a shoemaker, D his product equated to C.
If it had not been possible for reciprocity to be thus effected, there would
have been no association of the parties. That demand holds things to-
gether as a single unit is shown by the fact that when men do not need
one another, i.e., when neither needs the other or one does not need the
other, they do not exchange, as we do when some one wants what one
has oneself, e.g., when people permit the exportation of corn in ex-
change for wine. This equation therefore must be established. And for
the future exchange—that if we do not need a thing now we shall have it
if ever we do need it—money is as it were our surety; for it must be
possible for us to get what we want by bringing the money. Now the
same thing happens to money itself as to goods—it is not always worth
the same; yet it tends to be steadier. This is why all goods must have a
price set on them; for then there will always be exchange, and if so,
association of man with man. Money, then, acting as a measure, makes
goods commensurate and equates them; for neither would there have
been association if there were not exchange, nor exchange if there were
not equality, nor equality if there were not commensurability. Now in
truth it is impossible that things differing so much should become com-
mensurate, but with reference to demand they may become so suffi-
ciently. There must, then, be a unit, and that fixed by agreement (for
which reason it is called money); for it is this that makes all things
commensurate, since all things are measured by money. Let A be a house,Nicomachean Ethics/81
B ten minae, C a bed. A is half of B, if the house is worth five minae or
equal to them; the bed, C, is a tenth of B; it is plain, then, how many
beds are equal to a house, viz., five. That exchange took place thus
before there was money is plain; for it makes no difference whether it is
five beds that exchange for a house, or the money value of five beds.
We have now defined the unjust and the just. These having been
marked off from each other, it is plain that just action is intermediate
between acting unjustly and being unjustly treated; for the one is to have
too much and the other to have too little. Justice is a kind of mean, but
not in the same way as the other virtues, but because it relates to an
intermediate amount, while injustice relates to the extremes. And justice
is that in virtue of which the just man is said to be a doer, by choice, of
that which is just, and one who will distribute either between himself
and another or between two others not so as to give more of what is
desirable to himself and less to his neighbour (and conversely with what
is harmful), but so as to give what is equal in accordance with propor-
tion; and similarly in distributing between two other persons. Injustice
on the other hand is similarly related to the unjust, which is excess and
defect, contrary to proportion, of the useful or hurtful. For which reason
injustice is excess and defect, viz. because it is productive of excess and
defect-in one’s own case excess of what is in its own nature useful and
defect of what is hurtful, while in the case of others it is as a whole like
what it is in one’s own case, but proportion may be violated in either
direction. In the unjust act to have too little is to be unjustly treated; to
have too much is to act unjustly.
Let this be taken as our account of the nature of justice and injus-
tice, and similarly of the just and the unjust in general.
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Since acting unjustly does not necessarily imply being unjust, we must
ask what sort of unjust acts imply that the doer is unjust with respect to
each type of injustice, e.g., a thief, an adulterer, or a brigand. Surely the
answer does not turn on the difference between these types. For a man
might even lie with a woman knowing who she was, but the origin of his
might be not deliberate choice but passion. He acts unjustly, then, but is
not unjust; e.g., a man is not a thief, yet he stole, nor an adulterer, yet he
committed adultery; and similarly in all other cases.
Now we have previously stated how the reciprocal is related to the
just; but we must not forget that what we are looking for is not only82/Aristotle
what is just without qualification but also political justice. This is found
among men who share their life with a view to self-sufficiency, men who
are free and either proportionately or arithmetically equal, so that be-
tween those who do not fulfil this condition there is no political justice
but justice in a special sense and by analogy. For justice exists only
between men whose mutual relations are governed by law; and law ex-
ists for men between whom there is injustice; for legal justice is the
discrimination of the just and the unjust. And between men between
whom there is injustice there is also unjust action (though there is not
injustice between all between whom there is unjust action), and this is
assigning too much to oneself of things good in themselves and too little
of things evil in themselves. This is why we do not allow a man to rule,
but rational principle, because a man behaves thus in his own interests
and becomes a tyrant. The magistrate on the other hand is the guardian
of justice, and, if of justice, then of equality also. And since he is as-
sumed to have no more than his share, if he is just (for he does not
assign to himself more of what is good in itself, unless such a share is
proportional to his merits—so that it is for others that he labours, and it
is for this reason that men, as we stated previously, say that justice is
‘another’s good’), therefore a reward must be given him, and this is
honour and privilege; but those for whom such things are not enough
become tyrants.
The justice of a master and that of a father are not the same as the
justice of citizens, though they are like it; for there can be no injustice in
the unqualified sense towards thing that are one’s own, but a man’s
chattel, and his child until it reaches a certain age and sets up for itself,
are as it were part of himself, and no one chooses to hurt himself (for
which reason there can be no injustice towards oneself). Therefore the
justice or injustice of citizens is not manifested in these relations; for it
was as we saw according to law, and between people naturally subject
to law, and these as we saw’ are people who have an equal share in
ruling and being ruled. Hence justice can more truly be manifested to-
wards a wife than towards children and chattels, for the former is house-
hold justice; but even this is different from political justice.
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Of political justice part is natural, part legal, natural, that which every-
where has the same force and does not exist by people’s thinking this or
that; legal, that which is originally indifferent, but when it has been laidNicomachean Ethics/83
down is not indifferent, e.g., that a prisoner’s ransom shall be a mina, or
that a goat and not two sheep shall be sacrificed, and again all the laws
that are passed for particular cases, e.g., that sacrifice shall be made in
honour of Brasidas, and the provisions of decrees. Now some think that
all justice is of this sort, because that which is by nature is unchange-
able and has everywhere the same force (as fire burns both here and in
Persia), while they see change in the things recognized as just. This,
however, is not true in this unqualified way, but is true in a sense; or
rather, with the gods it is perhaps not true at all, while with us there is
something that is just even by nature, yet all of it is changeable; but still
some is by nature, some not by nature. It is evident which sort of thing,
among things capable of being otherwise, is by nature, and which is not
but is legal and conventional, assuming that both are equally change-
able. And in all other things the same distinction will apply; by nature
the right hand is stronger, yet it is possible that all men should come to
be ambidextrous. The things which are just by virtue of convention and
expediency are like measures; for wine and corn measures are not ev-
erywhere equal, but larger in wholesale and smaller in retail markets.
Similarly, the things which are just not by nature but by human enact-
ment are not everywhere the same, since constitutions also are not the
same, though there is but one which is everywhere by nature the best.
Of things just and lawful each is related as the universal to its particu-
lars; for the things that are done are many, but of them each is one, since
it is universal.
There is a difference between the act of injustice and what is unjust,
and between the act of justice and what is just; for a thing is unjust by
nature or by enactment; and this very thing, when it has been done, is an
act of injustice, but before it is done is not yet that but is unjust. So, too,
with an act of justice (though the general term is rather ‘just action,’ and
‘act of justice’ is applied to the correction of the act of injustice).
Each of these must later be examined separately with regard to the
nature and number of its species and the nature of the things with which
it is concerned.
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Acts just and unjust being as we have described them, a man acts un-
justly or justly whenever he does such acts voluntarily; when involun-
tarily, he acts neither unjustly nor justly except in an incidental way; for
he does things which happen to be just or unjust. Whether an act is or is84/Aristotle
not one of injustice (or of justice) is determined by its voluntariness or
involuntariness; for when it is voluntary it is blamed, and at the same
time is then an act of injustice; so that there will be things that are unjust
but not yet acts of injustice, if voluntariness be not present as well. By
the voluntary I mean, as has been said before, any of the things in a
man’s own power which he does with knowledge, i.e., not in ignorance
either of the person acted on or of the instrument used or of the end that
will be attained (e.g., whom he is striking, with what, and to what end),
each such act being done not incidentally nor under compulsion (e.g., if
A takes B’s hand and therewith strikes C, B does not act voluntarily; for
the act was not in his own power). The person struck may be the striker’s
father, and the striker may know that it is a man or one of the persons
present, but not know that it is his father; a similar distinction may be
made in the case of the end, and with regard to the whole action. There-
fore that which is done in ignorance, or though not done in ignorance is
not in the agent’s power, or is done under compulsion, is involuntary
(for many natural processes, even, we knowingly both perform and ex-
perience, none of which is either voluntary or involuntary; e.g., growing
old or dying). But in the case of unjust and just acts alike the injustice or
justice may be only incidental; for a man might return a deposit unwill-
ingly and from fear, and then he must not be said either to do what is just
or to act justly, except in an incidental way. Similarly the man who
under compulsion and unwillingly fails to return the deposit must be
said to act unjustly, and to do what is unjust, only incidentally. Of vol-
untary acts we do some by choice, others not by choice; by choice those
which we do after deliberation, not by choice those which we do without
previous deliberation. Thus there are three kinds of injury in transac-
tions between man and man; those done in ignorance are mistakes when
the person acted on, the act, the instrument, or the end that will be at-
tained is other than the agent supposed; the agent thought either that he
was not hiting any one or that he was not hitting with this missile or not
hitting this person or to this end, but a result followed other than that
which he thought likely (e.g., he threw not with intent to wound but only
to prick), or the person hit or the missile was other than he supposed.
Now when (1) the injury takes place contrary to reasonable expectation,
it is a misadventure. When (2) it is not contrary to reasonable expecta-
tion, but does not imply vice, it is a mistake (for a man makes a mistake
when the fault originates in him, but is the victim of accident when the
origin lies outside him). When (3) he acts with knowledge but not afterNicomachean Ethics/85
deliberation, it is an act of injustice—e.g., the acts due to anger or to
other passions necessary or natural to man; for when men do such harmful
and mistaken acts they act unjustly, and the acts are acts of injustice,
but this does not imply that the doers are unjust or wicked; for the injury
is not due to vice. But when (4) a man acts from choice, he is an unjust
man and a vicious man.
Hence acts proceeding from anger are rightly judged not to be done
of malice aforethought; for it is not the man who acts in anger but he
who enraged him that starts the mischief. Again, the matter in dispute is
not whether the thing happened or not, but its justice; for it is apparent
injustice that occasions rage. For they do not dispute about the occur-
rence of the act-as in commercial transactions where one of the two
parties must be vicious-unless they do so owing to forgetfulness; but,
agreeing about the fact, they dispute on which side justice lies (whereas
a man who has deliberately injured another cannot help knowing that he
has done so), so that the one thinks he is being treated unjustly and the
other disagrees.
But if a man harms another by choice, he acts unjustly; and these
are the acts of injustice which imply that the doer is an unjust man,
provided that the act violates proportion or equality. Similarly, a man is
just when he acts justly by choice; but he acts justly if he merely acts
voluntarily.
Of involuntary acts some are excusable, others not. For the mis-
takes which men make not only in ignorance but also from ignorance
are excusable, while those which men do not from ignorance but (though
they do them in ignorance) owing to a passion which is neither natural
nor such as man is liable to, are not excusable.
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Assuming that we have sufficiently defined the suffering and doing of
injustice, it may be asked (1) whether the truth in expressed in Euripides’
paradoxical words:
I slew my mother, that’s my tale in brief. Were you both willing, or
unwilling both?
Is it truly possible to be willingly treated unjustly, or is all suffering
of injustice the contrary involuntary, as all unjust action is voluntary?
And is all suffering of injustice of the latter kind or else all of the former,86/Aristotle
or is it sometimes voluntary, sometimes involuntary? So, too, with the
case of being justly treated; all just action is voluntary, so that it is
reasonable that there should be a similar opposition in either case—that
both being unjustly and being justly treated should be either alike volun-
tary or alike involuntary. But it would be thought paradoxical even in
the case of being justly treated, if it were always voluntary; for some are
unwillingly treated justly. (2) One might raise this question also, whether
every one who has suffered what is unjust is being unjustly treated, or
on the other hand it is with suffering as with acting. In action and in
passivity alike it is possible to partake of justice incidentally, and simi-
larly (it is plain) of injustice; for to do what is unjust is not the same as
to act unjustly, nor to suffer what is unjust as to be treated unjustly, and
similarly in the case of acting justly and being justly treated; for it is
impossible to be unjustly treated if the other does not act unjustly, or
justly treated unless he acts justly. Now if to act unjustly is simply to
harm some one voluntarily, and ‘voluntarily’ means ‘knowing the per-
son acted on, the instrument, and the manner of one’s acting,’ and the
incontinent man voluntarily harms himself, not only will he voluntarily
be unjustly treated but it will be possible to treat oneself unjustly. (This
also is one of the questions in doubt, whether a man can treat himself
unjustly.) Again, a man may voluntarily, owing to incontinence, be
harmed by another who acts voluntarily, so that it would be possible to
be voluntarily treated unjustly. Or is our definition incorrect; must we to
‘harming another, with knowledge both of the person acted on, of the
instrument, and of the manner’ add ‘contrary to the wish of the person
acted on’? Then a man may be voluntarily harmed and voluntarily suf-
fer what is unjust, but no one is voluntarily treated unjustly; for no one
wishes to be unjustly treated, not even the incontinent man. He acts
contrary to his wish; for no one wishes for what he does not think to be
good, but the incontinent man does do things that he does not think he
ought to do. Again, one who gives what is his own, as Homer says
Glaucus gave Diomede
Armour of gold for brazen, the price of a hundred beeves for nine, is
not unjustly treated; for though to give is in his power, to be unjustly
treated is not, but there must be some one to treat him unjustly. It is
plain, then, that being unjustly treated is not voluntary.
Of the questions we intended to discuss two still remain for discus-
sion; (3) whether it is the man who has assigned to another more than
his share that acts unjustly, or he who has the excessive share, and (4)Nicomachean Ethics/87
whether it is possible to treat oneself unjustly. The questions are con-
nected; for if the former alternative is possible and the distributor acts
unjustly and not the man who has the excessive share, then if a man
assigns more to another than to himself, knowingly and voluntarily, he
treats himself unjustly; which is what modest people seem to do, since
the virtuous man tends to take less than his share. Or does this statement
too need qualification? For (a) he perhaps gets more than his share of
some other good, e.g., of honour or of intrinsic nobility. (b) The ques-
tion is solved by applying the distinction we applied to unjust action; for
he suffers nothing contrary to his own wish, so that he is not unjustly
treated as far as this goes, but at most only suffers harm.
It is plain too that the distributor acts unjustly, but not always the
man who has the excessive share; for it is not he to whom what is unjust
appertains that acts unjustly, but he to whom it appertains to do the
unjust act voluntarily, i.e., the person in whom lies the origin of the
action, and this lies in the distributor, not in the receiver. Again, since
the word ‘do’ is ambiguous, and there is a sense in which lifeless things,
or a hand, or a servant who obeys an order, may be said to slay, he who
gets an excessive share does not act unjustly, though he ‘does’ what is
unjust.
Again, if the distributor gave his judgement in ignorance, he does
not act unjustly in respect of legal justice, and his judgement is not
unjust in this sense, but in a sense it is unjust (for legal justice and
primordial justice are different); but if with knowledge he judged un-
justly, he is himself aiming at an excessive share either of gratitude or of
revenge. As much, then, as if he were to share in the plunder, the man
who has judged unjustly for these reasons has got too much; the fact
that what he gets is different from what he distributes makes no differ-
ence, for even if he awards land with a view to sharing in the plunder he
gets not land but money.
Men think that acting unjustly is in their power, and therefore that
being just is easy. But it is not; to lie with one’s neighbour’s wife, to
wound another, to deliver a bribe, is easy and in our power, but to do
these things as a result of a certain state of character is neither easy nor
in our power. Similarly to know what is just and what is unjust requires,
men think, no great wisdom, because it is not hard to understand the
matters dealt with by the laws (though these are not the things that are
just, except incidentally); but how actions must be done and distribu-
tions effected in order to be just, to know this is a greater achievement88/Aristotle
than knowing what is good for the health; though even there, while it is
easy to know that honey, wine, hellebore, cautery, and the use of the
knife are so, to know how, to whom, and when these should be applied
with a view to producing health, is no less an achievement than that of
being a physician. Again, for this very reason men think that acting
unjustly is characteristic of the just man no less than of the unjust, be-
cause he would be not less but even more capable of doing each of these
unjust acts; for he could lie with a woman or wound a neighbour; and
the brave man could throw away his shield and turn to flight in this
direction or in that. But to play the coward or to act unjustly consists
not in doing these things, except incidentally, but in doing them as the
result of a certain state of character, just as to practise medicine and
healing consists not in applying or not applying the knife, in using or not
using medicines, but in doing so in a certain way.
Just acts occur between people who participate in things good in
themselves and can have too much or too little of them; for some beings
(e.g., presumably the gods) cannot have too much of them, and to oth-
ers, those who are incurably bad, not even the smallest share in them is
beneficial but all such goods are harmful, while to others they are ben-
eficial up to a point; therefore justice is essentially something human.
10 Our next subject is equity and the equitable (to epiekes), and
their respective relations to justice and the just. For on examination they
appear to be neither absolutely the same nor generically different; and
while we sometime praise what is equitable and the equitable man (so
that we apply the name by way of praise even to instances of the other
virtues, instead of ‘good’ meaning by epieikestebon that a thing is bet-
ter), at other times, when we reason it out, it seems strange if the equi-
table, being something different from the just, is yet praiseworthy; for
either the just or the equitable is not good, if they are different; or, if
both are good, they are the same.
These, then, are pretty much the considerations that give rise to the
problem about the equitable; they are all in a sense correct and not
opposed to one another; for the equitable, though it is better than one
kind of justice, yet is just, and it is not as being a different class of thing
that it is better than the just. The same thing, then, is just and equitable,
and while both are good the equitable is superior. What creates the prob-
lem is that the equitable is just, but not the legally just but a correction
of legal justice. The reason is that all law is universal but about some
things it is not possible to make a universal statement which shall beNicomachean Ethics/89
correct. In those cases, then, in which it is necessary to speak univer-
sally, but not possible to do so correctly, the law takes the usual case,
though it is not ignorant of the possibility of error. And it is none the less
correct; for the error is in the law nor in the legislator but in the nature
of the thing, since the matter of practical affairs is of this kind from the
start. When the law speaks universally, then, and a case arises on it
which is not covered by the universal statement, then it is right, where
the legislator fails us and has erred by oversimplicity, to correct the
omission—to say what the legislator himself would have said had he
been present, and would have put into his law if he had known. Hence
the equitable is just, and better than one kind of justice—not better than
absolute justice but better than the error that arises from the absolute-
ness of the statement. And this is the nature of the equitable, a correc-
tion of law where it is defective owing to its universality. In fact this is
the reason why all things are not determined by law, that about some
things it is impossible to lay down a law, so that a decree is needed. For
when the thing is indefinite the rule also is indefinite, like the leaden rule
used in making the Lesbian moulding; the rule adapts itself to the shape
of the stone and is not rigid, and so too the decree is adapted to the facts.
It is plain, then, what the equitable is, and that it is just and is better
than one kind of justice. It is evident also from this who the equitable
man is; the man who chooses and does such acts, and is no stickler for
his rights in a bad sense but tends to take less than his share though he
has the law oft his side, is equitable, and this state of character is equity,
which is a sort of justice and not a different state of character.
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Whether a man can treat himself unjustly or not, is evident from what
has been said. For (a) one class of just acts are those acts in accordance
with any virtue which are prescribed by the law; e.g., the law does not
expressly permit suicide, and what it does not expressly permit it for-
bids. Again, when a man in violation of the law harms another (other-
wise than in retaliation) voluntarily, he acts unjustly, and a voluntary
agent is one who knows both the person he is affecting by his action and
the instrument he is using; and he who through anger voluntarily stabs
himself does this contrary to the right rule of life, and this the law does
not allow; therefore he is acting unjustly. But towards whom? Surely
towards the state, not towards himself. For he suffers voluntarily, but
no one is voluntarily treated unjustly. This is also the reason why the90/Aristotle
state punishes; a certain loss of civil rights attaches to the man who
destroys himself, on the ground that he is treating the state unjustly.
Further (b) in that sense of ‘acting unjustly’ in which the man who
‘acts unjustly’ is unjust only and not bad all round, it is not possible to
treat oneself unjustly (this is different from the former sense; the unjust
man in one sense of the term is wicked in a particularized way just as the
coward is, not in the sense of being wicked all round, so that his ‘unjust
act’ does not manifest wickedness in general). For (i) that would imply
the possibility of the same thing’s having been subtracted from and added
to the same thing at the same time; but this is impossible—the just and
the unjust always involve more than one person. Further, (ii) unjust
action is voluntary and done by choice, and takes the initiative (for the
man who because he has suffered does the same in return is not thought
to act unjustly); but if a man harms himself he suffers and does the same
things at the same time. Further, (iii) if a man could treat himself un-
justly, he could be voluntarily treated unjustly. Besides, (iv) no one acts
unjustly without committing particular acts of injustice; but no one can
commit adultery with his own wife or housebreaking on his own house
or theft on his own property,
In general, the question ‘can a man treat himself unjustly?’ is solved
also by the distinction we applied to the question ‘can a man be volun-
tarily treated unjustly?’
(It is evident too that both are bad, being unjustly treated and acting
unjustly; for the one means having less and the other having more than
the intermediate amount, which plays the part here that the healthy does
in the medical art, and that good condition does in the art of bodily
training. But still acting unjustly is the worse, for it involves vice and is
blameworthy—involves vice which is either of the complete and un-
qualified kind or almost so (we must admit the latter alternative, be-
cause not all voluntary unjust action implies injustice as a state of char-
acter), while being unjustly treated does not involve vice and injustice in
oneself. In itself, then, being unjustly treated is less bad, but there is
nothing to prevent its being incidentally a greater evil. But theory cares
nothing for this; it calls pleurisy a more serious mischief than a stumble;
yet the latter may become incidentally the more serious, if the fall due to
it leads to your being taken prisoner or put to death the enemy.)
Metaphorically and in virtue of a certain resemblance there is a
justice, not indeed between a man and himself, but between certain parts
of him; yet not every kind of justice but that of master and servant orNicomachean Ethics/91
that of husband and wife. For these are the ratios in which the part of the
soul that has a rational principle stands to the irrational part; and it is
with a view to these parts that people also think a man can be unjust to
himself, viz., because these parts are liable to suffer something contrary
to their respective desires; there is therefore thought to be a mutual
justice between them as between ruler and ruled.




Since we have previously said that one ought to choose that which is
intermediate, not the excess nor the defect, and that the intermediate is
determined by the dictates of the right rule, let us discuss the nature of
these dictates. In all the states of character we have mentioned, as in all
other matters, there is a mark to which the man who has the rule looks,
and heightens or relaxes his activity accordingly, and there is a standard
which determines the mean states which we say are intermediate be-
tween excess and defect, being in accordance with the right rule. But
such a statement, though true, is by no means clear; for not only here
but in all other pursuits which are objects of knowledge it is indeed true
to say that we must not exert ourselves nor relax our efforts too much
nor too little, but to an intermediate extent and as the right rule dictates;
but if a man had only this knowledge he would be none the wiser e.g.,
we should not know what sort of medicines to apply to our body if some
one were to say ‘all those which the medical art prescribes, and which
agree with the practice of one who possesses the art’. Hence it is neces-
sary with regard to the states of the soul also not only that this true
statement should be made, but also that it should be determined what is
the right rule and what is the standard that fixes it.
We divided the virtues of the soul and a said that some are virtues of
character and others of intellect. Now we have discussed in detail the
moral virtues; with regard to the others let us express our view as fol-
lows, beginning with some remarks about the soul. We said before that
there are two parts of the soul—that which grasps a rule or rational
principle, and the irrational; let us now draw a similar distinction within
the part which grasps a rational principle. And let it be assumed that
there are two parts which grasp a rational principle—one by which we
contemplate the kind of things whose originative causes are invariable,92/Aristotle
and one by which we contemplate variable things; for where objects
differ in kind the part of the soul answering to each of the two is differ-
ent in kind, since it is in virtue of a certain likeness and kinship with
their objects that they have the knowledge they have. Let one of these
parts be called the scientific and the other the calculative; for to deliber-
ate and to calculate are the same thing, but no one deliberates about the
invariable. Therefore the calculative is one part of the faculty which
grasps a rational principle. We must, then, learn what is the best state of
each of these two parts; for this is the virtue of each.
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The virtue of a thing is relative to its proper work. Now there are three
things in the soul which control action and truth-sensation, reason, de-
sire.
Of these sensation originates no action; this is plain from the fact
that the lower animals have sensation but no share in action.
What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoid-
ance are in desire; so that since moral virtue is a state of character
concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both
the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be
good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts. Now this
kind of intellect and of truth is practical; of the intellect which is con-
templative, not practical nor productive, the good and the bad state are
truth and falsity respectively (for this is the work of everything intellec-
tual); while of the part which is practical and intellectual the good state
is truth in agreement with right desire.
The origin of action—its efficient, not its final cause—is choice,
and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end. This is
why choice cannot exist either without reason and intellect or without a
moral state; for good action and its opposite cannot exist without a
combination of intellect and character. Intellect itself, however, moves
nothing, but only the intellect which aims at an end and is practical; for
this rules the productive intellect, as well, since every one who makes
makes for an end, and that which is made is not an end in the unqualified
sense (but only an end in a particular relation, and the end of a particu-
lar operation)—only that which is done is that; for good action is an
end, and desire aims at this. Hence choice is either desiderative reason
or ratiocinative desire, and such an origin of action is a man. (It is to be
noted that nothing that is past is an object of choice, e.g., no one choosesNicomachean Ethics/93
to have sacked Troy; for no one deliberates about the past, but about
what is future and capable of being otherwise, while what is past is not
capable of not having taken place; hence Agathon is right in saying
For this alone is lacking even to God, To make undone things thathave
once been done.)
The work of both the intellectual parts, then, is truth. Therefore the
states that are most strictly those in respect of which each of these parts
will reach truth are the virtues of the two parts.
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Let us begin, then, from the beginning, and discuss these states once
more. Let it be assumed that the states by virtue of which the soul pos-
sesses truth by way of affirmation or denial are five in number, i.e., art,
scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, intuitive
reason; we do not include judgement and opinion because in these we
may be mistaken.
Now what scientific knowledge is, if we are to speak exactly and
not follow mere similarities, is plain from what follows. We all suppose
that what we know is not even capable of being otherwise; of things
capable of being otherwise we do not know, when they have passed
outside our observation, whether they exist or not. Therefore the object
of scientific knowledge is of necessity. Therefore it is eternal; for things
that are of necessity in the unqualified sense are all eternal; and things
that are eternal are ungenerated and imperishable. Again, every science
is thought to be capable of being taught, and its object of being learned.
And all teaching starts from what is already known, as we maintain in
the Analytics also; for it proceeds sometimes through induction and
sometimes by syllogism. Now induction is the starting-point which knowl-
edge even of the universal presupposes, while syllogism proceeds from
universals. There are therefore starting-points from which syllogism
proceeds, which are not reached by syllogism; it is therefore by induc-
tion that they are acquired. Scientific knowledge is, then, a state of ca-
pacity to demonstrate, and has the other limiting characteristics which
we specify in the Analytics, for it is when a man believes in a certain
way and the starting-points are known to him that he has scientific knowl-
edge, since if they are not better known to him than the conclusion, he
will have his knowledge only incidentally.
Let this, then, be taken as our account of scientific knowledge.94/Aristotle
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In the variable are included both things made and things done; making
and acting are different (for their nature we treat even the discussions
outside our school as reliable); so that the reasoned state of capacity to
act is different from the reasoned state of capacity to make. Hence too
they are not included one in the other; for neither is acting making nor is
making acting. Now since architecture is an art and is essentially a rea-
soned state of capacity to make, and there is neither any art that is not
such a state nor any such state that is not an art, art is identical with a
state of capacity to make, involving a true course of reasoning. All art is
concerned with coming into being, i.e., with contriving and considering
how something may come into being which is capable of either being or
not being, and whose origin is in the maker and not in the thing made;
for art is concerned neither with things that are, or come into being, by
necessity, nor with things that do so in accordance with nature (since
these have their origin in themselves). Making and acting being differ-
ent, art must be a matter of making, not of acting. And in a sense chance
and art are concerned with the same objects; as Agathon says, ‘art loves
chance and chance loves art’. Art, then, as has been is a state concerned
with making, involving a true course of reasoning, and lack of art on the
contrary is a state concerned with making, involving a false course of
reasoning; both are concerned with the variable.
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Regarding practical wisdom we shall get at the truth by considering
who are the persons we credit with it. Now it is thought to be the mark
of a man of practical wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is
good and expedient for himself, not in some particular respect, e.g.,
about what sorts of thing conduce to health or to strength, but about
what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general. This is shown by
the fact that we credit men with practical wisdom in some particular
respect when they have calculated well with a view to some good end
which is one of those that are not the object of any art. It follows that in
the general sense also the man who is capable of deliberating has prac-
tical wisdom. Now no one deliberates about things that are invariable,
nor about things that it is impossible for him to do. Therefore, since
scientific knowledge involves demonstration, but there is no demonstra-
tion of things whose first principles are variable (for all such things
might actually be otherwise), and since it is impossible to deliberateNicomachean Ethics/95
about things that are of necessity, practical wisdom cannot be scientific
knowledge nor art; not science because that which can be done is ca-
pable of being otherwise, not art because action and making are differ-
ent kinds of thing. The remaining alternative, then, is that it is a true and
reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good
or bad for man. For while making has an end other than itself, action
cannot; for good action itself is its end. It is for this reason that we think
Pericles and men like him have practical wisdom, viz. because they can
see what is good for themselves and what is good for men in general; we
consider that those can do this who are good at managing households or
states. (This is why we call temperance (sophrosune) by this name; we
imply that it preserves one’s practical wisdom (sozousa tan phronsin).
Now what it preserves is a judgement of the kind we have described.
For it is not any and every judgement that pleasant and painful objects
destroy and pervert, e.g., the judgement that the triangle has or has not
its angles equal to two right angles, but only judgements about what is
to be done. For the originating causes of the things that are done consist
in the end at which they are aimed; but the man who has been ruined by
pleasure or pain forthwith fails to see any such originating cause—to
see that for the sake of this or because of this he ought to choose and do
whatever he chooses and does; for vice is destructive of the originating
cause of action.) Practical wisdom, then, must be a reasoned and true
state of capacity to act with regard to human goods. But further, while
there is such a thing as excellence in art, there is no such thing as excel-
lence in practical wisdom; and in art he who errs willingly is preferable,
but in practical wisdom, as in the virtues, he is the reverse. Plainly, then,
practical wisdom is a virtue and not an art. There being two parts of the
soul that can follow a course of reasoning, it must be the virtue of one of
the two, i.e., of that part which forms opinions; for opinion is about the
variable and so is practical wisdom. But yet it is not only a reasoned
state; this is shown by the fact that a state of that sort may forgotten but
practical wisdom cannot.
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Scientific knowledge is judgement about things that are universal and
necessary, and the conclusions of demonstration, and all scientific knowl-
edge, follow from first principles (for scientific knowledge involves ap-
prehension of a rational ground). This being so, the first principle from
which what is scientifically known follows cannot be an object of scien-96/Aristotle
tific knowledge, of art, or of practical wisdom; for that which can be
scientifically known can be demonstrated, and art and practical wisdom
deal with things that are variable. Nor are these first principles the ob-
jects of philosophic wisdom, for it is a mark of the philosopher to have
demonstration about some things. If, then, the states of mind by which
we have truth and are never deceived about things invariable or even
variable are scientific knowlededge, practical wisdom, philosophic wis-
dom, and intuitive reason, and it cannot be any of the three (i.e., practi-
cal wisdom, scientific knowledge, or philosophic wisdom), the remain-
ing alternative is that it is intuitive reason that grasps the first prin-
ciples.
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Wisdom (1) in the arts we ascribe to their most finished exponents, e.g.,
to Phidias as a sculptor and to Polyclitus as a maker of portrait-statues,
and here we mean nothing by wisdom except excellence in art; but (2)
we think that some people are wise in general, not in some particular
field or in any other limited respect, as Homer says in the Margites,
Him did the gods make neither a digger nor yet a ploughman
Nor wise in anything else. Therefore wisdom must plainly be the
most finished of the forms of knowledge. It follows that the wise man
must not only know what follows from the first principles, but must also
possess truth about the first principles. Therefore wisdom must be intui-
tive reason combined with scientific knowledge—scientific knowledge
of the highest objects which has received as it were its proper comple-
tion.
Of the highest objects, we say; for it would be strange to think that
the art of politics, or practical wisdom, is the best knowledge, since man
is not the best thing in the world. Now if what is healthy or good is
different for men and for fishes, but what is white or straight is always
the same, any one would say that what is wise is the same but what is
practically wise is different; for it is to that which observes well the
various matters concerning itself that one ascribes practical wisdom,
and it is to this that one will entrust such matters. This is why we say
that some even of the lower animals have practical wisdom, viz. those
which are found to have a power of foresight with regard to their own
life. It is evident also that philosophic wisdom and the art of politicsNicomachean Ethics/97
cannot be the same; for if the state of mind concerned with a man’s own
interests is to be called philosophic wisdom, there will be many philo-
sophic wisdoms; there will not be one concerned with the good of all
animals (any more than there is one art of medicine for all existing
things), but a different philosophic wisdom about the good of each spe-
cies.
But if the argument be that man is the best of the animals, this
makes no difference; for there are other things much more divine in their
nature even than man, e.g., most conspicuously, the bodies of which the
heavens are framed. From what has been said it is plain, then, that philo-
sophic wisdom is scientific knowledge, combined with intuitive reason,
of the things that are highest by nature. This is why we say Anaxagoras,
Thales, and men like them have philosophic but not practical wisdom,
when we see them ignorant of what is to their own advantage, and why
we say that they know things that are remarkable, admirable, difficult,
and divine, but useless; viz., because it is not human goods that they
seek.
Practical wisdom on the other hand is concerned with things human
and things about which it is possible to deliberate; for we say this is
above all the work of the man of practical wisdom, to deliberate well,
but no one deliberates about things invariable, nor about things which
have not an end, and that a good that can be brought about by action.
The man who is without qualification good at deliberating is the man
who is capable of aiming in accordance with calculation at the best for
man of things attainable by action. Nor is practical wisdom concerned
with universals only—it must also recognize the particulars; for it is
practical, and practice is concerned with particulars. This is why some
who do not know, and especially those who have experience, are more
practical than others who know; for if a man knew that light meats are
digestible and wholesome, but did not know which sorts of meat are
light, he would not produce health, but the man who knows that chicken
is wholesome is more likely to produce health.
Now practical wisdom is concerned with action; therefore one should
have both forms of it, or the latter in preference to the former. But of
practical as of philosophic wisdom there must be a controlling kind.98/Aristotle
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Political wisdom and practical wisdom are the same state of mind, but
their essence is not the same. Of the wisdom concerned with the city, the
practical wisdom which plays a controlling part is legislative wisdom,
while that which is related to this as particulars to their universal is
known by the general name ‘political wisdom’; this has to do with ac-
tion and deliberation, for a decree is a thing to be carried out in the form
of an individual act. This is why the exponents of this art are alone said
to ‘take part in politics’; for these alone ‘do things’ as manual labourers
‘do things.’
Practical wisdom also is identified especially with that form of it
which is concerned with a man himself—with the individual; and this is
known by the general name ‘practical wisdom’; of the other kinds one is
called household management, another legislation, the third politics, and
of the latter one part is called deliberative and the other judicial. Now
knowing what is good for oneself will be one kind of knowledge, but it
is very different from the other kinds; and the man who knows and
concerns himself with his own interests is thought to have practical wis-
dom, while politicians are thought to be busybodies; hence the word of
Euripides,
But how could I be wise, who might at ease, Numbered among the
army’s multitude, Have had an equal share? For those who aim too high
and do too much. Those who think thus seek their own good, and con-
sider that one ought to do so. From this opinion, then, has come the view
that such men have practical wisdom; yet perhaps one’s own good can-
not exist without household management, nor without a form of govern-
ment. Further, how one should order one’s own affairs is not clear and
needs inquiry.
What has been said is confirmed by the fact that while young men
become geometricians and mathematicians and wise in matters like these,
it is thought that a young man of practical wisdom cannot be found. The
cause is that such wisdom is concerned not only with universals but
with particulars, which become familiar from experience, but a young
man has no experience, for it is length of time that gives experience;
indeed one might ask this question too, why a boy may become a math-
ematician, but not a philosopher or a physicist. It is because the objects
of mathematics exist by abstraction, while the first principles of these
other subjects come from experience, and because young men have no
conviction about the latter but merely use the proper language, while theNicomachean Ethics/99
essence of mathematical objects is plain enough to them?
Further, error in deliberation may be either about the universal or
about the particular; we may fall to know either that all water that weighs
heavy is bad, or that this particular water weighs heavy.
That practical wisdom is not scientific knowledge is evident; for it
is, as has been said, concerned with the ultimate particular fact, since
the thing to be done is of this nature. It is opposed, then, to intuitive
reason; for intuitive reason is of the limiting premisses, for which no
reason can be given, while practical wisdom is concerned with the ulti-
mate particular, which is the object not of scientific knowledge but of
perception—not the perception of qualities peculiar to one sense but a
perception akin to that by which we perceive that the particular figure
before us is a triangle; for in that direction as well as in that of the major
premiss there will be a limit. But this is rather perception than practical
wisdom, though it is another kind of perception than that of the qualities
peculiar to each sense.
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There is a difference between inquiry and deliberation; for deliberation
is inquiry into a particular kind of thing. We must grasp the nature of
excellence in deliberation as well whether it is a form of scientific knowl-
edge, or opinion, or skill in conjecture, or some other kind of thing.
Scientific knowledge it is not; for men do not inquire about the things
they know about, but good deliberation is a kind of deliberation, and he
who deliberates inquires and calculates. Nor is it skill in conjecture; for
this both involves no reasoning and is something that is quick in its
operation, while men deliberate a long time, and they say that one should
carry out quickly the conclusions of one’s deliberation, but should de-
liberate slowly. Again, readiness of mind is different from excellence in
deliberation; it is a sort of skill in conjecture. Nor again is excellence in
deliberation opinion of any sort. But since the man who deliberates badly
makes a mistake, while he who deliberates well does so correctly, excel-
lence in deliberation is clearly a kind of correctness, but neither of knowl-
edge nor of opinion; for there is no such thing as correctness of knowl-
edge (since there is no such thing as error of knowledge), and correct-
ness of opinion is truth; and at the same time everything that is an object
of opinion is already determined. But again excellence in deliberation
involves reasoning. The remaining alternative, then, is that it is correct-
ness of thinking; for this is not yet assertion, since, while even opinion is100/Aristotle
not inquiry but has reached the stage of assertion, the man who is delib-
erating, whether he does so well or ill, is searching for something and
calculating.
But excellence in deliberation is a certain correctness of delibera-
tion; hence we must first inquire what deliberation is and what it is
about. And, there being more than one kind of correctness, plainly ex-
cellence in deliberation is not any and every kind; for (1) the incontinent
man and the bad man, if he is clever, will reach as a result of his calcu-
lation what he sets before himself, so that he will have deliberated cor-
rectly, but he will have got for himself a great evil. Now to have deliber-
ated well is thought to be a good thing; for it is this kind of correctness
of deliberation that is excellence in deliberation, viz. that which tends to
attain what is good. But (2) it is possible to attain even good by a false
syllogism, and to attain what one ought to do but not by the right means,
the middle term being false; so that this too is not yet excellence in
deliberation this state in virtue of which one attains what one ought but
not by the right means. Again (3) it is possible to attain it by long delib-
eration while another man attains it quickly. Therefore in the former
case we have not yet got excellence in deliberation, which is rightness
with regard to the expedient—rightness in respect both of the end, the
manner, and the time. (4) Further it is possible to have deliberated well
either in the unqualified sense or with reference to a particular end.
Excellence in deliberation in the unqualified sense, then, is that which
succeeds with reference to what is the end in the unqualified sense, and
excellence in deliberation in a particular sense is that which succeeds
relatively to a particular end. If, then, it is characteristic of men of prac-
tical wisdom to have deliberated well, excellence in deliberation will be
correctness with regard to what conduces to the end of which practical
wisdom is the true apprehension.
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Understanding, also, and goodness of understanding, in virtue of which
men are said to be men of understanding or of good understanding, are
neither entirely the same as opinion or scientific knowledge (for at that
rate all men would have been men of understanding), nor are they one of
the particular sciences, such as medicine, the science of things con-
nected with health, or geometry, the science of spatial magnitudes. For
understanding is neither about things that are always and are unchange-
able, nor about any and every one of the things that come into being, butNicomachean Ethics/101
about things which may become subjects of questioning and delibera-
tion. Hence it is about the same objects as practical wisdom; but under-
standing and practical wisdom are not the same. For practical wisdom
issues commands, since its end is what ought to be done or not to be
done; but understanding only judges. (Understanding is identical with
goodness of understanding, men of understanding with men of good
understanding.) Now understanding is neither the having nor the ac-
quiring of practical wisdom; but as learning is called understanding
when it means the exercise of the faculty of knowledge, so ‘understand-
ing’ is applicable to the exercise of the faculty of opinion for the pur-
pose of judging of what some one else says about matters with which
practical wisdom is concerned—and of judging soundly; for ‘well’ and
‘soundly’ are the same thing. And from this has come the use of the
name ‘understanding’ in virtue of which men are said to be ‘of good
understanding,’ viz., from the application of the word to the grasping of
scientific truth; for we often call such grasping understanding.
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What is called judgement, in virtue of which men are said to ‘be sympa-
thetic judges’ and to ‘have judgement,’ is the right discrimination of the
equitable. This is shown by the fact that we say the equitable man is
above all others a man of sympathetic judgement, and identify equity
with sympathetic judgement about certain facts. And sympathetic judge-
ment is judgement which discriminates what is equitable and does so
correctly; and correct judgement is that which judges what is true.
Now all the states we have considered converge, as might be ex-
pected, to the same point; for when we speak of judgement and under-
standing and practical wisdom and intuitive reason we credit the same
people with possessing judgement and having reached years of reason
and with having practical wisdom and understanding. For all these fac-
ulties deal with ultimates, i.e., with particulars; and being a man of
understanding and of good or sympathetic judgement consists in being
able judge about the things with which practical wisdom is concerned;
for the equities are common to all good men in relation to other men.
Now all things which have to be done are included among particulars or
ultimates; for not only must the man of practical wisdom know particu-
lar facts, but understanding and judgement are also concerned with things
to be done, and these are ultimates. And intuitive reason is concerned
with the ultimates in both directions; for both the first terms and the last102/Aristotle
are objects of intuitive reason and not of argument, and the intuitive
reason which is presupposed by demonstrations grasps the unchange-
able and first terms, while the intuitive reason involved in practical rea-
sonings grasps the last and variable fact, i.e., the minor premiss. For
these variable facts are the starting-points for the apprehension of the
end, since the universals are reached from the particulars; of these there-
fore we must have perception, and this perception is intuitive reason.
This is why these states are thought to be natural endowments—
why, while no one is thought to be a philosopher by nature, people are
thought to have by nature judgement, understanding, and intuitive rea-
son. This is shown by the fact that we think our powers correspond to
our time of life, and that a particular age brings with it intuitive reason
and judgement; this implies that nature is the cause. (Hence intuitive
reason is both beginning and end; for demonstrations are from these and
about these.) Therefore we ought to attend to the undemonstrated say-
ings and opinions of experienced and older people or of people of prac-
tical wisdom not less than to demonstrations; for because experience
has given them an eye they see aright.
We have stated, then, what practical and philosophic wisdom are,
and with what each of them is concerned, and we have said that each is
the virtue of a different part of the soul.
12
Difficulties might be raised as to the utility of these qualities of mind.
For (1) philosophic wisdom will contemplate none of the things that will
make a man happy (for it is not concerned with any coming into being),
and though practical wisdom has this merit, for what purpose do we
need it? Practical wisdom is the quality of mind concerned with things
just and noble and good for man, but these are the things which it is the
mark of a good man to do, and we are none the more able to act for
knowing them if the virtues are states of character, just as we are none
the better able to act for knowing the things that are healthy and sound,
in the sense not of producing but of issuing from the state of health; for
we are none the more able to act for having the art of medicine or of
gymnastics. But (2) if we are to say that a man should have practical
wisdom not for the sake of knowing moral truths but for the sake of
becoming good, practical wisdom will be of no use to those who are
good; again it is of no use to those who have not virtue; for it will make
no difference whether they have practical wisdom themselves or obeyNicomachean Ethics/103
others who have it, and it would be enough for us to do what we do in
the case of health; though we wish to become healthy, yet we do not
learn the art of medicine. (3) Besides this, it would be thought strange if
practical wisdom, being inferior to philosophic wisdom, is to be put in
authority over it, as seems to be implied by the fact that the art which
produces anything rules and issues commands about that thing.
These, then, are the questions we must discuss; so far we have only
stated the difficulties.
(1) Now first let us say that in themselves these states must be wor-
thy of choice because they are the virtues of the two parts of the soul
respectively, even if neither of them produce anything.
(2) Secondly, they do produce something, not as the art of medicine
produces health, however, but as health produces health; so does philo-
sophic wisdom produce happiness; for, being a part of virtue entire, by
being possessed and by actualizing itself it makes a man happy.
(3) Again, the work of man is achieved only in accordance with
practical wisdom as well as with moral virtue; for virtue makes us aim
at the right mark, and practical wisdom makes us take the right means.
(Of the fourth part of the soul—the nutritive—there is no such virtue;
for there is nothing which it is in its power to do or not to do.)
(4) With regard to our being none the more able to do because of
our practical wisdom what is noble and just, let us begin a little further
back, starting with the following principle. As we say that some people
who do just acts are not necessarily just, i.e., those who do the acts
ordained by the laws either unwillingly or owing to ignorance or for
some other reason and not for the sake of the acts themselves (though, to
be sure, they do what they should and all the things that the good man
ought), so is it, it seems, that in order to be good one must be in a certain
state when one does the several acts, i.e., one must do them as a result of
choice and for the sake of the acts themselves. Now virtue makes the
choice right, but the question of the things which should naturally be
done to carry out our choice belongs not to virtue but to another faculty.
We must devote our attention to these matters and give a clearer state-
ment about them. There is a faculty which is called cleverness; and this
is such as to be able to do the things that tend towards the mark we have
set before ourselves, and to hit it. Now if the mark be noble, the clever-
ness is laudable, but if the mark be bad, the cleverness is mere smart-
ness; hence we call even men of practical wisdom clever or smart. Prac-
tical wisdom is not the faculty, but it does not exist without this faculty.104/Aristotle
And this eye of the soul acquires its formed state not without the aid of
virtue, as has been said and is plain; for the syllogisms which deal with
acts to be done are things which involve a starting-point, viz., ‘since the
end, i.e., what is best, is of such and such a nature,’ whatever it may be
(let it for the sake of argument be what we please); and this is not evi-
dent except to the good man; for wickedness perverts us and causes us
to be deceived about the starting-points of action. Therefore it is evident
that it is impossible to be practically wise without being good.
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We must therefore consider virtue also once more; for virtue too is simi-
larly related; as practical wisdom is to cleverness—not the same, but
like it—so is natural virtue to virtue in the strict sense. For all men think
that each type of character belongs to its possessors in some sense by
nature; for from the very moment of birth we are just or fitted for
selfcontrol or brave or have the other moral qualities; but yet we seek
something else as that which is good in the strict sense—we seek for the
presence of such qualities in another way. For both children and brutes
have the natural dispositions to these qualities, but without reason these
are evidently hurtful. Only we seem to see this much, that, while one
may be led astray by them, as a strong body which moves without sight
may stumble badly because of its lack of sight, still, if a man once
acquires reason, that makes a difference in action; and his state, while
still like what it was, will then be virtue in the strict sense. Therefore, as
in the part of us which forms opinions there are two types, cleverness
and practical wisdom, so too in the moral part there are two types,
natural virtue and virtue in the strict sense, and of these the latter in-
volves practical wisdom. This is why some say that all the virtues are
forms of practical wisdom, and why Socrates in one respect was on the
right track while in another he went astray; in thinking that all the vir-
tues were forms of practical wisdom he was wrong, but in saying they
implied practical wisdom he was right. This is confirmed by the fact
that even now all men, when they define virtue, after naming the state of
character and its objects add ‘that (state) which is in accordance with
the right rule’; now the right rule is that which is in accordance with
practical wisdom. All men, then, seem somehow to divine that this kind
of state is virtue, viz. that which is in accordance with practical wis-
dom. But we must go a little further. For it is not merely the state in
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the right rule, that is virtue; and practical wisdom is a right rule about
such matters. Socrates, then, thought the virtues were rules or rational
principles (for he thought they were, all of them, forms of scientific
knowledge), while we think they involve a rational principle.
It is clear, then, from what has been said, that it is not possible to be
good in the strict sense without practical wisdom, nor practically wise
without moral virtue. But in this way we may also refute the dialectical
argument whereby it might be contended that the virtues exist in separa-
tion from each other; the same man, it might be said, is not best equipped
by nature for all the virtues, so that he will have already acquired one
when he has not yet acquired another. This is possible in respect of the
natural virtues, but not in respect of those in respect of which a man is
called without qualification good; for with the presence of the one qual-
ity, practical wisdom, will be given all the virtues. And it is plain that,
even if it were of no practical value, we should have needed it because it
is the virtue of the part of us in question; plain too that the choice will
not be right without practical wisdom any more than without virtue; for
the one deter, mines the end and the other makes us do the things that
lead to the end.
But again it is not supreme over philosophic wisdom, i.e., over the
superior part of us, any more than the art of medicine is over health; for
it does not use it but provides for its coming into being; it issues orders,
then, for its sake, but not to it. Further, to maintain its supremacy would
be like saying that the art of politics rules the gods because it issues
orders about all the affairs of the state.
BOOK VII
1
Let us now make a fresh beginning and point out that of moral states to
be avoided there are three kinds—vice, incontinence, brutishness. The
contraries of two of these are evident,—one we call virtue, the other
continence; to brutishness it would be most fitting to oppose superhu-
man virtue, a heroic and divine kind of virtue, as Homer has represented
Priam saying of Hector that he was very good,
For he seemed not, he,
The child of a mortal man, but as one that of God’s seed came.
Therefore if, as they say, men become gods by excess of virtue, of106/Aristotle
this kind must evidently be the state opposed to the brutish state; for as
a brute has no vice or virtue, so neither has a god; his state is higher than
virtue, and that of a brute is a different kind of state from vice.
Now, since it is rarely that a godlike man is found—to use the epi-
thet of the Spartans, who when they admire any one highly call him a
‘godlike man’—so too the brutish type is rarely found among men; it is
found chiefly among barbarians, but some brutish qualities are also
produced by disease or deformity; and we also call by this evil name
those men who go beyond all ordinary standards by reason of vice. Of
this kind of disposition, however, we must later make some mention,
while we have discussed vice before we must now discuss incontinence
and softness (or effeminacy), and continence and endurance; for we must
treat each of the two neither as identical with virtue or wickedness, nor
as a different genus. We must, as in all other cases, set the observed
facts before us and, after first discussing the difficulties, go on to prove,
if possible, the truth of all the common opinions about these affections
of the mind, or, failing this, of the greater number and the most authori-
tative; for if we both refute the objections and leave the common opin-
ions undisturbed, we shall have proved the case sufficiently.
Now (1) both continence and endurance are thought to be included
among things good and praiseworthy, and both incontinence and soft,
ness among things bad and blameworthy; and the same man is thought
to be continent and ready to abide by the result of his calculations, or
incontinent and ready to abandon them. And (2) the incontinent man,
knowing that what he does is bad, does it as a result of passion, while
the continent man, knowing that his appetites are bad, refuses on ac-
count of his rational principle to follow them (3) The temperate man all
men call continent and disposed to endurance, while the continent man
some maintain to be always temperate but others do not; and some call
the self-indulgent man incontinent and the incontinent man selfindulgent
indiscriminately, while others distinguish them. (4) The man of practi-
cal wisdom, they sometimes say, cannot be incontinent, while some-
times they say that some who are practically wise and clever are incon-
tinent. Again (5) men are said to be incontinent even with respect to
anger, honour, and gain.—These, then, are the things that are said.Nicomachean Ethics/107
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Now we may ask (1) how a man who judges rightly can behave inconti-
nently. That he should behave so when he has knowledge, some say is
impossible; for it would be strange—so Socrates thought—if when
knowledge was in a man something else could master it and drag it
about like a slave. For Socrates was entirely opposed to the view in
question, holding that there is no such thing as incontinence; no one, he
said, when he judges acts against what he judges best—people act so
only by reason of ignorance. Now this view plainly contradicts the ob-
served facts, and we must inquire about what happens to such a man; if
he acts by reason of ignorance, what is the manner of his ignorance? For
that the man who behaves incontinently does not, before he gets into this
state, think he ought to act so, is evident. But there are some who con-
cede certain of Socrates’ contentions but not others; that nothing is stron-
ger than knowledge they admit, but not that on one acts contrary to what
has seemed to him the better course, and therefore they say that the
incontinent man has not knowledge when he is mastered by his plea-
sures, but opinion. But if it is opinion and not knowledge, if it is not a
strong conviction that resists but a weak one, as in men who hesitate, we
sympathize with their failure to stand by such convictions against strong
appetites; but we do not sympathize with wickedness, nor with any of
the other blameworthy states. Is it then practical wisdom whose resis-
tance is mastered? That is the strongest of all states. But this is absurd;
the same man will be at once practically wise and incontinent, but no
one would say that it is the part of a practically wise man to do willingly
the basest acts. Besides, it has been shown before that the man of prac-
tical wisdom is one who will act (for he is a man concerned with the
individual facts) and who has the other virtues.
(2) Further, if continence involves having strong and bad appetites,
the temperate man will not be continent nor the continent man temper-
ate; for a temperate man will have neither excessive nor bad appetites.
But the continent man must; for if the appetites are good, the state of
character that restrains us from following them is bad, so that not all
continence will be good; while if they are weak and not bad, there is
nothing admirable in resisting them, and if they are weak and bad, there
is nothing great in resisting these either.
(3) Further, if continence makes a man ready to stand by any and
every opinion, it is bad, i.e., if it makes him stand even by a false opin-
ion; and if incontinence makes a man apt to abandon any and every108/Aristotle
opinion, there will be a good incontinence, of which Sophocles’
Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes will be an instance; for he is to be praised
for not standing by what Odysseus persuaded him to do, because he is
pained at telling a lie.
(4) Further, the sophistic argument presents a difficulty; the syllo-
gism arising from men’s wish to expose paradoxical results arising from
an opponent’s view, in order that they may be admired when they suc-
ceed, is one that puts us in a difficulty (for thought is bound fast when it
will not rest because the conclusion does not satisfy it, and cannot ad-
vance because it cannot refute the argument). There is an argument
from which it follows that folly coupled with incontinence is virtue; for
a man does the opposite of what he judges, owing to incontinence, but
judges what is good to be evil and something that he should not do, and
consequence he will do what is good and not what is evil.
(5) Further, he who on conviction does and pursues and chooses
what is pleasant would be thought to be better than one who does so as
a result not of calculation but of incontinence; for he is easier to cure
since he may be persuaded to change his mind. But to the incontinent
man may be applied the proverb ‘when water chokes, what is one to
wash it down with?’ If he had been persuaded of the rightness of what
he does, he would have desisted when he was persuaded to change his
mind; but now he acts in spite of his being persuaded of something quite
different.
(6) Further, if incontinence and continence are concerned with any
and every kind of object, who is it that is incontinent in the unqualified
sense? No one has all the forms of incontinence, but we say some people
are incontinent without qualification.
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Of some such kind are the difficulties that arise; some of these points
must be refuted and the others left in possession of the field; for the
solution of the difficulty is the discovery of the truth. (1) We must con-
sider first, then, whether incontinent people act knowingly or not, and in
what sense knowingly; then (2) with what sorts of object the incontinent
and the continent man may be said to be concerned (i.e., whether with
any and every pleasure and pain or with certain determinate kinds), and
whether the continent man and the man of endurance are the same or
different; and similarly with regard to the other matters germane to this
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the continent man and the incontinent are differentiated by their objects
or by their attitude, i.e., whether the incontinent man is incontinent sim-
ply by being concerned with such and such objects, or, instead, by his
attitude, or, instead of that, by both these things; (b) the second question
is whether incontinence and continence are concerned with any and ev-
ery object or not. The man who is incontinent in the unqualified sense is
neither concerned with any and every object, but with precisely those
with which the self-indulgent man is concerned, nor is he characterized
by being simply related to these (for then his state would be the same as
self-indulgence), but by being related to them in a certain way. For the
one is led on in accordance with his own choice, thinking that he ought
always to pursue the present pleasure; while the other does not think so,
but yet pursues it.
(1) As for the suggestion that it is true opinion and not knowledge
against which we act incontinently, that makes no difference to the argu-
ment; for some people when in a state of opinion do not hesitate, but
think they know exactly. If, then, the notion is that owing to their weak
conviction those who have opinion are more likely to act against their
judgement than those who know, we answer that there need be no differ-
ence between knowledge and opinion in this respect; for some men are
no less convinced of what they think than others of what they know; as
is shown by the of Heraclitus. But (a), since we use the word ‘know’ in
two senses (for both the man who has knowledge but is not using it and
he who is using it are said to know), it will make a difference whether,
when a man does what he should not, he has the knowledge but is not
exercising it, or is exercising it; for the latter seems strange, but not the
former.
(b) Further, since there are two kinds of premisses, there is nothing
to prevent a man’s having both premisses and acting against his knowl-
edge, provided that he is using only the universal premiss and not the
particular; for it is particular acts that have to be done. And there are
also two kinds of universal term; one is predicable of the agent, the
other of the object; e.g., ‘dry food is good for every man,’ and ‘I am a
man,’ or ‘such and such food is dry’; but whether ‘this food is such and
such,’ of this the incontinent man either has not or is not exercising the
knowledge. There will, then, be, firstly, an enormous difference between
these manners of knowing, so that to know in one way when we act
incontinently would not seem anything strange, while to know in the
other way would be extraordinary.110/Aristotle
And further (c) the possession of knowledge in another sense than
those just named is something that happens to men; for within the case
of having knowledge but not using it we see a difference of state, admit-
ting of the possibility of having knowledge in a sense and yet not having
it, as in the instance of a man asleep, mad, or drunk. But now this is just
the condition of men under the influence of passions; for outbursts of
anger and sexual appetites and some other such passions, it is evident,
actually alter our bodily condition, and in some men even produce fits
of madness. It is plain, then, that incontinent people must be said to be
in a similar condition to men asleep, mad, or drunk. The fact that men
use the language that flows from knowledge proves nothing; for even
men under the influence of these passions utter scientific proofs and
verses of Empedocles, and those who have just begun to learn a science
can string together its phrases, but do not yet know it; for it has to
become part of themselves, and that takes time; so that we must suppose
that the use of language by men in an incontinent state means no more
than its utterance by actors on the stage. (d) Again, we may also view
the cause as follows with reference to the facts of human nature. The
one opinion is universal, the other is concerned with the particular facts,
and here we come to something within the sphere of perception; when a
single opinion results from the two, the soul must in one type of case
affirm the conclusion, while in the case of opinions concerned with pro-
duction it must immediately act (e.g., if ‘everything sweet ought to be
tasted,’ and ‘this is sweet,’ in the sense of being one of the particular
sweet things, the man who can act and is not prevented must at the same
time actually act accordingly). When, then, the universal opinion is
present in us forbidding us to taste, and there is also the opinion that
‘everything sweet is pleasant,’ and that ‘this is sweet’ (now this is the
opinion that is active), and when appetite happens to be present in us,
the one opinion bids us avoid the object, but appetite leads us towards it
(for it can move each of our bodily parts); so that it turns out that a man
behaves incontinently under the influence (in a sense) of a rule and an
opinion, and of one not contrary in itself, but only incidentally—for the
appetite is contrary, not the opinion—to the right rule. It also follows
that this is the reason why the lower animals are not incontinent, viz.,
because they have no universal judgement but only imagination and
memory of particulars.
The explanation of how the ignorance is dissolved and the inconti-
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drunk or asleep and is not peculiar to this condition; we must go to the
students of natural science for it. Now, the last premiss both being an
opinion about a perceptible object, and being what determines our ac-
tions this a man either has not when he is in the state of passion, or has
it in the sense in which having knowledge did not mean knowing but
only talking, as a drunken man may utter the verses of Empedocles. And
because the last term is not universal nor equally an object of scientific
knowledge with the universal term, the position that Socrates sought to
establish actually seems to result; for it is not in the presence of what is
thought to be knowledge proper that the affection of incontinence arises
(nor is it this that is ‘dragged about’ as a result of the state of passion),
but in that of perceptual knowledge.
This must suffice as our answer to the question of action with and
without knowledge, and how it is possible to behave incontinently with
knowledge.
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(2) We must next discuss whether there is any one who is incontinent
without qualification, or all men who are incontinent are so in a particu-
lar sense, and if there is, with what sort of objects he is concerned. That
both continent persons and persons of endurance, and incontinent and
soft persons, are concerned with pleasures and pains, is evident.
Now of the things that produce pleasure some are necessary, while
others are worthy of choice in themselves but admit of excess, the bodily
causes of pleasure being necessary (by such I mean both those con-
cerned with food and those concerned with sexual intercourse, i.e., the
bodily matters with which we defined self-indulgence and temperance
as being concerned), while the others are not necessary but worthy of
choice in themselves (e.g., victory, honour, wealth, and good and pleas-
ant things of this sort). This being so, (a) those who go to excess with
reference to the latter, contrary to the right rule which is in themselves,
are not called incontinent simply, but incontinent with the qualification
‘in respect of money, gain, honour, or anger,’—not simply incontinent,
on the ground that they are different from incontinent people and are
called incontinent by reason of a resemblance. (Compare the case of
Anthropos (Man), who won a contest at the Olympic games; in his case
the general definition of man differed little from the definition peculiar
to him, but yet it was different.) This is shown by the fact that inconti-
nence either without qualification or in respect of some particular bodily112/Aristotle
pleasure is blamed not only as a fault but as a kind of vice, while none of
the people who are incontinent in these other respects is so blamed.
But (b) of the people who are incontinent with respect to bodily
enjoyments, with which we say the temperate and the self-indulgent man
are concerned, he who pursues the excesses of things pleasant—and
shuns those of things painful, of hunger and thirst and heat and cold and
all the objects of touch and taste—not by choice but contrary to his
choice and his judgement, is called incontinent, not with the qualifica-
tion ‘in respect of this or that,’ e.g., of anger, but just simply. This is
confirmed by the fact that men are called ‘soft’ with regard to these
pleasures, but not with regard to any of the others. And for this reason
we group together the incontinent and the self-indulgent, the continent
and the temperate man—but not any of these other types—because they
are concerned somehow with the same pleasures and pains; but though
these are concerned with the same objects, they are not similarly related
to them, but some of them make a deliberate choice while the others do
not.
This is why we should describe as self-indulgent rather the man
who without appetite or with but a slight appetite pursues the excesses
of pleasure and avoids moderate pains, than the man who does so be-
cause of his strong appetites; for what would the former do, if he had in
addition a vigorous appetite, and a violent pain at the lack of the ‘neces-
sary’ objects?
Now of appetites and pleasures some belong to the class of things
generically noble and good-for some pleasant things are by nature wor-
thy of choice, while others are contrary to these, and others are interme-
diate, to adopt our previous distinction—e.g., wealth, gain, victory,
honour. And with reference to all objects whether of this or of the inter-
mediate kind men are not blamed for being affected by them, for desir-
ing and loving them, but for doing so in a certain way, i.e., for going to
excess. (This is why all those who contrary to the rule either are mas-
tered by or pursue one of the objects which are naturally noble and
good, e.g., those who busy themselves more than they ought about honour
or about children and parents, (are not wicked); for these too are good,
and those who busy themselves about them are praised; but yet there is
an excess even in them—if like Niobe one were to fight even against the
gods, or were to be as much devoted to one’s father as Satyrus nick-
named ‘the filial,’ who was thought to be very silly on this point.) There
is no wickedness, then, with regard to these objects, for the reason named,Nicomachean Ethics/113
viz., because each of them is by nature a thing worthy of choice for its
own sake; yet excesses in respect of them are bad and to be avoided.
Similarly there is no incontinence with regard to them; for incontinence
is not only to be avoided but is also a thing worthy of blame; but owing
to a similarity in the state of feeling people apply the name incontinence,
adding in each case what it is in respect of, as we may describe as a bad
doctor or a bad actor one whom we should not call bad, simply. As,
then, in this case we do not apply the term without qualification because
each of these conditions is no shadness but only analogous to it, so it is
clear that in the other case also that alone must be taken to be inconti-
nence and continence which is concerned with the same objects as tem-
perance and self-indulgence, but we apply the term to anger by virtue of
a resemblance; and this is why we say with a qualification ‘incontinent
in respect of anger’ as we say ‘incontinent in respect of honour, or of
gain.’
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(1) Some things are pleasant by nature, and of these (a) some are so
without qualification, and (b) others are so with reference to particular
classes either of animals or of men; while (2) others are not pleasant by
nature, but (a) some of them become so by reason of injuries to the
system, and (b) others by reason of acquired habits, and (c) others by
reason of originally bad natures. This being so, it is possible with regard
to each of the latter kinds to discover similar states of character to those
recognized with regard to the former; I mean (A) the brutish states, as in
the case of the female who, they say, rips open pregnant women and
devours the infants, or of the things in which some of the tribes about
the Black Sea that have gone savage are said to delight—in raw meat or
in human flesh, or in lending their children to one another to feast upon—
or of the story told of Phalaris.
These states are brutish, but (B) others arise as a result of disease
(or, in some cases, of madness, as with the man who sacrificed and ate
his mother, or with the slave who ate the liver of his fellow), and others
are morbid states (C) resulting from custom, e.g., the habit of plucking
out the hair or of gnawing the nails, or even coals or earth, and in addi-
tion to these paederasty; for these arise in some by nature and in others,
as in those who have been the victims of lust from childhood, from
habit.
Now those in whom nature is the cause of such a state no one would114/Aristotle
call incontinent, any more than one would apply the epithet to women
because of the passive part they play in copulation; nor would one apply
it to those who are in a morbid condition as a result of habit. To have
these various types of habit is beyond the limits of vice, as brutishness is
too; for a man who has them to master or be mastered by them is not
simple (continence or) incontinence but that which is so by analogy, as
the man who is in this condition in respect of fits of anger is to be called
incontinent in respect of that feeling but not incontinent simply. For
every excessive state whether of folly, of cowardice, of self-indulgence,
or of bad temper, is either brutish or morbid; the man who is by nature
apt to fear everything, even the squeak of a mouse, is cowardly with a
brutish cowardice, while the man who feared a weasel did so in conse-
quence of disease; and of foolish people those who by nature are thought-
less and live by their senses alone are brutish, like some races of the
distant barbarians, while those who are so as a result of disease (e.g., of
epilepsy) or of madness are morbid. Of these characteristics it is pos-
sible to have some only at times, and not to be mastered by them. e.g.,
Phalaris may have restrained a desire to eat the flesh of a child or an
appetite for unnatural sexual pleasure; but it is also possible to be mas-
tered, not merely to have the feelings. Thus, as the wickedness which is
on the human level is called wickedness simply, while that which is not
is called wickedness not simply but with the qualification ‘brutish’ or
‘morbid,’ in the same way it is plain that some incontinence is brutish
and some morbid, while only that which corresponds to human self-
indulgence is incontinence simply.
That incontinence and continence, then, are concerned only with the
same objects as selfindulgence and temperance and that what is con-
cerned with other objects is a type distinct from incontinence, and called
incontinence by a metaphor and not simply, is plain.
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That incontinence in respect of anger is less disgraceful than that in
respect of the appetites is what we will now proceed to see. (1) Anger
seems to listen to argument to some extent, but to mishear it, as do hasty
servants who run out before they have heard the whole of what one
says, and then muddle the order, or as dogs bark if there is but a knock
at the door, before looking to see if it is a friend; so anger by reason of
the warmth and hastiness of its nature, though it hears, does not hear an
order, and springs to take revenge. For argument or imagination in-Nicomachean Ethics/115
forms us that we have been insulted or slighted, and anger, reasoning as
it were that anything like this must be fought against, boils up straight-
way; while appetite, if argument or perception merely says that an ob-
ject is pleasant, springs to the enjoyment of it. Therefore anger obeys
the argument in a sense, but appetite does not. It is therefore more dis-
graceful; for the man who is incontinent in respect of anger is in a sense
conquered by argument, while the other is conquered by appetite and
not by argument.
(2) Further, we pardon people more easily for following natural
desires, since we pardon them more easily for following such appetites
as are common to all men, and in so far as they are common; now anger
and bad temper are more natural than the appetites for excess, i.e., for
unnecessary objects. Take for instance the man who defended himself
on the charge of striking his father by saying ‘yes, but he struck his
father, and he struck his, and’ (pointing to his child) ‘this boy will strike
me when he is a man; it runs in the family’; or the man who when he was
being dragged along by his son bade him stop at the doorway, since he
himself had dragged his father only as far as that.
(2) Further, those who are more given to plotting against others are
more criminal. Now a passionate man is not given to plotting, nor is
anger itself—it is open; but the nature of appetite is illustrated by what
the poets call Aphrodite, ‘guile-weaving daughter of Cyprus,’ and by
Homer’s words about her ‘embroidered girdle’:
And the whisper of wooing is there, Whose subtlety stealeth the wits of
the wise, how prudent soe’er.
Therefore if this form of incontinence is more criminal and dis-
graceful than that in respect of anger, it is both incontinence without
qualification and in a sense vice.
(4) Further, no one commits wanton outrage with a feeling of pain,
but every one who acts in anger acts with pain, while the man who
commits outrage acts with pleasure. If, then, those acts at which it is
most just to be angry are more criminal than others, the incontinence
which is due to appetite is the more criminal; for there is no wanton
outrage involved in anger.
Plainly, then, the incontinence concerned with appetite is more dis-
graceful than that concerned with anger, and continence and inconti-
nence are concerned with bodily appetites and pleasures; but we must116/Aristotle
grasp the differences among the latter themselves. For, as has been said
at the beginning, some are human and natural both in kind and in mag-
nitude, others are brutish, and others are due to organic injuries and
diseases. Only with the first of these are temperance and self-indulgence
concerned; this is why we call the lower animals neither temperate nor
self-indulgent except by a metaphor, and only if some one race of ani-
mals exceeds another as a whole in wantonness, destructiveness, and
omnivorous greed; these have no power of choice or calculation, but
they are departures from the natural norm, as, among men, madmen
are. Now brutishness is a less evil than vice, though more alarming; for
it is not that the better part has been perverted, as in man,—they have no
better part. Thus it is like comparing a lifeless thing with a living in
respect of badness; for the badness of that which has no originative
source of movement is always less hurtful, and reason is an originative
source. Thus it is like comparing injustice in the abstract with an unjust
man. Each is in some sense worse; for a bad man will do ten thousand
times as much evil as a brute.
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With regard to the pleasures and pains and appetites and aversions aris-
ing through touch and taste, to which both self-indulgence and temper-
ance were formerly narrowed down, it possible to be in such a state as
to be defeated even by those of them which most people master, or to
master even those by which most people are defeated; among these possi-
bilities, those relating to pleasures are incontinence and continence, those
relating to pains softness and endurance. The state of most people is
intermediate, even if they lean more towards the worse states.
Now, since some pleasures are necessary while others are not, and
are necessary up to a point while the excesses of them are not, nor the
deficiencies, and this is equally true of appetites and pains, the man who
pursues the excesses of things pleasant, or pursues to excess necessary
objects, and does so by choice, for their own sake and not at all for the
sake of any result distinct from them, is self-indulgent; for such a man is
of necessity unlikely to repent, and therefore incurable, since a man who
cannot repent cannot be cured. The man who is deficient in his pursuit
of them is the opposite of self-indulgent; the man who is intermediate is
temperate. Similarly, there is the man who avoids bodily pains not be-
cause he is defeated by them but by choice. (Of those who do not choose
such acts, one kind of man is led to them as a result of the pleasureNicomachean Ethics/117
involved, another because he avoids the pain arising from the appetite,
so that these types differ from one another. Now any one would think
worse of a man with no appetite or with weak appetite were he to do
something disgraceful, than if he did it under the influence of powerful
appetite, and worse of him if he struck a blow not in anger than if he did
it in anger; for what would he have done if he had been strongly af-
fected? This is why the self-indulgent man is worse than the inconti-
nent.) of the states named, then, the latter is rather a kind of softness; the
former is self-indulgence. While to the incontinent man is opposed the
continent, to the soft is opposed the man of endurance; for endurance
consists in resisting, while continence consists in conquering, and re-
sisting and conquering are different, as not being beaten is different
from winning; this is why continence is also more worthy of choice than
endurance. Now the man who is defective in respect of resistance to the
things which most men both resist and resist successfully is soft and
effeminate; for effeminacy too is a kind of softness; such a man trails
his cloak to avoid the pain of lifting it, and plays the invalid without
thinking himself wretched, though the man he imitates is a wretched
man.
The case is similar with regard to continence and incontinence. For
if a man is defeated by violent and excessive pleasures or pains, there is
nothing wonderful in that; indeed we are ready to pardon him if he has
resisted, as Theodectes’ Philoctetes does when bitten by the snake, or
Carcinus’ Cercyon in the Alope, and as people who try to restrain their
laughter burst out into a guffaw, as happened to Xenophantus. But it is
surprising if a man is defeated by and cannot resist pleasures or pains
which most men can hold out against, when this is not due to heredity or
disease, like the softness that is hereditary with the kings of the Scythians,
or that which distinguishes the female sex from the male.
The lover of amusement, too, is thought to be self-indulgent, but is
really soft. For amusement is a relaxation, since it is a rest from work;
and the lover of amusement is one of the people who go to excess in this.
Of incontinence one kind is impetuosity, another weakness. For some
men after deliberating fail, owing to their emotion, to stand by the con-
clusions of their deliberation, others because they have not deliberated
are led by their emotion; since some men (just as people who first tickle
others are not tickled themselves), if they have first perceived and seen
what is coming and have first roused themselves and their calculative
faculty, are not defeated by their emotion, whether it be pleasant or118/Aristotle
painful. It is keen and excitable people that suffer especially from the
impetuous form of incontinence; for the former by reason of their quick-
ness and the latter by reason of the violence of their passions do not
await the argument, because they are apt to follow their imagination.
8
The self-indulgent man, as was said, is not apt to repent; for he stands
by his choice; but incontinent man is likely to repent. This is why the
position is not as it was expressed in the formulation of the problem, but
the self-indulgent man is incurable and the incontinent man curable; for
wickedness is like a disease such as dropsy or consumption, while in-
continence is like epilepsy; the former is a permanent, the latter an inter-
mittent badness. And generally incontinence and vice are different in
kind; vice is unconscious of itself, incontinence is not (of incontinent
men themselves, those who become temporarily beside themselves are
better than those who have the rational principle but do not abide by it,
since the latter are defeated by a weaker passion, and do not act without
previous deliberation like the others); for the incontinent man is like the
people who get drunk quickly and on little wine, i.e., on less than most
people.
Evidently, then, incontinence is not vice (though perhaps it is so in a
qualified sense); for incontinence is contrary to choice while vice is in
accordance with choice; not but what they are similar in respect of the
actions they lead to; as in the saying of Demodocus about the Milesians,
‘the Milesians are not without sense, but they do the things that sense-
less people do,’ so too incontinent people are not criminal, but they will
do criminal acts.
Now, since the incontinent man is apt to pursue, not on conviction,
bodily pleasures that are excessive and contrary to the right rule, while
the self-indulgent man is convinced because he is the sort of man to
pursue them, it is on the contrary the former that is easily persuaded to
change his mind, while the latter is not. For virtue and vice respectively
preserve and destroy the first principle, and in actions the final cause is
the first principle, as the hypotheses are in mathematics; neither in that
case is it argument that teaches the first principles, nor is it so here-
virtue either natural or produced by habituation is what teaches right
opinion about the first principle. Such a man as this, then, is temperate;
his contrary is the self-indulgent.
But there is a sort of man who is carried away as a result of passionNicomachean Ethics/119
and contrary to the right rule—a man whom passion masters so that he
does not act according to the right rule, but does not master to the extent
of making him ready to believe that he ought to pursue such pleasures
without reserve; this is the incontinent man, who is better than the self-
indulgent man, and not bad without qualification; for the best thing in
him, the first principle, is preserved. And contrary to him is another
kind of man, he who abides by his convictions and is not carried away,
at least as a result of passion. It is evident from these considerations that
the latter is a good state and the former a bad one.
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Is the man continent who abides by any and every rule and any and
every choice, or the man who abides by the right choice, and is he incon-
tinent who abandons any and every choice and any and every rule, or he
who abandons the rule that is not false and the choice that is right; this
is how we put it before in our statement of the problem. Or is it inciden-
tally any and every choice but per se the true rule and the right choice by
which the one abides and the other does not? If any one chooses or
pursues this for the sake of that, per se he pursues and chooses the latter,
but incidentally the former. But when we speak without qualification we
mean what is per se. Therefore in a sense the one abides by, and the
other abandons, any and every opinion; but without qualification, the
true opinion.
There are some who are apt to abide by their opinion, who are called
strong-headed, viz. those who are hard to persuade in the first instance
and are not easily persuaded to change; these have in them something
like the continent man, as the prodigal is in a way like the liberal man
and the rash man like the confident man; but they are different in many
respects. For it is to passion and appetite that the one will not yield,
since on occasion the continent man will be easy to persuade; but it is to
argument that the others refuse to yield, for they do form appetites and
many of them are led by their pleasures. Now the people who are strong-
headed are the opinionated, the ignorant, and the boorish—the opinion-
ated being influenced by pleasure and pain; for they delight in the vic-
tory they gain if they are not persuaded to change, and are pained if their
decisions become null and void as decrees sometimes do; so that they
are liker the incontinent than the continent man.
But there are some who fail to abide by their resolutions, not as a
result of incontinence, e.g., Neoptolemus in Sophocles’ Philoctetes; yet120/Aristotle
it was for the sake of pleasure that he did not stand fast—but a noble
pleasure; for telling the truth was noble to him, but he had been per-
suaded by Odysseus to tell the lie. For not every one who does anything
for the sake of pleasure is either self-indulgent or bad or incontinent, but
he who does it for a disgraceful pleasure.
Since there is also a sort of man who takes less delight than he
should in bodily things, and does not abide by the rule, he who is inter-
mediate between him and the incontinent man is the continent man; for
the incontinent man fails to abide by the rule because he delights too
much in them, and this man because he delights in them too little; while
the continent man abides by the rule and does not change on either ac-
count. Now if continence is good, both the contrary states must be bad,
as they actually appear to be; but because the other extreme is seen in
few people and seldom, as temperance is thought to be contrary only to
self-indulgence, so is continence to incontinence.
Since many names are applied analogically, it is by analogy that we
have come to speak of the ‘continence’ the temperate man; for both the
continent man and the temperate man are such as to do nothing contrary
to the rule for the sake of the bodily pleasures, but the former has and
the latter has not bad appetites, and the latter is such as not to feel
pleasure contrary to the rule, while the former is such as to feel pleasure
but not to be led by it. And the incontinent and the self-indulgent man
are also like another; they are different, but both pursue bodily plea-
sures—the latter, however, also thinking that he ought to do so, while
the former does not think this.
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Nor can the same man have practical wisdom and be incontinent; for it
has been shown that a man is at the same time practically wise, and
good in respect of character. Further, a man has practical wisdom not
by knowing only but by being able to act; but the incontinent man is
unable to act—there is, however, nothing to prevent a clever man from
being incontinent; this is why it is sometimes actually thought that some
people have practical wisdom but are incontinent, viz., because clever-
ness and practical wisdom differ in the way we have described in our
first discussions, and are near together in respect of their reasoning, but
differ in respect of their purpose—nor yet is the incontinent man like the
man who knows and is contemplating a truth, but like the man who is
asleep or drunk. And he acts willingly (for he acts in a sense with knowl-Nicomachean Ethics/121
edge both of what he does and of the end to which he does it), but is not
wicked, since his purpose is good; so that he is half-wicked. And he is
not a criminal; for he does not act of malice aforethought; of the two
types of incontinent man the one does not abide by the conclusions of
his deliberation, while the excitable man does not deliberate at all. And
thus the incontinent man like a city which passes all the right decrees
and has good laws, but makes no use of them, as in Anaxandrides’
jesting remark,
The city willed it, that cares nought for laws; but the wicked man is
like a city that uses its laws, but has wicked laws to use.
Now incontinence and continence are concerned with that which is
in excess of the state characteristic of most men; for the continent man
abides by his resolutions more and the incontinent man less than most
men can.
Of the forms of incontinence, that of excitable people is more cur-
able than that of those who deliberate but do not abide by their deci-
sions, and those who are incontinent through habituation are more cur-
able than those in whom incontinence is innate; for it is easier to change
a habit than to change one’s nature; even habit is hard to change just
because it is like nature, as Evenus says:
I say that habit’s but a long practice, friend,
And this becomes men’s nature in the end.
We have now stated what continence, incontinence, endurance, and
softness are, and how these states are related to each other.
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The study of pleasure and pain belongs to the province of the political
philosopher; for he is the architect of the end, with a view to which we
call one thing bad and another good without qualification. Further, it is
one of our necessary tasks to consider them; for not only did we lay it
down that moral virtue and vice are concerned with pains and pleasures,
but most people say that happiness involves pleasure; this is why the
blessed man is called by a name derived from a word meaning enjoy-
ment.
Now (1) some people think that no pleasure is a good, either in itself
or incidentally, since the good and pleasure are not the same; (2) others
think that some pleasures are good but that most are bad. (3) Again122/Aristotle
there is a third view, that even if all pleasures are good, yet the best thing
in the world cannot be pleasure. (1) The reasons given for the view that
pleasure is not a good at all are (a) that every pleasure is a perceptible
process to a natural state, and that no process is of the same kind as its
end, e.g., no process of building of the same kind as a house. (b) A
temperate man avoids pleasures. (c) A man of practical wisdom pur-
sues what is free from pain, not what is pleasant. (d) The pleasures are
a hindrance to thought, and the more so the more one delights in them,
e.g., in sexual pleasure; for no one could think of anything while ab-
sorbed in this. (e) There is no art of pleasure; but every good is the
product of some art. (f) Children and the brutes pursue pleasures. (2)
The reasons for the view that not all pleasures are good are that (a) there
are pleasures that are actually base and objects of reproach, and (b)
there are harmful pleasures; for some pleasant things are unhealthy. (3)
The reason for the view that the best thing in the world is not pleasure is
that pleasure is not an end but a process.
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These are pretty much the things that are said. That it does not follow
from these grounds that pleasure is not a good, or even the chief good, is
plain from the following considerations. (A, a) First, since that which is
good may be so in either of two senses (one thing good simply and
another good for a particular person), natural constitutions and states of
being, and therefore also the corresponding movements and processes,
will be correspondingly divisible. Of those which are thought to be bad
some will be bad if taken without qualification but not bad for a particu-
lar person, but worthy of his choice, and some will not be worthy of
choice even for a particular person, but only at a particular time and for
a short period, though not without qualification; while others are not
even pleasures, but seem to be so, viz. all those which involve pain and
whose end is curative, e.g., the processes that go on in sick persons.
(b) Further, one kind of good being activity and another being state,
the processes that restore us to our natural state are only incidentally
pleasant; for that matter the activity at work in the appetites for them is
the activity of so much of our state and nature as has remained unim-
paired; for there are actually pleasures that involve no pain or appetite
(e.g., those of contemplation), the nature in such a case not being defec-
tive at all. That the others are incidental is indicated by the fact that men
do not enjoy the same pleasant objects when their nature is in its settledNicomachean Ethics/123
state as they do when it is being replenished, but in the former case they
enjoy the things that are pleasant without qualification, in the latter the
contraries of these as well; for then they enjoy even sharp and bitter
things, none of which is pleasant either by nature or without qualifica-
tion. The states they produce, therefore, are not pleasures naturally or
without qualification; for as pleasant things differ, so do the pleasures
arising from them.
(c) Again, it is not necessary that there should be something else
better than pleasure, as some say the end is better than the process; for
leasures are not processes nor do they all involve process—they are
activities and ends; nor do they arise when we are becoming something,
but when we are exercising some faculty; and not all pleasures have an
end different from themselves, but only the pleasures of persons who
are being led to the perfecting of their nature. This is why it is not right
to say that pleasure is perceptible process, but it should rather be called
activity of the natural state, and instead of ‘perceptible’ ‘unimpeded.’ It
is thought by some people to be process just because they think it is in
the strict sense good; for they think that activity is process, which it is
not.
(B) The view that pleasures are bad because some pleasant things
are unhealthy is like saying that healthy things are bad because some
healthy things are bad for money-making; both are bad in the respect
mentioned, but they are not bad for that reason-indeed, thinking itself is
sometimes injurious to health.
Neither practical wisdom nor any state of being is impeded by the
pleasure arising from it; it is foreign pleasures that impede, for the plea-
sures arising from thinking and learning will make us think and learn all
the more.
(C) The fact that no pleasure is the product of any art arises natu-
rally enough; there is no art of any other activity either, but only of the
corresponding faculty; though for that matter the arts of the perfumer
and the cook are thought to be arts of pleasure.
(D) The arguments based on the grounds that the temperate man
avoids pleasure and that the man of practical wisdom pursues the pain-
less life, and that children and the brutes pursue pleasure, are all refuted
by the same consideration. We have pointed out in what sense pleasures
are good without qualification and in what sense some are not good;
now both the brutes and children pursue pleasures of the latter kind (and
the man of practical wisdom pursues tranquil freedom from that kind),124/Aristotle
viz., those which imply appetite and pain, i.e., the bodily pleasures (for
it is these that are of this nature) and the excesses of them, in respect of
which the self-indulgent man is self-indulent. This is why the temperate
man avoids these pleasures; for even he has pleasures of his own.
13
But further (E) it is agreed that pain is bad and to be avoided; for some
pain is without qualification bad, and other pain is bad because it is in
some respect an impediment to us. Now the contrary of that which is to
be avoided, qua something to be avoided and bad, is good. Pleasure,
then, is necessarily a good. For the answer of Speusippus, that pleasure
is contrary both to pain and to good, as the greater is contrary both to
the less and to the equal, is not successful; since he would not say that
pleasure is essentially just a species of evil.
And (F) if certain pleasures are bad, that does not prevent the chief
good from being some pleasure, just as the chief good may be some
form of knowledge though certain kinds of knowledge are bad. Perhaps
it is even necessary, if each disposition has unimpeded activities, that,
whether the activity (if unimpeded) of all our dispositions or that of
some one of them is happiness, this should be the thing most worthy of
our choice; and this activity is pleasure. Thus the chief good would be
some pleasure, though most pleasures might perhaps be bad without
qualification. And for this reason all men think that the happy life is
pleasant and weave pleasure into their ideal of happiness-and reason-
ably too; for no activity is perfect when it is impeded, and happiness is
a perfect thing; this is why the happy man needs the goods of the body
and external goods, i.e., those of fortune, viz. in order that he may not
be impeded in these ways. Those who say that the victim on the rack or
the man who falls into great misfortunes is happy if he is good, are,
whether they mean to or not, talking nonsense. Now because we need
fortune as well as other things, some people think good fortune the same
thing as happiness; but it is not that, for even good fortune itself when in
excess is an impediment, and perhaps should then be no longer called
good fortune; for its limit is fixed by reference to happiness.
And indeed the fact that all things, both brutes and men, pursue
pleasure is an indication of its being somehow the chief good:
No voice is wholly lost that many peoples... But since no one nature
or state either is or is thought the best for all, neither do all pursue the
same pleasure; yet all pursue pleasure. And perhaps they actually pur-Nicomachean Ethics/125
sue not the pleasure they think they pursue nor that which they would
say they pursue, but the same pleasure; for all things have by nature
something divine in them. But the bodily pleasures have appropriated
the name both because we oftenest steer our course for them and be-
cause all men share in them; thus because they alone are familiar, men
think there are no others.
It is evident also that if pleasure, i.e., the activity of our faculties, is
not a good, it will not be the case that the happy man lives a pleasant
life; for to what end should he need pleasure, if it is not a good but the
happy man may even live a painful life? For pain is neither an evil nor a
good, if pleasure is not; why then should he avoid it? Therefore, too, the
life of the good man will not be pleasanter than that of any one else, if
his activities are not more pleasant.
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(G) With regard to the bodily pleasures, those who say that some plea-
sures are very much to be chosen, viz. the noble pleasures, but not the
bodily pleasures, i.e., those with which the self-indulgent man is con-
cerned, must consider why, then, the contrary pains are bad. For the
contrary of bad is good. Are the necessary pleasures good in the sense in
which even that which is not bad is good? Or are they good up to a
point? Is it that where you have states and processes of which there
cannot be too much, there cannot be too much of the corresponding
pleasure, and that where there can be too much of the one there can be
too much of the other also? Now there can be too much of bodily goods,
and the bad man is bad by virtue of pursuing the excess, not by virtue of
pursuing the necessary pleasures (for all men enjoy in some way or
other both dainty foods and wines and sexual intercourse, but not all
men do so as they ought). The contrary is the case with pain; for he does
not avoid the excess of it, he avoids it altogether; and this is peculiar to
him, for the alternative to excess of pleasure is not pain, except to the
man who pursues this excess.
Since we should state not only the truth, but also the cause of er-
ror—for this contributes towards producing conviction, since when a
reasonable explanation is given of why the false view appears true, this
tends to produce belief in the true view—therefore we must state why
the bodily pleasures appear the more worthy of choice. (a) Firstly, then,
it is because they expel pain; owing to the excesses of pain that men
experience, they pursue excessive and in general bodily pleasure as be-126/Aristotle
ing a cure for the pain. Now curative agencies produce intense feeling—
which is the reason why they are pursued—because they show up against
the contrary pain. (Indeed pleasure is thought not to be good for these
two reasons, as has been said, viz., that (a) some of them are activities
belonging to a bad nature—either congenital, as in the case of a brute,
or due to habit, i.e., those of bad men; while (b) others are meant to cure
a defective nature, and it is better to be in a healthy state than to be
getting into it, but these arise during the process of being made perfect
and are therefore only incidentally good., b) Further, they are pursued
because of their violence by those who cannot enjoy other pleasures. (At
all events they go out of their way to manufacture thirsts somehow for
themselves. When these are harmless, the practice is irreproachable;
when they are hurtful, it is bad.) For they have nothing else to enjoy,
and, besides, a neutral state is painful to many people because of their
nature. For the animal nature is always in travail, as the students of
natural science also testify, saying that sight and hearing are painful;
but we have become used to this, as they maintain. Similarly, while, in
youth, people are, owing to the growth that is going on, in a situation
like that of drunken men, and youth is pleasant, on the other hand people
of excitable nature always need relief; for even their body is ever in
torment owing to its special composition, and they are always under the
influence of violent desire; but pain is driven out both by the contrary
pleasure, and by any chance pleasure if it be strong; and for these rea-
sons they become self-indulgent and bad. But the pleasures that do not
involve pains do not admit of excess; and these are among the things
pleasant by nature and not incidentally. By things pleasant incidentally
I mean those that act as cures (for because as a result people are cured,
through some action of the part that remains healthy, for this reason the
process is thought pleasant); by things naturally pleasant I mean those
that stimulate the action of the healthy nature.
There is no one thing that is always pleasant, because our nature is
not simple but there is another element in us as well, inasmuch as we are
perishable creatures, so that if the one element does something, this is
unnatural to the other nature, and when the two elements are evenly
balanced, what is done seems neither painful nor pleasant; for if the
nature of anything were simple, the same action would always be most
pleasant to it. This is why God always enjoys a single and simple plea-
sure; for there is not only an activity of movement but an activity of
immobility, and pleasure is found more in rest than in movement. ButNicomachean Ethics/127
‘change in all things is sweet,’ as the poet says, because of some vice;
for as it is the vicious man that is changeable, so the nature that needs
change is vicious; for it is not simple nor good.
We have now discussed continence and incontinence, and pleasure
and pain, both what each is and in what sense some of them are good
and others bad; it remains to speak of friendship.
BOOK VIII
1
After what we have said, a discussion of friendship would naturally
follow, since it is a virtue or implies virtue, and is besides most neces-
sary with a view to living. For without friends no one would choose to
live, though he had all other goods; even rich men and those in posses-
sion of office and of dominating power are thought to need friends most
of all; for what is the use of such prosperity without the opportunity of
beneficence, which is exercised chiefly and in its most laudable form
towards friends? Or how can prosperity be guarded and preserved with-
out friends? The greater it is, the more exposed is it to risk. And in
poverty and in other misfortunes men think friends are the only refuge.
It helps the young, too, to keep from error; it aids older people by min-
istering to their needs and supplementing the activities that are failing
from weakness; those in the prime of life it stimulates to noble actions-
‘two going together’-for with friends men are more able both to think
and to act. Again, parent seems by nature to feel it for offspring and
offspring for parent, not only among men but among birds and among
most animals; it is felt mutually by members of the same race, and
especially by men, whence we praise lovers of their fellowmen. We may
even in our travels how near and dear every man is to every other. Friend-
ship seems too to hold states together, and lawgivers to care more for it
than for justice; for unanimity seems to be something like friendship,
and this they aim at most of all, and expel faction as their worst enemy;
and when men are friends they have no need of justice, while when they
are just they need friendship as well, and the truest form of justice is
thought to be a friendly quality.
But it is not only necessary but also noble; for we praise those who
love their friends, and it is thought to be a fine thing to have many
friends; and again we think it is the same people that are good men and
are friends.
Not a few things about friendship are matters of debate. Some de-128/Aristotle
fine it as a kind of likeness and say like people are friends, whence come
the sayings ‘like to like,’ ‘birds of a feather flock together,’ and so on;
others on the contrary say ‘two of a trade never agree.’ On this very
question they inquire for deeper and more physical causes, Euripides
saying that ‘parched earth loves the rain, and stately heaven when filled
with rain loves to fall to earth,’ and Heraclitus that ‘it is what opposes
that helps’ and ‘from different tones comes the fairest tune’ and ‘all
things are produced through strife’; while Empedocles, as well as oth-
ers, expresses the opposite view that like aims at like. The physical
problems we may leave alone (for they do not belong to the present
inquiry); let us examine those which are human and involve character
and feeling, e.g., whether friendship can arise between any two people
or people cannot be friends if they are wicked, and whether there is one
species of friendship or more than one. Those who think there is only
one because it admits of degrees have relied on an inadequate indica-
tion; for even things different in species admit of degree. We have dis-
cussed this matter previously.
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The kinds of friendship may perhaps be cleared up if we first come to
know the object of love. For not everything seems to be loved but only
the lovable, and this is good, pleasant, or useful; but it would seem to be
that by which some good or pleasure is produced that is useful, so that
it is the good and the useful that are lovable as ends. Do men love, then,
the good, or what is good for them? These sometimes clash. So too with
regard to the pleasant. Now it is thought that each loves what is good for
himself, and that the good is without qualification lovable, and what is
good for each man is lovable for him; but each man loves not what is
good for him but what seems good. This however will make no differ-
ence; we shall just have to say that this is ‘that which seems lovable’.
Now there are three grounds on which people love; of the love of lifeless
objects we do not use the word ‘friendship’; for it is not mutual love, nor
is there a wishing of good to the other (for it would surely be ridiculous
to wish wine well; if one wishes anything for it, it is that it may keep, so
that one may have it oneself); but to a friend we say we ought to wish
what is good for his sake. But to those who thus wish good we ascribe
only goodwill, if the wish is not reciprocated; goodwill when it is recip-
rocal being friendship. Or must we add ‘when it is recognized’? For
many people have goodwill to those whom they have not seen but judgeNicomachean Ethics/129
to be good or useful; and one of these might return this feeling. These
people seem to bear goodwill to each other; but how could one call them
friends when they do not know their mutual feelings? To be friends,
then, the must be mutually recognized as bearing goodwill and wishing
well to each other for one of the aforesaid reasons.
3
Now these reasons differ from each other in kind; so, therefore, do the
corresponding forms of love and friendship. There are therefore three
kinds of friendship, equal in number to the things that are lovable; for
with respect to each there is a mutual and recognized love, and those
who love each other wish well to each other in that respect in which they
love one another. Now those who love each other for their utility do not
love each other for themselves but in virtue of some good which they get
from each other. So too with those who love for the sake of pleasure; it
is not for their character that men love ready-witted people, but because
they find them pleasant. Therefore those who love for the sake of utility
love for the sake of what is good for themselves, and those who love for
the sake of pleasure do so for the sake of what is pleasant to themselves,
and not in so far as the other is the person loved but in so far as he is
useful or pleasant. And thus these friendships are only incidental; for it
is not as being the man he is that the loved person is loved, but as
providing some good or pleasure. Such friendships, then, are easily dis-
solved, if the parties do not remain like themselves; for if the one party
is no longer pleasant or useful the other ceases to love him.
Now the useful is not permanent but is always changing. Thus when
the motive of the friendship is done away, the friendship is dissolved,
inasmuch as it existed only for the ends in question. This kind of friend-
ship seems to exist chiefly between old people (for at that age people
pursue not the pleasant but the useful) and, of those who are in their
prime or young, between those who pursue utility. And such people do
not live much with each other either; for sometimes they do not even
find each other pleasant; therefore they do not need such companionship
unless they are useful to each other; for they are pleasant to each other
only in so far as they rouse in each other hopes of something good to
come. Among such friendships people also class the friendship of a host
and guest. On the other hand the friendship of young people seems to
aim at pleasure; for they live under the guidance of emotion, and pursue
above all what is pleasant to themselves and what is immediately before130/Aristotle
them; but with increasing age their pleasures become different. This is
why they quickly become friends and quickly cease to be so; their friend-
ship changes with the object that is found pleasant, and such pleasure
alters quickly. Young people are amorous too; for the greater part of the
friendship of love depends on emotion and aims at pleasure; this is why
they fall in love and quickly fall out of love, changing often within a
single day. But these people do wish to spend their days and lives to-
gether; for it is thus that they attain the purpose of their friendship.
Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike
in virtue; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are
good themselves. Now those who wish well to their friends for their
sake are most truly friends; for they do this by reason of own nature and
not incidentally; therefore their friendship lasts as long as they are good-
and goodness is an enduring thing. And each is good without qualifica-
tion and to his friend, for the good are both good without qualification
and useful to each other. So too they are pleasant; for the good are
pleasant both without qualification and to each other, since to each his
own activities and others like them are pleasurable, and the actions of
the good are the same or like. And such a friendship is as might be
expected permanent, since there meet in it all the qualities that friends
should have. For all friendship is for the sake of good or of pleasure-
good or pleasure either in the abstract or such as will be enjoyed by him
who has the friendly feeling-and is based on a certain resemblance; and
to a friendship of good men all the qualities we have named belong in
virtue of the nature of the friends themselves; for in the case of this kind
of friendship the other qualities also are alike in both friends, and that
which is good without qualification is also without qualification pleas-
ant, and these are the most lovable qualities. Love and friendship there-
fore are found most and in their best form between such men.
But it is natural that such friendships should be infrequent; for such
men are rare. Further, such friendship requires time and familiarity; as
the proverb says, men cannot know each other till they have ‘eaten salt
together’; nor can they admit each other to friendship or be friends till
each has been found lovable and been trusted by each. Those who quickly
show the marks of friendship to each other wish to be friends, but are
not friends unless they both are lovable and know the fact; for a wish for
friendship may arise quickly, but friendship does not.Nicomachean Ethics/131
4
This kind of friendship, then, is perfect both in respect of duration and
in all other respects, and in it each gets from each in all respects the
same as, or something like what, he gives; which is what ought to hap-
pen between friends. Friendship for the sake of pleasure bears a resem-
blance to this kind; for good people too are pleasant to each other. So
too does friendship for the sake of utility; for the good are also useful to
each other. Among men of these inferior sorts too, friendships are most
permanent when the friends get the same thing from each other (e.g.,
pleasure), and not only that but also from the same source, as happens
between readywitted people, not as happens between lover and beloved.
For these do not take pleasure in the same things, but the one in seeing
the beloved and the other in receiving attentions from his lover; and
when the bloom of youth is passing the friendship sometimes passes too
(for the one finds no pleasure in the sight of the other, and the other gets
no attentions from the first); but many lovers on the other hand are
constant, if familiarity has led them to love each other’s characters,
these being alike. But those who exchange not pleasure but utility in
their amour are both less truly friends and less constant. Those who are
friends for the sake of utility part when the advantage is at an end; for
they were lovers not of each other but of profit.
For the sake of pleasure or utility, then, even bad men may be friends
of each other, or good men of bad, or one who is neither good nor bad
may be a friend to any sort of person, but for their own sake clearly only
good men can be friends; for bad men do not delight in each other unless
some advantage come of the relation.
The friendship of the good too and this alone is proof against slan-
der; for it is not easy to trust any one talk about a man who has long
been tested by oneself; and it is among good men that trust and the
feeling that ‘he would never wrong me’ and all the other things that are
demanded in true friendship are found. In the other kinds of friendship,
however, there is nothing to prevent these evils arising. For men apply
the name of friends even to those whose motive is utility, in which sense
states are said to be friendly (for the alliances of states seem to aim at
advantage), and to those who love each other for the sake of pleasure, in
which sense children are called friends. Therefore we too ought perhaps
to call such people friends, and say that there are several kinds of friend-
ship—firstly and in the proper sense that of good men qua good, and by
analogy the other kinds; for it is in virtue of something good and some-132/Aristotle
thing akin to what is found in true friendship that they are friends, since
even the pleasant is good for the lovers of pleasure. But these two kinds
of friendship are not often united, nor do the same people become friends
for the sake of utility and of pleasure; for things that are only inciden-
tally connected are not often coupled together.
Friendship being divided into these kinds, bad men will be friends
for the sake of pleasure or of utility, being in this respect like each other,
but good men will be friends for their own sake, i.e., in virtue of their
goodness. These, then, are friends without qualification; the others are
friends incidentally and through a resemblance to these.
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As in regard to the virtues some men are called good in respect of a state
of character, others in respect of an activity, so too in the case of friend-
ship; for those who live together delight in each other and confer ben-
efits on each other, but those who are asleep or locally separated are not
performing, but are disposed to perform, the activities of friendship;
distance does not break off the friendship absolutely, but only the activ-
ity of it. But if the absence is lasting, it seems actually to make men
forget their friendship; hence the saying ‘out of sight, out of mind’.
Neither old people nor sour people seem to make friends easily; for
there is little that is pleasant in them, and no one can spend his days with
one whose company is painful, or not pleasant, since nature seems above
all to avoid the painful and to aim at the pleasant. Those, however, who
approve of each other but do not live together seem to be well-disposed
rather than actual friends. For there is nothing so characteristic of friends
as living together (since while it people who are in need that desire ben-
efits, even those who are supremely happy desire to spend their days
together; for solitude suits such people least of all); but people cannot
live together if they are not pleasant and do not enjoy the same things, as
friends who are companions seem to do.
The truest friendship, then, is that of the good, as we have fre-
quently said; for that which is without qualification good or pleasant
seems to be lovable and desirable, and for each person that which is
good or pleasant to him; and the good man is lovable and desirable to
the good man for both these reasons. Now it looks as if love were a
feeling, friendship a state of character; for love may be felt just as much
towards lifeless things, but mutual love involves choice and choice springs
from a state of character; and men wish well to those whom they love,Nicomachean Ethics/133
for their sake, not as a result of feeling but as a result of a state of
character. And in loving a friend men love what is good for themselves;
for the good man in becoming a friend becomes a good to his friend.
Each, then, both loves what is good for himself, and makes an equal
return in goodwill and in pleasantness; for friendship is said to be equal-
ity, and both of these are found most in the friendship of the good.
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Between sour and elderly people friendship arises less readily, inas-
much as they are less good-tempered and enjoy companionship less; for
these are thou to be the greatest marks of friendship productive of it.
This is why, while men become friends quickly, old men do not; it is
because men do not become friends with those in whom they do not
delight; and similarly sour people do not quickly make friends either.
But such men may bear goodwill to each other; for they wish one an-
other well and aid one another in need; but they are hardly friends be-
cause they do not spend their days together nor delight in each other,
and these are thought the greatest marks of friendship.
One cannot be a friend to many people in the sense of having friend-
ship of the perfect type with them, just as one cannot be in love with
many people at once (for love is a sort of excess of feeling, and it is the
nature of such only to be felt towards one person); and it is not easy for
many people at the same time to please the same person very greatly, or
perhaps even to be good in his eyes. One must, too, acquire some expe-
rience of the other person and become familiar with him, and that is
very hard. But with a view to utility or pleasure it is possible that many
people should please one; for many people are useful or pleasant, and
these services take little time.
Of these two kinds that which is for the sake of pleasure is the more
like friendship, when both parties get the same things from each other
and delight in each other or in the things, as in the friendships of the
young; for generosity is more found in such friendships. Friendship based
on utility is for the commercially minded. People who are supremely
happy, too, have no need of useful friends, but do need pleasant friends;
for they wish to live with some one and, though they can endure for a
short time what is painful, no one could put up with it continuously, nor
even with the Good itself if it were painful to him; this is why they look
out for friends who are pleasant. Perhaps they should look out for friends
who, being pleasant, are also good, and good for them too; for so they134/Aristotle
will have all the characteristics that friends should have.
People in positions of authority seem to have friends who fall into
distinct classes; some people are useful to them and others are pleasant,
but the same people are rarely both; for they seek neither those whose
pleasantness is accompanied by virtue nor those whose utility is with a
view to noble objects, but in their desire for pleasure they seek for ready-
witted people, and their other friends they choose as being clever at
doing what they are told, and these characteristics are rarely combined.
Now we have said that the good man is at the same time pleasant and
useful; but such a man does not become the friend of one who surpasses
him in station, unless he is surpassed also in virtue; if this is not so, he
does not establish equality by being proportionally exceeded in both
respects. But people who surpass him in both respects are not so easy to
find.
However that may be, the aforesaid friendships involve equality;
for the friends get the same things from one another and wish the same
things for one another, or exchange one thing for another, e.g., pleasure
for utility; we have said, however, that they are both less truly friend-
ships and less permanent.
But it is from their likeness and their unlikeness to the same thing
that they are thought both to be and not to be friendships. It is by their
likeness to the friendship of virtue that they seem to be friendships (for
one of them involves pleasure and the other utility, and these character-
istics belong to the friendship of virtue as well); while it is because the
friendship of virtue is proof against slander and permanent, while these
quickly change (besides differing from the former in many other re-
spects), that they appear not to be friendships; i.e., it is because of their
unlikeness to the friendship of virtue.
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But there is another kind of friendship, viz., that which involves an
inequality between the parties, e.g., that of father to son and in general
of elder to younger, that of man to wife and in general that of ruler to
subject. And these friendships differ also from each other; for it is not
the same that exists between parents and children and between rulers
and subjects, nor is even that of father to son the same as that of son to
father, nor that of husband to wife the same as that of wife to husband.
For the virtue and the function of each of these is different, and so are
the reasons for which they love; the love and the friendship are thereforeNicomachean Ethics/135
different also. Each party, then, neither gets the same from the other, nor
ought to seek it; but when children render to parents what they ought to
render to those who brought them into the world, and parents render
what they should to their children, the friendship of such persons will be
abiding and excellent. In all friendships implying inequality the love
also should be proportional, i.e., the better should be more loved than he
loves, and so should the more useful, and similarly in each of the other
cases; for when the love is in proportion to the merit of the parties, then
in a sense arises equality, which is certainly held to be characteristic of
friendship.
But equality does not seem to take the same form in acts of justice
and in friendship; for in acts of justice what is equal in the primary
sense is that which is in proportion to merit, while quantitative equality
is secondary, but in friendship quantitative equality is primary and pro-
portion to merit secondary. This becomes clear if there is a great inter-
val in respect of virtue or vice or wealth or anything else between the
parties; for then they are no longer friends, and do not even expect to be
so. And this is most manifest in the case of the gods; for they surpass us
most decisively in all good things. But it is clear also in the case of
kings; for with them, too, men who are much their inferiors do not ex-
pect to be friends; nor do men of no account expect to be friends with
the best or wisest men. In such cases it is not possible to define exactly
up to what point friends can remain friends; for much can be taken
away and friendship remain, but when one party is removed to a great
distance, as God is, the possibility of friendship ceases. This is in fact
the origin of the question whether friends really wish for their friends
the greatest goods, e.g., that of being gods; since in that case their friends
will no longer be friends to them, and therefore will not be good things
for them (for friends are good things). The answer is that if we were
right in saying that friend wishes good to friend for his sake, his friend
must remain the sort of being he is, whatever that may be; therefore it is
for him oily so long as he remains a man that he will wish the greatest
goods. But perhaps not all the greatest goods; for it is for himself most
of all that each man wishes what is good.
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Most people seem, owing to ambition, to wish to be loved rather than to
love; which is why most men love flattery; for the flatterer is a friend in
an inferior position, or pretends to be such and to love more than he is136/Aristotle
loved; and being loved seems to be akin to being honoured, and this is
what most people aim at. But it seems to be not for its own sake that
people choose honour, but incidentally. For most people enjoy being
honoured by those in positions of authority because of their hopes (for
they think that if they want anything they will get it from them; and
therefore they delight in honour as a token of favour to come); while
those who desire honour from good men, and men who know, are aim-
ing at confirming their own opinion of themselves; they delight in honour,
therefore, because they believe in their own goodness on the strength of
the judgement of those who speak about them. In being loved, on the
other hand, people delight for its own sake; whence it would seem to be
better than being honoured, and friendship to be desirable in itself. But
it seems to lie in loving rather than in being loved, as is indicated by the
delight mothers take in loving; for some mothers hand over their chil-
dren to be brought up, and so long as they know their fate they love
them and do not seek to be loved in return (if they cannot have both), but
seem to be satisfied if they see them prospering; and they themselves
love their children even if these owing to their ignorance give them noth-
ing of a mother’s due. Now since friendship depends more on loving,
and it is those who love their friends that are praised, loving seems to be
the characteristic virtue of friends, so that it is only those in whom this
is found in due measure that are lasting friends, and only their friend-
ship that endures.
It is in this way more than any other that even unequals can be
friends; they can be equalized. Now equality and likeness are friend-
ship, and especially the likeness of those who are like in virtue; for being
steadfast in themselves they hold fast to each other, and neither ask nor
give base services, but (one may say) even prevent them; for it is char-
acteristic of good men neither to go wrong themselves nor to let their
friends do so. But wicked men have no steadfastness (for they do not
remain even like to themselves), but become friends for a short time
because they delight in each other’s wickedness. Friends who are useful
or pleasant last longer; i.e., as long as they provide each other with
enjoyments or advantages. Friendship for utility’s sake seems to be that
which most easily exists between contraries, e.g., between poor and
rich, between ignorant and learned; for what a man actually lacks he
aims at, and one gives something else in return. But under this head, too,
might bring lover and beloved, beautiful and ugly. This is why lovers
sometimes seem ridiculous, when they demand to be loved as they love;Nicomachean Ethics/137
if they are equally lovable their claim can perhaps be justified, but when
they have nothing lovable about them it is ridiculous. Perhaps, however,
contrary does not even aim at contrary by its own nature, but only inci-
dentally, the desire being for what is intermediate; for that is what is
good, e.g., it is good for the dry not to become wet but to come to the
intermediate state, and similarly with the hot and in all other cases.
These subjects we may dismiss; for they are indeed somewhat foreign to
our inquiry.
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Friendship and justice seem, as we have said at the outset of our discus-
sion, to be concerned with the same objects and exhibited between the
same persons. For in every community there is thought to be some form
of justice, and friendship too; at least men address as friends their fel-
low-voyagers and fellow-soldiers, and so too those associated with them
in any other kind of community. And the extent of their association is
the extent of their friendship, as it is the extent to which justice exists
between them. And the proverb ‘what friends have is common property’
expresses the truth; for friendship depends on community. Now broth-
ers and comrades have all things in common, but the others to whom we
have referred have definite things in common—some more things, oth-
ers fewer; for of friendships, too, some are more and others less truly
friendships. And the claims of justice differ too; the duties of parents to
children, and those of brothers to each other are not the same, nor those
of comrades and those of fellow-citizens, and so, too, with the other
kinds of friendship. There is a difference, therefore, also between the
acts that are unjust towards each of these classes of associates, and the
injustice increases by being exhibited towards those who are friends in a
fuller sense; e.g., it is a more terrible thing to defraud a comrade than a
fellow-citizen, more terrible not to help a brother than a stranger, and
more terrible to wound a father than any one else. And the demands of
justice also seem to increase with the intensity of the friendship, which
implies that friendship and justice exist between the same persons and
have an equal extension.
Now all forms of community are like parts of the political commu-
nity; for men journey together with a view to some particular advan-
tage, and to provide something that they need for the purposes of life;
and it is for the sake of advantage that the political community too seems
both to have come together originally and to endure, for this is what138/Aristotle
legislators aim at, and they call just that which is to the common advan-
tage. Now the other communities aim at advantage bit by bit, e.g., sail-
ors at what is advantageous on a voyage with a view to making money
or something of the kind, fellow-soldiers at what is advantageous in
war, whether it is wealth or victory or the taking of a city that they seek,
and members of tribes and demes act similarly (Some communities seem
to arise for the sake or pleasure, viz. religious guilds and social clubs;
for these exist respectively for the sake of offering sacrifice and of com-
panionship. But all these seem to fall under the political community; for
it aims not at present advantage but at what is advantageous for life as
a whole), offering sacrifices and arranging gatherings for the purpose,
and assigning honours to the gods, and providing pleasant relaxations
for themselves. For the ancient sacrifices and gatherings seem to take
place after the harvest as a sort of firstfruits, because it was at these
seasons that people had most leisure. All the communities, then, seem to
be parts of the political community; and the particular kinds friendship
will correspond to the particular kinds of community.
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There are three kinds of constitution, and an equal number of deviation-
forms—perversions, as it were, of them. The constitutions are monar-
chy, aristocracy, and thirdly that which is based on a property qualifica-
tion, which it seems appropriate to call timocratic, though most people
are wont to call it polity. The best of these is monarchy, the worst
timocracy. The deviation from monarchy is tyrany; for both are forms
of one-man rule, but there is the greatest difference between them; the
tyrant looks to his own advantage, the king to that of his subjects. For a
man is not a king unless he is sufficient to himself and excels his sub-
jects in all good things; and such a man needs nothing further; therefore
he will not look to his own interests but to those of his subjects; for a
king who is not like that would be a mere titular king. Now tyranny is
the very contrary of this; the tyrant pursues his own good. And it is
clearer in the case of tyranny that it is the worst deviation-form; but it is
the contrary of the best that is worst. Monarchy passes over into tyr-
anny; for tyranny is the evil form of one-man rule and the bad king
becomes a tyrant. Aristocracy passes over into oligarchy by the badness
of the rulers, who distribute contrary to equity what belongs to the city—
all or most of the good things to themselves, and office always to the
same people, paying most regard to wealth; thus the rulers are few andNicomachean Ethics/139
are bad men instead of the most worthy. Timocracy passes over into
democracy; for these are coterminous, since it is the ideal even of
timocracy to be the rule of the majority, and all who have the property
qualification count as equal. Democracy is the least bad of the devia-
tions; for in its case the form of constitution is but a slight deviation.
These then are the changes to which constitutions are most subject; for
these are the smallest and easiest transitions.
One may find resemblances to the constitutions and, as it were,
patterns of them even in households. For the association of a father with
his sons bears the form of monarchy, since the father cares for his chil-
dren; and this is why Homer calls Zeus ‘father’; it is the ideal of monar-
chy to be paternal rule. But among the Persians the rule of the father is
tyrannical; they use their sons as slaves. Tyrannical too is the rule of a
master over slaves; for it is the advantage of the master that is brought
about in it. Now this seems to be a correct form of government, but the
Persian type is perverted; for the modes of rule appropriate to different
relations are diverse. The association of man and wife seems to be aris-
tocratic; for the man rules in accordance with his worth, and in those
matters in which a man should rule, but the matters that befit a woman
he hands over to her. If the man rules in everything the relation passes
over into oligarchy; for in doing so he is not acting in accordance with
their respective worth, and not ruling in virtue of his superiority. Some-
times, however, women rule, because they are heiresses; so their rule is
not in virtue of excellence but due to wealth and power, as in oligar-
chies. The association of brothers is like timocracy; for they are equal,
except in so far as they differ in age; hence if they differ much in age, the
friendship is no longer of the fraternal type. Democracy is found chiefly
in masterless dwellings (for here every one is on an equality), and in
those in which the ruler is weak and every one has licence to do as he
pleases.
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Each of the constitutions may be seen to involve friendship just in so far
as it involves justice. The friendship between a king and his subjects
depends on an excess of benefits conferred; for he confers benefits on
his subjects if being a good man he cares for them with a view to their
well-being, as a shepherd does for his sheep (whence Homer called
Agamemnon ‘shepherd of the peoples’). Such too is the friendship of a
father, though this exceeds the other in the greatness of the benefits140/Aristotle
conferred; for he is responsible for the existence of his children, which
is thought the greatest good, and for their nurture and upbringing.
These things are ascribed to ancestors as well. Further, by nature a
father tends to rule over his sons, ancestors over descendants, a king
over his subjects. These friendships imply superiority of one party over
the other, which is why ancestors are honoured. The justice therefore
that exists between persons so related is not the same on both sides but
is in every case proportioned to merit; for that is true of the friendship as
well. The friendship of man and wife, again, is the same that is found in
an aristocracy; for it is in accordance with virtue the better gets more of
what is good, and each gets what befits him; and so, too, with the justice
in these relations. The friendship of brothers is like that of comrades;
for they are equal and of like age, and such persons are for the most part
like in their feelings and their character. Like this, too, is the friendship
appropriate to timocratic government; for in such a constitution the ideal
is for the citizens to be equal and fair; therefore rule is taken in turn, and
on equal terms; and the friendship appropriate here will correspond.
But in the deviation-forms, as justice hardly exists, so too does friend-
ship. It exists least in the worst form; in tyranny there is little or no
friendship. For where there is nothing common to ruler and ruled, there
is not friendship either, since there is not justice; e.g., between crafts-
man and tool, soul and body, master and slave; the latter in each case is
benefited by that which uses it, but there is no friendship nor justice
towards lifeless things. But neither is there friendship towards a horse
or an ox, nor to a slave qua slave. For there is nothing common to the
two parties; the slave is a living tool and the tool a lifeless slave. Qua
slave then, one cannot be friends with him. But qua man one can; for
there seems to be some justice between any man and any other who can
share in a system of law or be a party to an agreement; therefore there
can also be friendship with him in so far as he is a man. Therefore while
in tyrannies friendship and justice hardly exist, in democracies they ex-
ist more fully; for where the citizens are equal they have much in com-
mon.
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Every form of friendship, then, involves association, as has been said.
One might, however, mark off from the rest both the friendship of kin-
dred and that of comrades. Those of fellow-citizens, fellow-tribesmen,
fellow-voyagers, and the like are more like mere friendships of associa-Nicomachean Ethics/141
tion; for they seem to rest on a sort of compact. With them we might
class the friendship of host and guest. The friendship of kinsmen itself,
while it seems to be of many kinds, appears to depend in every case on
parental friendship; for parents love their children as being a part of
themselves, and children their parents as being something originating
from them. Now (1) parents know their offspring better than there chil-
dren know that they are their children, and (2) the originator feels his
offspring to be his own more than the offspring do their begetter; for the
product belongs to the producer (e.g., a tooth or hair or anything else to
him whose it is), but the producer does not belong to the product, or
belongs in a less degree. And (3) the length of time produces the same
result; parents love their children as soon as these are born, but children
love their parents only after time has elapsed and they have acquired
understanding or the power of discrimination by the senses. From these
considerations it is also plain why mothers love more than fathers do.
Parents, then, love their children as themselves (for their issue are by
virtue of their separate existence a sort of other selves), while children
love their parents as being born of them, and brothers love each other as
being born of the same parents; for their identity with them makes them
identical with each other (which is the reason why people talk of ‘the
same blood,’ ‘the same stock,’ and so on). They are, therefore, in a
sense the same thing, though in separate individuals. Two things that
contribute greatly to friendship are a common upbringing and similarity
of age; for ‘two of an age take to each other,’ and people brought up
together tend to be comrades; whence the friendship of brothers is akin
to that of comrades. And cousins and other kinsmen are bound up to-
gether by derivation from brothers, viz. by being derived from the same
parents. They come to be closer together or farther apart by virtue of the
nearness or distance of the original ancestor.
The friendship of children to parents, and of men to gods, is a rela-
tion to them as to something good and superior; for they have conferred
the greatest benefits, since they are the causes of their being and of their
nourishment, and of their education from their birth; and this kind of
friendship possesses pleasantness and utility also, more than that of
strangers, inasmuch as their life is lived more in common. The friend-
ship of brothers has the characteristics found in that of comrades (and
especially when these are good), and in general between people who are
like each other, inasmuch as they belong more to each other and start
with a love for each other from their very birth, and inasmuch as those142/Aristotle
born of the same parents and brought up together and similarly edu-
cated are more akin in character; and the test of time has been applied
most fully and convincingly in their case.
Between other kinsmen friendly relations are found in due propor-
tion. Between man and wife friendship seems to exist by nature; for man
is naturally inclined to form couples—even more than to form cities,
inasmuch as the household is earlier and more necessary than the city,
and reproduction is more common to man with the animals. With the
other animals the union extends only to this point, but human beings
live together not only for the sake of reproduction but also for the vari-
ous purposes of life; for from the start the functions are divided, and
those of man and woman are different; so they help each other by throw-
ing their peculiar gifts into the common stock. It is for these reasons that
both utility and pleasure seem to be found in this kind of friendship. But
this friendship may be based also on virtue, if the parties are good; for
each has its own virtue and they will delight in the fact. And children
seem to be a bond of union (which is the reason why childless people
part more easily); for children are a good common to both and what is
common holds them together.
How man and wife and in general friend and friend ought mutually
to behave seems to be the same question as how it is just for them to
behave; for a man does not seem to have the same duties to a friend, a
stranger, a comrade, and a schoolfellow.
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There are three kinds of friendship, as we said at the outset of our in-
quiry, and in respect of each some are friends on an equality and others
by virtue of a superiority (for not only can equally good men become
friends but a better man can make friends with a worse, and similarly in
friendships of pleasure or utility the friends may be equal or unequal in
the benefits they confer). This being so, equals must effect the required
equalization on a basis of equality in love and in all other respects,
while unequals must render what is in proportion to their superiority or
inferiority. Complaints and reproaches arise either only or chiefly in the
friendship of utility, and this is only to be expected. For those who are
friends on the ground of virtue are anxious to do well by each other
(since that is a mark of virtue and of friendship), and between men who
are emulating each other in this there cannot be complaints or quarrels;
no one is offended by a man who loves him and does well by him—if heNicomachean Ethics/143
is a person of nice feeling he takes his revenge by doing well by the
other. And the man who excels the other in the services he renders will
not complain of his friend, since he gets what he aims at; for each man
desires what is good. Nor do complaints arise much even in friendships
of pleasure; for both get at the same time what they desire, if they enjoy
spending their time together; and even a man who complained of an-
other for not affording him pleasure would seem ridiculous, since it is in
his power not to spend his days with him.
But the friendship of utility is full of complaints; for as they use
each other for their own interests they always want to get the better of
the bargain, and think they have got less than they should, and blame
their partners because they do not get all they ‘want and deserve’; and
those who do well by others cannot help them as much as those whom
they benefit want.
Now it seems that, as justice is of two kinds, one unwritten and the
other legal, one kind of friendship of utility is moral and the other legal.
And so complaints arise most of all when men do not dissolve the rela-
tion in the spirit of the same type of friendship in which they contracted
it. The legal type is that which is on fixed terms; its purely commercial
variety is on the basis of immediate payment, while the more liberal
variety allows time but stipulates for a definite quid pro quo. In this
variety the debt is clear and not ambiguous, but in the postponement it
contains an element of friendliness; and so some states do not allow
suits arising out of such agreements, but think men who have bargained
on a basis of credit ought to accept the consequences. The moral type is
not on fixed terms; it makes a gift, or does whatever it does, as to a
friend; but one expects to receive as much or more, as having not given
but lent; and if a man is worse off when the relation is dissolved than he
was when it was contracted he will complain. This happens because all
or most men, while they wish for what is noble, choose what is advanta-
geous; now it is noble to do well by another without a view to repay-
ment, but it is the receiving of benefits that is advantageous. Therefore
if we can we should return the equivalent of what we have received (for
we must not make a man our friend against his will; we must recognize
that we were mistaken at the first and took a benefit from a person we
should not have taken it from—since it was not from a friend, nor from
one who did it just for the sake of acting so—and we must settle up just
as if we had been benefited on fixed terms). Indeed, one would agree to
repay if one could (if one could not, even the giver would not have144/Aristotle
expected one to do so); therefore if it is possible we must repay. But at
the outset we must consider the man by whom we are being benefited
and on what terms he is acting, in order that we may accept the benefit
on these terms, or else decline it.
It is disputable whether we ought to measure a service by its utility
to the receiver and make the return with a view to that, or by the benevo-
lence of the giver. For those who have received say they have received
from their benefactors what meant little to the latter and what they might
have got from others—minimizing the service; while the givers, on the
contrary, say it was the biggest thing they had, and what could not have
been got from others, and that it was given in times of danger or similar
need. Now if the friendship is one that aims at utility, surely the advan-
tage to the receiver is the measure. For it is he that asks for the service,
and the other man helps him on the assumption that he will receive the
equivalent; so the assistance has been precisely as great as the advan-
tage to the receiver, and therefore he must return as much as he has
received, or even more (for that would be nobler). In friendships based
on virtue on the other hand, complaints do not arise, but the purpose of
the doer is a sort of measure; for in purpose lies the essential element of
virtue and character.
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Differences arise also in friendships based on superiority; for each ex-
pects to get more out of them, but when this happens the friendship is
dissolved. Not only does the better man think he ought to get more, since
more should be assigned to a good man, but the more useful similarly
expects this; they say a useless man should not get as much as they
should, since it becomes an act of public service and not a friendship if
the proceeds of the friendship do not answer to the worth of the benefits
conferred. For they think that, as in a commercial partnership those who
put more in get more out, so it should be in friendship. But the man who
is in a state of need and inferiority makes the opposite claim; they think
it is the part of a good friend to help those who are in need; what, they
say, is the use of being the friend of a good man or a powerful man, if
one is to get nothing out of it?
At all events it seems that each party is justified in his claim, and
that each should get more out of the friendship than the other—not more
of the same thing, however, but the superior more honour and the infe-
rior more gain; for honour is the prize of virtue and of beneficence,Nicomachean Ethics/145
while gain is the assistance required by inferiority.
It seems to be so in constitutional arrangements also; the man who
contributes nothing good to the common stock is not honoured; for what
belongs to the public is given to the man who benefits the public, and
honour does belong to the public. It is not possible to get wealth from
the common stock and at the same time honour. For no one puts up with
the smaller share in all things; therefore to the man who loses in wealth
they assign honour and to the man who is willing to be paid, wealth,
since the proportion to merit equalizes the parties and preserves the
friendship, as we have said. This then is also the way in which we should
associate with unequals; the man who is benefited in respect of wealth
or virtue must give honour in return, repaying what he can. For friend-
ship asks a man to do what he can, not what is proportional to the merits
of the case; since that cannot always be done, e.g., in honours paid to
the gods or to parents; for no one could ever return to them the equiva-
lent of what he gets, but the man who serves them to the utmost of his
power is thought to be a good man. This is why it would not seem open
to a man to disown his father (though a father may disown his son);
being in debt, he should repay, but there is nothing by doing which a son
will have done the equivalent of what he has received, so that he is
always in debt. But creditors can remit a debt; and a father can therefore
do so too. At the same time it is thought that presumably no one would
repudiate a son who was not far gone in wickedness; for apart from the
natural friendship of father and son it is human nature not to reject a
son’s assistance. But the son, if he is wicked, will naturally avoid aiding
his father, or not be zealous about it; for most people wish to get ben-




In all friendships between dissimilars it is, as we have said, proportion
that equalizes the parties and preserves the friendship; e.g., in the politi-
cal form of friendship the shoemaker gets a return for his shoes in pro-
portion to his worth, and the weaver and all other craftsmen do the
same. Now here a common measure has been provided in the form of
money, and therefore everything is referred to this and measured by this;
but in the friendship of lovers sometimes the lover complains that his
excess of love is not met by love in return though perhaps there is noth-146/Aristotle
ing lovable about him), while often the beloved complains that the lover
who formerly promised everything now performs nothing. Such inci-
dents happen when the lover loves the beloved for the sake of pleasure
while the beloved loves the lover for the sake of utility, and they do not
both possess the qualities expected of them. If these be the objects of the
friendship it is dissolved when they do not get the things that formed the
motives of their love; for each did not love the other person himself but
the qualities he had, and these were not enduring; that is why the friend-
ships also are transient. But the love of characters, as has been said,
endures because it is self-dependent. Differences arise when what they
get is something different and not what they desire; for it is like getting
nothing at all when we do not get what we aim at; compare the story of
the person who made promises to a lyre-player, promising him the more,
the better he sang, but in the morning, when the other demanded the
fulfilment of his promises, said that he had given pleasure for pleasure.
Now if this had been what each wanted, all would have been well; but if
the one wanted enjoyment but the other gain, and the one has what he
wants while the other has not, the terms of the association will not have
been properly fulfilled; for what each in fact wants is what he attends to,
and it is for the sake of that that that he will give what he has.
But who is to fix the worth of the service; he who makes the sacri-
fice or he who has got the advantage? At any rate the other seems to
leave it to him. This is what they say Protagoras used to do; whenever
he taught anything whatsoever, he bade the learner assess the value of
the knowledge, and accepted the amount so fixed. But in such matters
some men approve of the saying ‘let a man have his fixed reward’.
Those who get the money first and then do none of the things they said
they would, owing to the extravagance of their promises, naturally find
themselves the objects of complaint; for they do not fulfil what they
agreed to. The sophists are perhaps compelled to do this because no one
would give money for the things they do know. These people then, if
they do not do what they have been paid for, are naturally made the
objects of complaint.
But where there is no contract of service, those who give up some-
thing for the sake of the other party cannot (as we have said) be com-
plained of (for that is the nature of the friendship of virtue), and the
return to them must be made on the basis of their purpose (for it is
purpose that is the characteristic thing in a friend and in virtue). And so
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studied philosophy; for their worth cannot be measured against money,
and they can get no honour which will balance their services, but still it
is perhaps enough, as it is with the gods and with one’s parents, to give
them what one can.
If the gift was not of this sort, but was made with a view to a return,
it is no doubt preferable that the return made should be one that seems
fair to both parties, but if this cannot be achieved, it would seem not
only necessary that the person who gets the first service should fix the
reward, but also just; for if the other gets in return the equivalent of the
advantage the beneficiary has received, or the price lie would have paid
for the pleasure, he will have got what is fair as from the other.
We see this happening too with things put up for sale, and in some
places there are laws providing that no actions shall arise out of volun-
tary contracts, on the assumption that one should settle with a person to
whom one has given credit, in the spirit in which one bargained with
him. The law holds that it is more just that the person to whom credit
was given should fix the terms than that the person who gave credit
should do so. For most things are not assessed at the same value by
those who have them and those who want them; each class values highly
what is its own and what it is offering; yet the return is made on the
terms fixed by the receiver. But no doubt the receiver should assess a
thing not at what it seems worth when he has it, but at what he assessed
it at before he had it.
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A further problem is set by such questions as, whether one should in all
things give the preference to one’s father and obey him, or whether when
one is ill one should trust a doctor, and when one has to elect a general
should elect a man of military skill; and similarly whether one should
render a service by preference to a friend or to a good man, and should
show gratitude to a benefactor or oblige a friend, if one cannot do both.
All such questions are hard, are they not, to decide with precision?
For they admit of many variations of all sorts in respect both of the
magnitude of the service and of its nobility necessity. But that we should
not give the preference in all things to the same person is plain enough;
and we must for the most part return benefits rather than oblige friends,
as we must pay back a loan to a creditor rather than make one to a
friend. But perhaps even this is not always true; e.g., should a man who
has been ransomed out of the hands of brigands ransom his ransomer in148/Aristotle
return, whoever he may be (or pay him if he has not been captured but
demands payment) or should he ransom his father? It would seem that
he should ransom his father in preference even to himself. As we have
said, then, generally the debt should be paid, but if the gift is exceed-
ingly noble or exceedingly necessary, one should defer to these consid-
erations. For sometimes it is not even fair to return the equivalent of
what one has received, when the one man has done a service to one
whom he knows to be good, while the other makes a return to one whom
he believes to be bad. For that matter, one should sometimes not lend in
return to one who has lent to oneself; for the one person lent to a good
man, expecting to recover his loan, while the other has no hope of recov-
ering from one who is believed to be bad. Therefore if the facts really
are so, the demand is not fair; and if they are not, but people think they
are, they would be held to be doing nothing strange in refusing. As we
have often pointed out, then, discussions about feelings and actions have
just as much definiteness as their subject-matter.
That we should not make the same return to every one, nor give a
father the preference in everything, as one does not sacrifice everything
to Zeus, is plain enough; but since we ought to render different things to
parents, brothers, comrades, and benefactors, we ought to render to each
class what is appropriate and becoming. And this is what people seem
in fact to do; to marriages they invite their kinsfolk; for these have a part
in the family and therefore in the doings that affect the family; and at
funerals also they think that kinsfolk, before all others, should meet, for
the same reason. And it would be thought that in the matter of food we
should help our parents before all others, since we owe our own nour-
ishment to them, and it is more honourable to help in this respect the
authors of our being even before ourselves; and honour too one should
give to one’s parents as one does to the gods, but not any and every
honour; for that matter one should not give the same honour to one’s
father and one’s mother, nor again should one give them the honour due
to a philosopher or to a general, but the honour due to a father, or again
to a mother. To all older persons, too, one should give honour appropri-
ate to their age, by rising to receive them and finding seats for them and
so on; while to comrades and brothers one should allow freedom of
speech and common use of all things. To kinsmen, too, and fellow-tribes-
men and fellow-citizens and to every other class one should always try
to assign what is appropriate, and to compare the claims of each class
with respect to nearness of relation and to virtue or usefulness. TheNicomachean Ethics/149
comparison is easier when the persons belong to the same class, and
more laborious when they are different. Yet we must not on that account
shrink from the task, but decide the question as best we can.
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Another question that arises is whether friendships should or should not
be broken off when the other party does not remain the same. Perhaps
we may say that there is nothing strange in breaking off a friendship
based on utility or pleasure, when our friends no longer have these at-
tributes. For it was of these attributes that we were the friends; and
when these have failed it is reasonable to love no longer. But one might
complain of another if, when he loved us for our usefulness or pleasant-
ness, he pretended to love us for our character. For, as we said at the
outset, most differences arise between friends when they are not friends
in the spirit in which they think they are. So when a man has deceived
himself and has thought he was being loved for his character, when the
other person was doing nothing of the kind, he must blame himself;
when he has been deceived by the pretences of the other person, it is just
that he should complain against his deceiver; he will complain with more
justice than one does against people who counterfeit the currency, inas-
much as the wrongdoing is concerned with something more valuable.
But if one accepts another man as good, and he turns out badly and
is seen to do so, must one still love him? Surely it is impossible, since
not everything can be loved, but only what is good. What is evil neither
can nor should be loved; for it is not one’s duty to be a lover of evil, nor
to become like what is bad; and we have said that like is dear like. Must
the friendship, then, be forthwith broken off? Or is this not so in all
cases, but only when one’s friends are incurable in their wickedness? If
they are capable of being reformed one should rather come to the assis-
tance of their character or their property, inasmuch as this is better and
more characteristic of friendship. But a man who breaks off such a
friendship would seem to be doing nothing strange; for it was not to a
man of this sort that he was a friend; when his friend has changed,
therefore, and he is unable to save him, he gives him up.
But if one friend remained the same while the other became better
and far outstripped him in virtue, should the latter treat the former as a
friend? Surely he cannot. When the interval is great this becomes most
plain, e.g., in the case of childish friendships; if one friend remained a
child in intellect while the other became a fully developed man, how150/Aristotle
could they be friends when they neither approved of the same things nor
delighted in and were pained by the same things? For not even with
regard to each other will their tastes agree, and without this (as we saw)
they cannot be friends; for they cannot live together. But we have dis-
cussed these matters.
Should he, then, behave no otherwise towards him than he would if
he had never been his friend? Surely he should keep a remembrance of
their former intimacy, and as we think we ought to oblige friends rather
than strangers, so to those who have been our friends we ought to make
some allowance for our former friendship, when the breach has not been
due to excess of wickedness.
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Friendly relations with one’s neighbours, and the marks by which friend-
ships are defined, seem to have proceeded from a man’s relations to
himself. For (1) we define a friend as one who wishes and does what is
good, or seems so, for the sake of his friend, or (2) as one who wishes
his friend to exist and live, for his sake; which mothers do to their chil-
dren, and friends do who have come into conflict. And (3) others define
him as one who lives with and (4) has the same tastes as another, or (5)
one who grieves and rejoices with his friend; and this too is found in
mothers most of all. It is by some one of these characterstics that friend-
ship too is defined.
Now each of these is true of the good man’s relation to himself (and
of all other men in so far as they think themselves good; virtue and the
good man seem, as has been said, to be the measure of every class of
things). For his opinions are harmonious, and he desires the same things
with all his soul; and therefore he wishes for himself what is good and
what seems so, and does it (for it is characteristic of the good man to
work out the good), and does so for his own sake (for he does it for the
sake of the intellectual element in him, which is thought to be the man
himself); and he wishes himself to live and be preserved, and especially
the element by virtue of which he thinks. For existence is good to the
virtuous man, and each man wishes himself what is good, while no one
chooses to possess the whole world if he has first to become some one
else (for that matter, even now God possesses the good); he wishes for
this only on condition of being whatever he is; and the element that
thinks would seem to be the individual man, or to be so more than any
other element in him. And such a man wishes to live with himself; for heNicomachean Ethics/151
does so with pleasure, since the memories of his past acts are delightful
and his hopes for the future are good, and therefore pleasant. His mind
is well stored too with subjects of contemplation. And he grieves and
rejoices, more than any other, with himself; for the same thing is always
painful, and the same thing always pleasant, and not one thing at one
time and another at another; he has, so to speak, nothing to repent of.
Therefore, since each of these characteristics belongs to the good
man in relation to himself, and he is related to his friend as to himself
(for his friend is another self), friendship too is thought to be one of
these attributes, and those who have these attributes to be friends. Whether
there is or is not friendship between a man and himself is a question we
may dismiss for the present; there would seem to be friendship in so far
as he is two or more, to judge from the afore-mentioned attributes of
friendship, and from the fact that the extreme of friendship is likened to
one’s love for oneself.
But the attributes named seem to belong even to the majority of
men, poor creatures though they may be. Are we to say then that in so
far as they are satisfied with themselves and think they are good, they
share in these attributes? Certainly no one who is thoroughly bad and
impious has these attributes, or even seems to do so. They hardly belong
even to inferior people; for they are at variance with themselves, and
have appetites for some things and rational desires for others. This is
true, for instance, of incontinent people; for they choose, instead of the
things they themselves think good, things that are pleasant but hurtful;
while others again, through cowardice and laziness, shrink from doing
what they think best for themselves. And those who have done many
terrible deeds and are hated for their wickedness even shrink from life
and destroy themselves. And wicked men seek for people with whom to
spend their days, and shun themselves; for they remember many a
grevious deed, and anticipate others like them, when they are by them-
selves, but when they are with others they forget. And having nothing
lovable in them they have no feeling of love to themselves. Therefore
also such men do not rejoice or grieve with themselves; for their soul is
rent by faction, and one element in it by reason of its wickedness grieves
when it abstains from certain acts, while the other part is pleased, and
one draws them this way and the other that, as if they were pulling them
in pieces. If a man cannot at the same time be pained and pleased, at all
events after a short time he is pained because he was pleased, and he
could have wished that these things had not been pleasant to him; for152/Aristotle
bad men are laden with repentance.
Therefore the bad man does not seem to be amicably disposed even
to himself, because there is nothing in him to love; so that if to be thus is
the height of wretchedness, we should strain every nerve to avoid wick-
edness and should endeavour to be good; for so and only so can one be
either friendly to oneself or a friend to another.
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Goodwill is a friendly sort of relation, but is not identical with friend-
ship; for one may have goodwill both towards people whom one does
not know, and without their knowing it, but not friendship. This has
indeed been said already.’ But goodwill is not even friendly feeling. For
it does not involve intensity or desire, whereas these accompany friendly
feeling; and friendly feeling implies intimacy while goodwill may arise
of a sudden, as it does towards competitors in a contest; we come to feel
goodwill for them and to share in their wishes, but we would not do
anything with them; for, as we said, we feel goodwill suddenly and love
them only superficially.
Goodwill seems, then, to be a beginning of friendship, as the plea-
sure of the eye is the beginning of love. For no one loves if he has not
first been delighted by the form of the beloved, but he who delights in
the form of another does not, for all that, love him, but only does so
when he also longs for him when absent and craves for his presence; so
too it is not possible for people to be friends if they have not come to feel
goodwill for each other, but those who feel goodwill are not for all that
friends; for they only wish well to those for whom they feel goodwill,
and would not do anything with them nor take trouble for them. And so
one might by an extension of the term friendship say that goodwill is
inactive friendship, though when it is prolonged and reaches the point of
intimacy it becomes friendship—not the friendship based on utility nor
that based on pleasure; for goodwill too does not arise on those terms.
The man who has received a benefit bestows goodwill in return for what
has been done to him, but in doing so is only doing what is just; while he
who wishes some one to prosper because he hopes for enrichment through
him seems to have goodwill not to him but rather to himself, just as a
man is not a friend to another if he cherishes him for the sake of some
use to be made of him. In general, goodwill arises on account of some
excellence and worth, when one man seems to another beautiful or brave
or something of the sort, as we pointed out in the case of competitors inNicomachean Ethics/153
a contest.
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Unanimity also seems to be a friendly relation. For this reason it is not
identity of opinion; for that might occur even with people who do not
know each other; nor do we say that people who have the same views on
any and every subject are unanimous, e.g., those who agree about the
heavenly bodies (for unanimity about these is not a friendly relation),
but we do say that a city is unanimous when men have the same opinion
about what is to their interest, and choose the same actions, and do what
they have resolved in common. It is about things to be done, therefore,
that people are said to be unanimous, and, among these, about matters
of consequence and in which it is possible for both or all parties to get
what they want; e.g., a city is unanimous when all its citizens think that
the offices in it should be elective, or that they should form an alliance
with Sparta, or that Pittacus should be their ruler—at a time when he
himself was also willing to rule. But when each of two people wishes
himself to have the thing in question, like the captains in the Phoenissae,
they are in a state of faction; for it is not unanimity when each of two
parties thinks of the same thing, whatever that may be, but only when
they think of the same thing in the same hands, e.g., when both the
common people and those of the better class wish the best men to rule;
for thus and thus alone do all get what they aim at. Unanimity seems,
then, to be political friendship, as indeed it is commonly said to be; for
it is concerned with things that are to our interest and have an influence
on our life.
Now such unanimity is found among good men; for they are unani-
mous both in themselves and with one another, being, so to say, of one
mind (for the wishes of such men are constant and not at the mercy of
opposing currents like a strait of the sea), and they wish for what is just
and what is advantageous, and these are the objects of their common
endeavour as well. But bad men cannot be unanimous except to a small
extent, any more than they can be friends, since they aim at getting more
than their share of advantages, while in labour and public service they
fall short of their share; and each man wishing for advantage to himself
criticizes his neighbour and stands in his way; for if people do not watch
it carefully the common weal is soon destroyed. The result is that they
are in a state of faction, putting compulsion on each other but unwilling
themselves to do what is just.154/Aristotle
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Benefactors are thought to love those they have benefited, more than
those who have been well treated love those that have treated them well,
and this is discussed as though it were paradoxical. Most people think it
is because the latter are in the position of debtors and the former of
creditors; and therefore as, in the case of loans, debtors wish their credi-
tors did not exist, while creditors actually take care of the safety of their
debtors, so it is thought that benefactors wish the objects of their action
to exist since they will then get their gratitude, while the beneficiaries
take no interest in making this return. Epicharmus would perhaps de-
clare that they say this because they ‘look at things on their bad side,’
but it is quite like human nature; for most people are forgetful, and are
more anxious to be well treated than to treat others well. But the cause
would seem to be more deeply rooted in the nature of things; the case of
those who have lent money is not even analogous. For they have no
friendly feeling to their debtors, but only a wish that they may kept safe
with a view to what is to be got from them; while those who have done
a service to others feel friendship and love for those they have served
even if these are not of any use to them and never will be. This is what
happens with craftsmen too; every man loves his own handiwork better
than he would be loved by it if it came alive; and this happens perhaps
most of all with poets; for they have an excessive love for their own
poems, doting on them as if they were their children. This is what the
position of benefactors is like; for that which they have treated well is
their handiwork, and therefore they love this more than the handiwork
does its maker. The cause of this is that existence is to all men a thing to
be chosen and loved, and that we exist by virtue of activity (i.e., by
living and acting), and that the handiwork is in a sense, the producer in
activity; he loves his handiwork, therefore, because he loves existence.
And this is rooted in the nature of things; for what he is in potentiality,
his handiwork manifests in activity.
At the same time to the benefactor that is noble which depends on
his action, so that he delights in the object of his action, whereas to the
patient there is nothing noble in the agent, but at most something advan-
tageous, and this is less pleasant and lovable. What is pleasant is the
activity of the present, the hope of the future, the memory of the past;
but most pleasant is that which depends on activity, and similarly this is
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mains (for the noble is lasting), but for the person acted on the utility
passes away. And the memory of noble things is pleasant, but that of
useful things is not likely to be pleasant, or is less so; though the reverse
seems true of expectation.
Further, love is like activity, being loved like passivity; and loving
and its concomitants are attributes of those who are the more active.
Again, all men love more what they have won by labour; e.g., those
who have made their money love it more than those who have inherited
it; and to be well treated seems to involve no labour, while to treat others
well is a laborious task. These are the reasons, too, why mothers are
fonder of their children than fathers; bringing them into the world costs
them more pains, and they know better that the children are their own.
This last point, too, would seem to apply to benefactors.
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The question is also debated, whether a man should love himself most,
or some one else. People criticize those who love themselves most, and
call them self-lovers, using this as an epithet of disgrace, and a bad man
seems to do everything for his own sake, and the more so the more
wicked he is—and so men reproach him, for instance, with doing noth-
ing of his own accord—while the good man acts for honour’s sake, and
the more so the better he is, and acts for his friend’s sake, and sacrifices
his own interest.
But the facts clash with these arguments, and this is not surprising.
For men say that one ought to love best one’s best friend, and man’s best
friend is one who wishes well to the object of his wish for his sake, even
if no one is to know of it; and these attributes are found most of all in a
man’s attitude towards himself, and so are all the other attributes by
which a friend is defined; for, as we have said, it is from this relation
that all the characteristics of friendship have extended to our neighbours.
All the proverbs, too, agree with this, e.g., ‘a single soul,’ and ‘what
friends have is common property,’ and ‘friendship is equality,’ and ‘char-
ity begins at home’; for all these marks will be found most in a man’s
relation to himself; he is his own best friend and therefore ought to love
himself best. It is therefore a reasonable question, which of the two
views we should follow; for both are plausible.
Perhaps we ought to mark off such arguments from each other and
determine how far and in what respects each view is right. Now if we
grasp the sense in which each school uses the phrase ‘lover of self,’ the156/Aristotle
truth may become evident. Those who use the term as one of reproach
ascribe self-love to people who assign to themselves the greater share of
wealth, honours, and bodily pleasures; for these are what most people
desire, and busy themselves about as though they were the best of all
things, which is the reason, too, why they become objects of competi-
tion. So those who are grasping with regard to these things gratify their
appetites and in general their feelings and the irrational element of the
soul; and most men are of this nature (which is the reason why the
epithet has come to be used as it is—it takes its meaning from the pre-
vailing type of self-love, which is a bad one); it is just, therefore, that
men who are lovers of self in this way are reproached for being so. That
it is those who give themselves the preference in regard to objects of this
sort that most people usually call lovers of self is plain; for if a man
were always anxious that he himself, above all things, should act justly,
temperately, or in accordance with any other of the virtues, and in gen-
eral were always to try to secure for himself the honourable course, no
one will call such a man a lover of self or blame him.
But such a man would seem more than the other a lover of self; at
all events he assigns to himself the things that are noblest and best, and
gratifies the most authoritative element in and in all things obeys this;
and just as a city or any other systematic whole is most properly identi-
fied with the most authoritative element in it, so is a man; and therefore
the man who loves this and gratifies it is most of all a lover of self.
Besides, a man is said to have or not to have self-control according as
his reason has or has not the control, on the assumption that this is the
man himself; and the things men have done on a rational principle are
thought most properly their own acts and voluntary acts. That this is the
man himself, then, or is so more than anything else, is plain, and also
that the good man loves most this part of him. Whence it follows that he
is most truly a lover of self, of another type than that which is a matter
of reproach, and as different from that as living according to a rational
principle is from living as passion dictates, and desiring what is noble
from desiring what seems advantageous. Those, then, who busy them-
selves in an exceptional degree with noble actions all men approve and
praise; and if all were to strive towards what is noble and strain every
nerve to do the noblest deeds, everything would be as it should be for the
common weal, and every one would secure for himself the goods that
are greatest, since virtue is the greatest of goods.
Therefore the good man should be a lover of self (for he will bothNicomachean Ethics/157
himself profit by doing noble acts, and will benefit his fellows), but the
wicked man should not; for he will hurt both himself and his neighbours,
following as he does evil passions. For the wicked man, what he does
clashes with what he ought to do, but what the good man ought to do he
does; for reason in each of its possessors chooses what is best for itself,
and the good man obeys his reason. It is true of the good man too that he
does many acts for the sake of his friends and his country, and if neces-
sary dies for them; for he will throw away both wealth and honours and
in general the goods that are objects of competition, gaining for himself
nobility; since he would prefer a short period of intense pleasure to a
long one of mild enjoyment, a twelvemonth of noble life to many years
of humdrum existence, and one great and noble action to many trivial
ones. Now those who die for others doubtless attain this result; it is
therefore a great prize that they choose for themselves. They will throw
away wealth too on condition that their friends will gain more; for while
a man’s friend gains wealth he himself achieves nobility; he is therefore
assigning the greater good to himself. The same too is true of honour
and office; all these things he will sacrifice to his friend; for this is noble
and laudable for himself. Rightly then is he thought to be good, since he
chooses nobility before all else. But he may even give up actions to his
friend; it may be nobler to become the cause of his friend’s acting than
to act himself. In all the actions, therefore, that men are praised for, the
good man is seen to assign to himself the greater share in what is noble.
In this sense, then, as has been said, a man should be a lover of self; but
in the sense in which most men are so, he ought not.
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It is also disputed whether the happy man will need friends or not. It is
said that those who are supremely happy and self-sufficient have no
need of friends; for they have the things that are good, and therefore
being self-sufficient they need nothing further, while a friend, being an-
other self, furnishes what a man cannot provide by his own effort; whence
the saying ‘when fortune is kind, what need of friends?’ But it seems
strange, when one assigns all good things to the happy man, not to as-
sign friends, who are thought the greatest of external goods. And if it is
more characteristic of a friend to do well by another than to be well done
by, and to confer benefits is characteristic of the good man and of virtue,
and it is nobler to do well by friends than by strangers, the good man
will need people to do well by. This is why the question is asked whether158/Aristotle
we need friends more in prosperity or in adversity, on the assumption
that not only does a man in adversity need people to confer benefits on
him, but also those who are prospering need people to do well by. Surely
it is strange, too, to make the supremely happy man a solitary; for no
one would choose the whole world on condition of being alone, since
man is a political creature and one whose nature is to live with others.
Therefore even the happy man lives with others; for he has the things
that are by nature good. And plainly it is better to spend his days with
friends and good men than with strangers or any chance persons. There-
fore the happy man needs friends.
What then is it that the first school means, and in what respect is it
right? Is it that most identify friends with useful people? Of such friends
indeed the supremely happy man will have no need, since he already has
the things that are good; nor will he need those whom one makes one’s
friends because of their pleasantness, or he will need them only to a
small extent (for his life, being pleasant, has no need of adventitious
pleasure); and because he does not need such friends he is thought not to
need friends.
But that is surely not true. For we have said at the outset that hap-
piness is an activity; and activity plainly comes into being and is not
present at the start like a piece of property. If (1) happiness lies in living
and being active, and the good man’s activity is virtuous and pleasant in
itself, as we have said at the outset, and (2) a thing’s being one’s own is
one of the attributes that make it pleasant, and (3) we can contemplate
our neighbours better than ourselves and their actions better than our
own, and if the actions of virtuous men who are their friends are pleas-
ant to good men (since these have both the attributes that are naturally
pleasant),—if this be so, the supremely happy man will need friends of
this sort, since his purpose is to contemplate worthy actions and actions
that are his own, and the actions of a good man who is his friend have
both these qualities.
Further, men think that the happy man ought to live pleasantly. Now
if he were a solitary, life would be hard for him; for by oneself it is not
easy to be continuously active; but with others and towards others it is
easier. With others therefore his activity will be more continuous, and it
is in itself pleasant, as it ought to be for the man who is supremely
happy; for a good man qua good delights in virtuous actions and is
vexed at vicious ones, as a musical man enjoys beautiful tunes but is
pained at bad ones. A certain training in virtue arises also from theNicomachean Ethics/159
company of the good, as Theognis has said before us.
If we look deeper into the nature of things, a virtuous friend seems
to be naturally desirable for a virtuous man. For that which is good by
nature, we have said, is for the virtuous man good and pleasant in itself.
Now life is defined in the case of animals by the power of perception in
that of man by the power of perception or thought; and a power is de-
fined by reference to the corresponding activity, which is the essential
thing; therefore life seems to be essentially the act of perceiving or think-
ing. And life is among the things that are good and pleasant in them-
selves, since it is determinate and the determinate is of the nature of the
good; and that which is good by nature is also good for the virtuous man
(which is the reason why life seems pleasant to all men); but we must
not apply this to a wicked and corrupt life nor to a life spent in pain; for
such a life is indeterminate, as are its attributes. The nature of pain will
become plainer in what follows. But if life itself is good and pleasant
(which it seems to be, from the very fact that all men desire it, and
particularly those who are good and supremely happy; for to such men
life is most desirable, and their existence is the most supremely happy)
and if he who sees perceives that he sees, and he who hears, that he
hears, and he who walks, that he walks, and in the case of all other
activities similarly there is something which perceives that we are ac-
tive, so that if we perceive, we perceive that we perceive, and if we
think, that we think; and if to perceive that we perceive or think is to
perceive that we exist (for existence was defined as perceiving or think-
ing); and if perceiving that one lives is in itself one of the things that are
pleasant (for life is by nature good, and to perceive what is good present
in oneself is pleasant); and if life is desirable, and particularly so for
good men, because to them existence is good and pleasant for they are
pleased at the consciousness of the presence in them of what is in itself
good); and if as the virtuous man is to himself, he is to his friend also
(for his friend is another self):—if all this be true, as his own being is
desirable for each man, so, or almost so, is that of his friend. Now his
being was seen to be desirable because he perceived his own goodness,
and such perception is pleasant in itself. He needs, therefore, to be con-
scious of the existence of his friend as well, and this will be realized in
their living together and sharing in discussion and thought; for this is
what living together would seem to mean in the case of man, and not, as
in the case of cattle, feeding in the same place.
If, then, being is in itself desirable for the supremely happy man160/Aristotle
(since it is by its nature good and pleasant), and that of his friend is very
much the same, a friend will be one of the things that are desirable. Now
that which is desirable for him he must have, or he will be deficient in
this respect. The man who is to be happy will therefore need virtuous
friends.
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Should we, then, make as many friends as possible, or—as in the case
of hospitality it is thought to be suitable advice, that one should be
‘neither a man of many guests nor a man with none’—will that apply to
friendship as well; should a man neither be friendless nor have an exces-
sive number of friends?
To friends made with a view to utility this saying would seem thor-
oughly applicable; for to do services to many people in return is a labo-
rious task and life is not long enough for its performance. Therefore
friends in excess of those who are sufficient for our own life are super-
fluous, and hindrances to the noble life; so that we have no need of
them. Of friends made with a view to pleasure, also, few are enough, as
a little seasoning in food is enough.
But as regards good friends, should we have as many as possible, or
is there a limit to the number of one’s friends, as there is to the size of a
city? You cannot make a city of ten men, and if there are a hundred
thousand it is a city no longer. But the proper number is presumably not
a single number, but anything that falls between certain fixed points. So
for friends too there is a fixed number perhaps the largest number with
whom one can live together (for that, we found, thought to be very char-
acteristic of friendship); and that one cannot live with many people and
divide oneself up among them is plain. Further, they too must be friends
of one another, if they are all to spend their days together; and it is a
hard business for this condition to be fulfilled with a large number. It is
found difficult, too, to rejoice and to grieve in an intimate way with
many people, for it may likely happen that one has at once to be happy
with one friend and to mourn with another. Presumably, then, it is well
not to seek to have as many friends as possible, but as many as are
enough for the purpose of living together; for it would seem actually
impossible to be a great friend to many people. This is why one cannot
love several people; love is ideally a sort of excess of friendship, and
that can only be felt towards one person; therefore great friendship too
can only be felt towards a few people. This seems to be confirmed inNicomachean Ethics/161
practice; for we do not find many people who are friends in the com-
radely way of friendship, and the famous friendships of this sort are
always between two people. Those who have many friends and mix
intimately with them all are thought to be no one’s friend, except in the
way proper to fellow-citizens, and such people are also called obsequi-
ous. In the way proper to fellow-citizens, indeed, it is possible to be the
friend of many and yet not be obsequious but a genuinely good man; but
one cannot have with many people the friendship based on virtue and on
the character of our friends themselves, and we must be content if we
find even a few such.
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Do we need friends more in good fortune or in bad? They are sought
after in both; for while men in adversity need help, in prosperity they
need people to live with and to make the objects of their beneficence; for
they wish to do well by others. Friendship, then, is more necessary in
bad fortune, and so it is useful friends that one wants in this case; but it
is more noble in good fortune, and so we also seek for good men as our
friends, since it is more desirable to confer benefits on these and to live
with these. For the very presence of friends is pleasant both in good
fortune and also in bad, since grief is lightened when friends sorrow
with us. Hence one might ask whether they share as it were our burden,
or—without that happening—their presence by its pleasantness, and
the thought of their grieving with us, make our pain less. Whether it is
for these reasons or for some other that our grief is lightened, is a ques-
tion that may be dismissed; at all events what we have described ap-
pears to take place.
But their presence seems to contain a mixture of various factors.
The very seeing of one’s friends is pleasant, especially if one is in adver-
sity, and becomes a safeguard against grief (for a friend tends to com-
fort us both by the sight of him and by his words, if he is tactful, since he
knows our character and the things that please or pain us); but to see
him pained at our misfortunes is painful; for every one shuns being a
cause of pain to his friends. For this reason people of a manly nature
guard against making their friends grieve with them, and, unless he be
exceptionally insensible to pain, such a man cannot stand the pain that
ensues for his friends, and in general does not admit fellow-mourners
because he is not himself given to mourning; but women and womanly
men enjoy sympathisers in their grief, and love them as friends and162/Aristotle
companions in sorrow. But in all things one obviously ought to imitate
the better type of person.
On the other hand, the presence of friends in our prosperity implies
both a pleasant passing of our time and the pleasant thought of their
pleasure at our own good fortune. For this cause it would seem that we
ought to summon our friends readily to share our good fortunes (for the
beneficent character is a noble one), but summon them to our bad for-
tunes with hesitation; for we ought to give them as little a share as
possible in our evils whence the saying ‘enough is my misfortune’. We
should summon friends to us most of all when they are likely by suffer-
ing a few inconveniences to do us a great service.
Conversely, it is fitting to go unasked and readily to the aid of those
in adversity (for it is characteristic of a friend to render services, and
especially to those who are in need and have not demanded them; such
action is nobler and pleasanter for both persons); but when our friends
are prosperous we should join readily in their activities (for they need
friends for these too), but be tardy in coming forward to be the objects
of their kindness; for it is not noble to be keen to receive benefits. Still,
we must no doubt avoid getting the reputation of kill-joys by repulsing
them; for that sometimes happens.
The presence of friends, then, seems desirable in all circumstances.
12
Does it not follow, then, that, as for lovers the sight of the beloved is the
thing they love most, and they prefer this sense to the others because on
it love depends most for its being and for its origin, so for friends the
most desirable thing is living together? For friendship is a partnership,
and as a man is to himself, so is he to his friend; now in his own case the
consciousness of his being is desirable, and so therefore is the conscious-
ness of his friend’s being, and the activity of this consciousness is pro-
duced when they live together, so that it is natural that they aim at this.
And whatever existence means for each class of men, whatever it is for
whose sake they value life, in that they wish to occupy themselves with
their friends; and so some drink together, others dice together, others
join in athletic exercises and hunting, or in the study of philosophy, each
class spending their days together in whatever they love most in life; for
since they wish to live with their friends, they do and share in those
things which give them the sense of living together. Thus the friendship
of bad men turns out an evil thing (for because of their instability theyNicomachean Ethics/163
unite in bad pursuits, and besides they become evil by becoming like
each other), while the friendship of good men is good, being augmented
by their companionship; and they are thought to become better too by
their activities and by improving each other; for from each other they
take the mould of the characteristics they approve—whence the saying
‘noble deeds from noble men’.—So much, then, for friendship; our next
task must be to discuss pleasure.
BOOK X
1
After these matters we ought perhaps next to discuss pleasure. For it is
thought to be most intimately connected with our human nature, which
is the reason why in educating the young we steer them by the rudders of
pleasure and pain; it is thought, too, that to enjoy the things we ought
and to hate the things we ought has the greatest bearing on virtue of
character. For these things extend right through life, with a weight and
power of their own in respect both to virtue and to the happy life, since
men choose what is pleasant and avoid what is painful; and such things,
it will be thought, we should least of all omit to discuss, especially since
they admit of much dispute. For some say pleasure is the good, while
others, on the contrary, say it is thoroughly bad—some no doubt being
persuaded that the facts are so, and others thinking it has a better effect
on our life to exhibit pleasure as a bad thing even if it is not; for most
people (they think) incline towards it and are the slaves of their plea-
sures, for which reason they ought to lead them in the opposite direc-
tion, since thus they will reach the middle state. But surely this is not
correct. For arguments about matters concerned with feelings and ac-
tions are less reliable than facts: and so when they clash with the facts of
perception they are despised, and discredit the truth as well; if a man
who runs down pleasure is once seen to be alming at it, his inclining
towards it is thought to imply that it is all worthy of being aimed at; for
most people are not good at drawing distinctions. True arguments seem,
then, most useful, not only with a view to knowledge, but with a view to
life also; for since they harmonize with the facts they are believed, and
so they stimulate those who understand them to live according to them.—
Enough of such questions; let us proceed to review the opinions that
have been expressed about pleasure.164/Aristotle
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Eudoxus thought pleasure was the good because he saw all things, both
rational and irrational, aiming at it, and because in all things that which
is the object of choice is what is excellent, and that which is most the
object of choice the greatest good; thus the fact that all things moved
towards the same object indicated that this was for all things the chief
good (for each thing, he argued, finds its own good, as it finds its own
nourishment); and that which is good for all things and at which all aim
was the good. His arguments were credited more because of the excel-
lence of his character than for their own sake; he was thought to be
remarkably self-controlled, and therefore it was thought that he was not
saying what he did say as a friend of pleasure, but that the facts really
were so. He believed that the same conclusion followed no less plainly
from a study of the contrary of pleasure; pain was in itself an object of
aversion to all things, and therefore its contrary must be similarly an
object of choice. And again that is most an object of choice which we
choose not because or for the sake of something else, and pleasure is
admittedly of this nature; for no one asks to what end he is pleased, thus
implying that pleasure is in itself an object of choice. Further, he argued
that pleasure when added to any good, e.g., to just or temperate action,
makes it more worthy of choice, and that it is only by itself that the good
can be increased.
This argument seems to show it to be one of the goods, and no more
a good than any other; for every good is more worthy of choice along
with another good than taken alone. And so it is by an argument of this
kind that Plato proves the good not to be pleasure; he argues that the
pleasant life is more desirable with wisdom than without, and that if the
mixture is better, pleasure is not the good; for the good cannot become
more desirable by the addition of anything to it. Now it is clear that
nothing else, any more than pleasure, can be the good if it is made more
desirable by the addition of any of the things that are good in them-
selves. What, then, is there that satisfies this criterion, which at the
same time we can participate in? It is something of this sort that we are
looking for. Those who object that that at which all things aim is not
necessarily good are, we may surmise, talking nonsense. For we say
that that which every one thinks really is so; and the man who attacks
this belief will hardly have anything more credible to maintain instead.
If it is senseless creatures that desire the things in question, there might
be something in what they say; but if intelligent creatures do so as well,Nicomachean Ethics/165
what sense can there be in this view? But perhaps even in inferior crea-
tures there is some natural good stronger than themselves which aims at
their proper good.
Nor does the argument about the contrary of pleasure seem to be
correct. They say that if pain is an evil it does not follow that pleasure is
a good; for evil is opposed to evil and at the same time both are opposed
to the neutral state—which is correct enough but does not apply to the
things in question. For if both pleasure and pain belonged to the class of
evils they ought both to be objects of aversion, while if they belonged to
the class of neutrals neither should be an object of aversion or they
should both be equally so; but in fact people evidently avoid the one as
evil and choose the other as good; that then must be the nature of the
opposition between them.
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Nor again, if pleasure is not a quality, does it follow that it is not a good;
for the activities of virtue are not qualities either, nor is happiness. They
say, however, that the good is determinate, while pleasure is indetermi-
nate, because it admits of degrees. Now if it is from the feeling of plea-
sure that they judge thus, the same will be true of justice and the other
virtues, in respect of which we plainly say that people of a certain char-
acter are so more or less, and act more or less in accordance with these
virtues; for people may be more just or brave, and it is possible also to
act justly or temperately more or less. But if their judgement is based on
the various pleasures, surely they are not stating the real cause, if in fact
some pleasures are unmixed and others mixed. Again, just as health
admits of degrees without being indeterminate, why should not plea-
sure? The same proportion is not found in all things, nor a single pro-
portion always in the same thing, but it may be relaxed and yet persist
up to a point, and it may differ in degree. The case of pleasure also may
therefore be of this kind.
Again, they assume that the good is perfect while movements and
comings into being are imperfect, and try to exhibit pleasure as being a
movement and a coming into being. But they do not seem to be right
even in saying that it is a movement. For speed and slowness are thought
to be proper to every movement, and if a movement, e.g., that of the
heavens, has not speed or slowness in itself, it has it in relation to some-
thing else; but of pleasure neither of these things is true. For while we
may become pleased quickly as we may become angry quickly, we can-166/Aristotle
not be pleased quickly, not even in relation to some one else, while we
can walk, or grow, or the like, quickly. While, then, we can change
quickly or slowly into a state of pleasure, we cannot quickly exhibit the
activity of pleasure, i.e., be pleased. Again, how can it be a coming into
being? It is not thought that any chance thing can come out of any chance
thing, but that a thing is dissolved into that out of which it comes into
being; and pain would be the destruction of that of which pleasure is the
coming into being.
They say, too, that pain is the lack of that which is according to
nature, and pleasure is replenishment. But these experiences are bodily.
If then pleasure is replenishment with that which is according to nature,
that which feels pleasure will be that in which the replenishment takes
place, i.e., the body; but that is not thought to be the case; therefore the
replenishment is not pleasure, though one would be pleased when re-
plenishment was taking place, just as one would be pained if one was
being operated on. This opinion seems to be based on the pains and
pleasures connected with nutrition; on the fact that when people have
been short of food and have felt pain beforehand they are pleased by the
replenishment. But this does not happen with all pleasures; for the plea-
sures of learning and, among the sensuous pleasures, those of smell,
and also many sounds and sights, and memories and hopes, do not pre-
suppose pain. Of what then will these be the coming into being? There
has not been lack of anything of which they could be the supplying
anew.
In reply to those who bring forward the disgraceful pleasures one
may say that these are not pleasant; if things are pleasant to people of
vicious constitution, we must not suppose that they are also pleasant to
others than these, just as we do not reason so about the things that are
wholesome or sweet or bitter to sick people, or ascribe whiteness to the
things that seem white to those suffering from a disease of the eye. Or
one might answer thus—that the pleasures are desirable, but not from
these sources, as wealth is desirable, but not as the reward of betrayal,
and health, but not at the cost of eating anything and everything. Or
perhaps pleasures differ in kind; for those derived from noble sources
are different from those derived from base sources, and one cannot the
pleasure of the just man without being just, nor that of the musical man
without being musical, and so on.
The fact, too, that a friend is different from a flatterer seems to
make it plain that pleasure is not a good or that pleasures are different inNicomachean Ethics/167
kind; for the one is thought to consort with us with a view to the good,
the other with a view to our pleasure, and the one is reproached for his
conduct while the other is praised on the ground that he consorts with us
for different ends. And no one would choose to live with the intellect of
a child throughout his life, however much he were to be pleased at the
things that children are pleased at, nor to get enjoyment by doing some
most disgraceful deed, though he were never to feel any pain in conse-
quence. And there are many things we should be keen about even if they
brought no pleasure, e.g., seeing, remembering, knowing, possessing
the virtues. If pleasures necessarily do accompany these, that makes no
odds; we should choose these even if no pleasure resulted. It seems to be
clear, then, that neither is pleasure the good nor is all pleasure desirable,
and that some pleasures are desirable in themselves, differing in kind or
in their sources from the others. So much for the things that are said
about pleasure and pain.
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What pleasure is, or what kind of thing it is, will become plainer if we
take up the question aga from the beginning. Seeing seems to be at any
moment complete, for it does not lack anything which coming into being
later will complete its form; and pleasure also seems to be of this nature.
For it is a whole, and at no time can one find a pleasure whose form will
be completed if the pleasure lasts longer. For this reason, too, it is not a
movement. For every movement (e.g., that of building) takes time and is
for the sake of an end, and is complete when it has made what it aims at.
It is complete, therefore, only in the whole time or at that final moment.
In their parts and during the time they occupy, all movements are in-
complete, and are different in kind from the whole movement and from
each other. For the fitting together of the stones is different from the
fluting of the column, and these are both different from the making of
the temple; and the making of the temple is complete (for it lacks noth-
ing with a view to the end proposed), but the making of the base or of
the triglyph is incomplete; for each is the making of only a part. They
differ in kind, then, and it is not possible to find at any and every time a
movement complete in form, but if at all, only in the whole time. So,
too, in the case of walking and all other movements. For if locomotion is
a movement from to there, it, too, has differences in kind—flying, walk-
ing, leaping, and so on. And not only so, but in walking itself there are
such differences; for the whence and whither are not the same in the168/Aristotle
whole racecourse and in a part of it, nor in one part and in another, nor
is it the same thing to traverse this line and that; for one traverses not
only a line but one which is in a place, and this one is in a different place
from that. We have discussed movement with precision in another work,
but it seems that it is not complete at any and every time, but that the
many movements are incomplete and different in kind, since the whence
and whither give them their form. But of pleasure the form is complete
at any and every time. Plainly, then, pleasure and movement must be
different from each other, and pleasure must be one of the things that are
whole and complete. This would seem to be the case, too, from the fact
that it is not possible to move otherwise than in time, but it is possible to
be pleased; for that which takes place in a moment is a whole.
From these considerations it is clear, too, that these thinkers are not
right in saying there is a movement or a coming into being of pleasure.
For these cannot be ascribed to all things, but only to those that are
divisible and not wholes; there is no coming into being of seeing nor of
a point nor of a unit, nor is any of these a movement or coming into
being; therefore there is no movement or coming into being of pleasure
either; for it is a whole.
Since every sense is active in relation to its object, and a sense
which is in good condition acts perfectly in relation to the most beautiful
of its objects (for perfect activity seems to be ideally of this nature;
whether we say that it is active, or the organ in which it resides, may be
assumed to be immaterial), it follows that in the case of each sense the
best activity is that of the best-conditioned organ in relation to the finest
of its objects. And this activity will be the most complete and pleasant.
For, while there is pleasure in respect of any sense, and in respect of
thought and contemplation no less, the most complete is pleasantest,
and that of a well-conditioned organ in relation to the worthiest of its
objects is the most complete; and the pleasure completes the activity.
But the pleasure does not complete it in the same way as the combina-
tion of object and sense, both good, just as health and the doctor are not
in the same way the cause of a man’s being healthy. (That pleasure is
produced in respect to each sense is plain; for we speak of sights and
sounds as pleasant. It is also plain that it arises most of all when both
the sense is at its best and it is active in reference to an object which
corresponds; when both object and perceiver are of the best there will
always be pleasure, since the requisite agent and patient are both present.)
Pleasure completes the activity not as the corresponding permanent stateNicomachean Ethics/169
does, by its immanence, but as an end which supervenes as the bloom of
youth does on those in the flower of their age. So long, then, as both the
intelligible or sensible object and the discriminating or contemplative
faculty are as they should be, the pleasure will be involved in the activ-
ity; for when both the passive and the active factor are unchanged and
are related to each other in the same way, the same result naturally
follows.
How, then, is it that no one is continuously pleased? Is it that we
grow weary? Certainly all human beings are incapable of continuous
activity. Therefore pleasure also is not continuous; for it accompanies
activity. Some things delight us when they are new, but later do so less,
for the same reason; for at first the mind is in a state of stimulation and
intensely active about them, as people are with respect to their vision
when they look hard at a thing, but afterwards our activity is not of this
kind, but has grown relaxed; for which reason the pleasure also is dulled.
One might think that all men desire pleasure because they all aim at
life; life is an activity, and each man is active about those things and
with those faculties that he loves most; e.g., the musician is active with
his hearing in reference to tunes, the student with his mind in reference
to theoretical questions, and so on in each case; now pleasure completes
the activities, and therefore life, which they desire. It is with good rea-
son, then, that they aim at pleasure too, since for every one it completes
life, which is desirable. But whether we choose life for the sake of plea-
sure or pleasure for the sake of life is a question we may dismiss for the
present. For they seem to be bound up together and not to admit of
separation, since without activity pleasure does not arise, and every
activity is completed by the attendant pleasure.
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For this reason pleasures seem, too, to differ in kind. For things differ-
ent in kind are, we think, completed by different things (we see this to be
true both of natural objects and of things produced by art, e.g., animals,
trees, a painting, a sculpture, a house, an implement); and, similarly, we
think that activities differing in kind are completed by things differing in
kind. Now the activities of thought differ from those of the senses, and
both differ among themselves, in kind; so, therefore, do the pleasures
that complete them.
This may be seen, too, from the fact that each of the pleasures is
bound up with the activity it completes. For an activity is intensified by170/Aristotle
its proper pleasure, since each class of things is better judged of and
brought to precision by those who engage in the activity with pleasure;
e.g., it is those who enjoy geometrical thinking that become geometers
and grasp the various propositions better, and, similarly, those who are
fond of music or of building, and so on, make progress in their proper
function by enjoying it; so the pleasures intensify the activities, and
what intensifies a thing is proper to it, but things different in kind have
properties different in kind.
This will be even more apparent from the fact that activities are
hindered by pleasures arising from other sources. For people who are
fond of playing the flute are incapable of attending to arguments if they
overhear some one playing the flute, since they enjoy flute-playing more
than the activity in hand; so the pleasure connected with fluteplaying
destroys the activity concerned with argument. This happens, similarly,
in all other cases, when one is active about two things at once; the more
pleasant activity drives out the other, and if it is much more pleasant
does so all the more, so that one even ceases from the other. This is why
when we enjoy anything very much we do not throw ourselves into any-
thing else, and do one thing only when we are not much pleased by
another; e.g., in the theatre the people who eat sweets do so most when
the actors are poor. Now since activities are made precise and more
enduring and better by their proper pleasure, and injured by alien plea-
sures, evidently the two kinds of pleasure are far apart. For alien plea-
sures do pretty much what proper pains do, since activities are destroyed
by their proper pains; e.g., if a man finds writing or doing sums un-
pleasant and painful, he does not write, or does not do sums, because
the activity is painful. So an activity suffers contrary effects from its
proper pleasures and pains, i.e., from those that supervene on it in virtue
of its own nature. And alien pleasures have been stated to do much the
same as pain; they destroy the activity, only not to the same degree.
Now since activities differ in respect of goodness and badness, and
some are worthy to be chosen, others to be avoided, and others neutral,
so, too, are the pleasures; for to each activity there is a proper pleasure.
The pleasure proper to a worthy activity is good and that proper to an
unworthy activity bad; just as the appetites for noble objects are laud-
able, those for base objects culpable. But the pleasures involved in ac-
tivities are more proper to them than the desires; for the latter are sepa-
rated both in time and in nature, while the former are close to the activi-
ties, and so hard to distinguish from them that it admits of dispute whetherNicomachean Ethics/171
the activity is not the same as the pleasure. (Still, pleasure does not
seem to be thought or perception—that would be strange; but because
they are not found apart they appear to some people the same.) As ac-
tivities are different, then, so are the corresponding pleasures. Now sight
is superior to touch in purity, and hearing and smell to taste; the plea-
sures, therefore, are similarly superior, and those of thought superior to
these, and within each of the two kinds some are superior to others.
Each animal is thought to have a proper pleasure, as it has a proper
function; viz. that which corresponds to its activity. If we survey them
species by species, too, this will be evident; horse, dog, and man have
different pleasures, as Heraclitus says ‘asses would prefer sweepings to
gold’; for food is pleasanter than gold to asses. So the pleasures of
creatures different in kind differ in kind, and it is plausible to suppose
that those of a single species do not differ. But they vary to no small
extent, in the case of men at least; the same things delight some people
and pain others, and are painful and odious to some, and pleasant to and
liked by others. This happens, too, in the case of sweet things; the same
things do not seem sweet to a man in a fever and a healthy man—nor hot
to a weak man and one in good condition. The same happens in other
cases. But in all such matters that which appears to the good man is
thought to be really so. If this is correct, as it seems to be, and virtue and
the good man as such are the measure of each thing, those also will be
pleasures which appear so to him, and those things pleasant which he
enjoys. If the things he finds tiresome seem pleasant to some one, that is
nothing surprising; for men may be ruined and spoilt in many ways; but
the things are not pleasant, but only pleasant to these people and to
people in this condition. Those which are admittedly disgraceful plainly
should not be said to be pleasures, except to a perverted taste; but of
those that are thought to be good what kind of pleasure or what pleasure
should be said to be that proper to man? Is it not plain from the corre-
sponding activities? The pleasures follow these. Whether, then, the per-
fect and supremely happy man has one or more activities, the pleasures
that perfect these will be said in the strict sense to be pleasures proper to
man, and the rest will be so in a secondary and fractional way, as are the
activities.172/Aristotle
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Now that we have spoken of the virtues, the forms of friendship, and the
varieties of pleasure, what remains is to discuss in outline the nature of
happiness, since this is what we state the end of human nature to be.
Our discussion will be the more concise if we first sum up what we have
said already. We said, then, that it is not a disposition; for if it were it
might belong to some one who was asleep throughout his life, living the
life of a plant, or, again, to some one who was suffering the greatest
misfortunes. If these implications are unacceptable, and we must rather
class happiness as an activity, as we have said before, and if some ac-
tivities are necessary, and desirable for the sake of something else, while
others are so in themselves, evidently happiness must be placed among
those desirable in themselves, not among those desirable for the sake of
something else; for happiness does not lack anything, but is self-suffi-
cient. Now those activities are desirable in themselves from which noth-
ing is sought beyond the activity. And of this nature virtuous actions are
thought to be; for to do noble and good deeds is a thing desirable for its
own sake.
Pleasant amusements also are thought to be of this nature; we choose
them not for the sake of other things; for we are injured rather than
benefited by them, since we are led to neglect our bodies and our prop-
erty. But most of the people who are deemed happy take refuge in such
pastimes, which is the reason why those who are ready-witted at them
are highly esteemed at the courts of tyrants; they make themselves pleas-
ant companions in the tyrants’ favourite pursuits, and that is the sort of
man they want. Now these things are thought to be of the nature of
happiness because people in despotic positions spend their leisure in
them, but perhaps such people prove nothing; for virtue and reason,
from which good activities flow, do not depend on despotic position;
nor, if these people, who have never tasted pure and generous pleasure,
take refuge in the bodily pleasures, should these for that reason be thought
more desirable; for boys, too, think the things that are valued among
themselves are the best. It is to be expected, then, that, as different things
seem valuable to boys and to men, so they should to bad men and to
good. Now, as we have often maintained, those things are both valuable
and pleasant which are such to the good man; and to each man the
activity in accordance with his own disposition is most desirable, and,
therefore, to the good man that which is in accordance with virtue. Hap-
piness, therefore, does not lie in amusement; it would, indeed, be strangeNicomachean Ethics/173
if the end were amusement, and one were to take trouble and suffer
hardship all one’s life in order to amuse oneself. For, in a word, every-
thing that we choose we choose for the sake of something else—except
happiness, which is an end. Now to exert oneself and work for the sake
of amusement seems silly and utterly childish. But to amuse oneself in
order that one may exert oneself, as Anacharsis puts it, seems right; for
amusement is a sort of relaxation, and we need relaxation because we
cannot work continuously. Relaxation, then, is not an end; for it is taken
for the sake of activity.
The happy life is thought to be virtuous; now a virtuous life re-
quires exertion, and does not consist in amusement. And we say that
serious things are better than laughable things and those connected with
amusement, and that the activity of the better of any two things—whether
it be two elements of our being or two men—is the more serious; but the
activity of the better is ipso facto superior and more of the nature of
happiness. And any chance person—even a slave—can enjoy the bodily
pleasures no less than the best man; but no one assigns to a slave a share
in happiness—unless he assigns to him also a share in human life. For
happiness does not lie in such occupations, but, as we have said before,
in virtuous activities.
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If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it
should be in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be that of
the best thing in us. Whether it be reason or something else that is this
element which is thought to be our natural ruler and guide and to take
thought of things noble and divine, whether it be itself also divine or
only the most divine element in us, the activity of this in accordance
with its proper virtue will be perfect happiness. That this activity is
contemplative we have already said.
Now this would seem to be in agreement both with what we said
before and with the truth. For, firstly, this activity is the best (since not
only is reason the best thing in us, but the objects of reason are the best
of knowable objects); and secondly, it is the most continuous, since we
can contemplate truth more continuously than we can do anything. And
we think happiness has pleasure mingled with it, but the activity of
philosophic wisdom is admittedly the pleasantest of virtuous activities;
at all events the pursuit of it is thought to offer pleasures marvellous for
their purity and their enduringness, and it is to be expected that those174/Aristotle
who know will pass their time more pleasantly than those who inquire.
And the self-sufficiency that is spoken of must belong most to the con-
templative activity. For while a philosopher, as well as a just man or one
possessing any other virtue, needs the necessaries of life, when they are
sufficiently equipped with things of that sort the just man needs people
towards whom and with whom he shall act justly, and the temperate
man, the brave man, and each of the others is in the same case, but the
philosopher, even when by himself, can contemplate truth, and the bet-
ter the wiser he is; he can perhaps do so better if he has fellow-workers,
but still he is the most self-sufficient. And this activity alone would
seem to be loved for its own sake; for nothing arises from it apart from
the contemplating, while from practical activities we gain more or less
apart from the action. And happiness is thought to depend on leisure;
for we are busy that we may have leisure, and make war that we may
live in peace. Now the activity of the practical virtues is exhibited in
political or military affairs, but the actions concerned with these seem to
be unleisurely. Warlike actions are completely so (for no one chooses to
be at war, or provokes war, for the sake of being at war; any one would
seem absolutely murderous if he were to make enemies of his friends in
order to bring about battle and slaughter); but the action of the states-
man is also unleisurely, and—apart from the political action itself—
aims at despotic power and honours, or at all events happiness, for him
and his fellow citizens—a happiness different from political action, and
evidently sought as being different. So if among virtuous actions politi-
cal and military actions are distinguished by nobility and greatness, and
these are unleisurely and aim at an end and are not desirable for their
own sake, but the activity of reason, which is contemplative, seems both
to be superior in serious worth and to aim at no end beyond itself, and to
have its pleasure proper to itself (and this augments the activity), and
the self-sufficiency, leisureliness, unweariedness (so far as this is pos-
sible for man), and all the other attributes ascribed to the supremely
happy man are evidently those connected with this activity, it follows
that this will be the complete happiness of man, if it be allowed a com-
plete term of life (for none of the attributes of happiness is incomplete).
But such a life would be too high for man; for it is not in so far as he
is man that he will live so, but in so far as something divine is present in
him; and by so much as this is superior to our composite nature is its
activity superior to that which is the exercise of the other kind of virtue.
If reason is divine, then, in comparison with man, the life according to itNicomachean Ethics/175
is divine in comparison with human life. But we must not follow those
who advise us, being men, to think of human things, and, being mortal,
of mortal things, but must, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal,
and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us; for
even if it be small in bulk, much more does it in power and worth sur-
pass everything. This would seem, too, to be each man himself, since it
is the authoritative and better part of him. It would be strange, then, if
he were to choose not the life of his self but that of something else. And
what we said before’ will apply now; that which is proper to each thing
is by nature best and most pleasant for each thing; for man, therefore,
the life according to reason is best and pleasantest, since reason more
than anything else is man. This life therefore is also the happiest.
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But in a secondary degree the life in accordance with the other kind of
virtue is happy; for the activities in accordance with this befit our hu-
man estate. Just and brave acts, and other virtuous acts, we do in rela-
tion to each other, observing our respective duties with regard to con-
tracts and services and all manner of actions and with regard to pas-
sions; and all of these seem to be typically human. Some of them seem
even to arise from the body, and virtue of character to be in many ways
bound up with the passions. Practical wisdom, too, is linked to virtue of
character, and this to practical wisdom, since the principles of practical
wisdom are in accordance with the moral virtues and rightness in mor-
als is in accordance with practical wisdom. Being connected with the
passions also, the moral virtues must belong to our composite nature;
and the virtues of our composite nature are human; so, therefore, are the
life and the happiness which correspond to these. The excellence of the
reason is a thing apart; we must be content to say this much about it, for
to describe it precisely is a task greater than our purpose requires. It
would seem, however, also to need external equipment but little, or less
than moral virtue does. Grant that both need the necessaries, and do so
equally, even if the statesman’s work is the more concerned with the
body and things of that sort; for there will be little difference there; but
in what they need for the exercise of their activities there will be much
difference. The liberal man will need money for the doing of his liberal
deeds, and the just man too will need it for the returning of services (for
wishes are hard to discern, and even people who are not just pretend to
wish to act justly); and the brave man will need power if he is to accom-176/Aristotle
plish any of the acts that correspond to his virtue, and the temperate
man will need opportunity; for how else is either he or any of the others
to be recognized? It is debated, too, whether the will or the deed is more
essential to virtue, which is assumed to involve both; it is surely clear
that its perfection involves both; but for deeds many things are needed,
and more, the greater and nobler the deeds are. But the man who is
contemplating the truth needs no such thing, at least with a view to the
exercise of his activity; indeed they are, one may say, even hindrances,
at all events to his contemplation; but in so far as he is a man and lives
with a number of people, he chooses to do virtuous acts; he will there-
fore need such aids to living a human life.
But that perfect happiness is a contemplative activity will appear
from the following consideration as well. We assume the gods to be
above all other beings blessed and happy; but what sort of actions must
we assign to them? Acts of justice? Will not the gods seem absurd if
they make contracts and return deposits, and so on? Acts of a brave
man, then, confronting dangers and running risks because it is noble to
do so? Or liberal acts? To whom will they give? It will be strange if they
are really to have money or anything of the kind. And what would their
temperate acts be? Is not such praise tasteless, since they have no bad
appetites? If we were to run through them all, the circumstances of
action would be found trivial and unworthy of gods. Still, every one
supposes that they live and therefore that they are active; we cannot
suppose them to sleep like Endymion. Now if you take away from a
living being action, and still more production, what is left but contem-
plation? Therefore the activity of God, which surpasses all others in
blessedness, must be contemplative; and of human activities, therefore,
that which is most akin to this must be most of the nature of happiness.
This is indicated, too, by the fact that the other animals have no
share in happiness, being completely deprived of such activity. For while
the whole life of the gods is blessed, and that of men too in so far as
some likeness of such activity belongs to them, none of the other ani-
mals is happy, since they in no way share in contemplation. Happiness
extends, then, just so far as contemplation does, and those to whom
contemplation more fully belongs are more truly happy, not as a mere
concomitant but in virtue of the contemplation; for this is in itself pre-
cious. Happiness, therefore, must be some form of contemplation.
But, being a man, one will also need external prosperity; for our
nature is not self-sufficient for the purpose of contemplation, but ourNicomachean Ethics/177
body also must be healthy and must have food and other attention. Still,
we must not think that the man who is to be happy will need many things
or great things, merely because he cannot be supremely happy without
external goods; for self-sufficiency and action do not involve excess,
and we can do noble acts without ruling earth and sea; for even with
moderate advantages one can act virtuously (this is manifest enough;
for private persons are thought to do worthy acts no less than despots—
indeed even more); and it is enough that we should have so much as
that; for the life of the man who is active in accordance with virtue will
be happy. Solon, too, was perhaps sketching well the happy man when
he described him as moderately furnished with externals but as having
done (as Solon thought) the noblest acts, and lived temperately; for one
can with but moderate possessions do what one ought. Anaxagoras also
seems to have supposed the happy man not to be rich nor a despot, when
he said that he would not be surprised if the happy man were to seem to
most people a strange person; for they judge by externals, since these
are all they perceive. The opinions of the wise seem, then, to harmonize
with our arguments. But while even such things carry some conviction,
the truth in practical matters is discerned from the facts of life; for these
are the decisive factor. We must therefore survey what we have already
said, bringing it to the test of the facts of life, and if it harmonizes with
the facts we must accept it, but if it clashes with them we must suppose
it to be mere theory. Now he who exercises his reason and cultivates it
seems to be both in the best state of mind and most dear to the gods. For
if the gods have any care for human affairs, as they are thought to have,
it would be reasonable both that they should delight in that which was
best and most akin to them (i.e., reason) and that they should reward
those who love and honour this most, as caring for the things that are
dear to them and acting both rightly and nobly. And that all these at-
tributes belong most of all to the philosopher is manifest. He, therefore,
is the dearest to the gods. And he who is that will presumably be also the
happiest; so that in this way too the philosopher will more than any
other be happy.
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If these matters and the virtues, and also friendship and pleasure, have
been dealt with sufficiently in outline, are we to suppose that our
programme has reached its end? Surely, as the saying goes, where there
are things to be done the end is not to survey and recognize the various178/Aristotle
things, but rather to do them; with regard to virtue, then, it is not enough
to know, but we must try to have and use it, or try any other way there
may be of becoming good. Now if arguments were in themselves enough
to make men good, they would justly, as Theognis says, have won very
great rewards, and such rewards should have been provided; but as
things are, while they seem to have power to encourage and stimulate
the generous-minded among our youth, and to make a character which
is gently born, and a true lover of what is noble, ready to be possessed
by virtue, they are not able to encourage the many to nobility and good-
ness. For these do not by nature obey the sense of shame, but only fear,
and do not abstain from bad acts because of their baseness but through
fear of punishment; living by passion they pursue their own pleasures
and the means to them, and and the opposite pains, and have not even a
conception of what is noble and truly pleasant, since they have never
tasted it. What argument would remould such people? It is hard, if not
impossible, to remove by argument the traits that have long since been
incorporated in the character; and perhaps we must be content if, when
all the influences by which we are thought to become good are present,
we get some tincture of virtue.
Now some think that we are made good by nature, others by habitu-
ation, others by teaching. Nature’s part evidently does not depend on us,
but as a result of some divine causes is present in those who are truly
fortunate; while argument and teaching, we may suspect, are not pow-
erful with all men, but the soul of the student must first have been culti-
vated by means of habits for noble joy and noble hatred, like earth which
is to nourish the seed. For he who lives as passion directs will not hear
argument that dissuades him, nor understand it if he does; and how can
we persuade one in such a state to change his ways? And in general
passion seems to yield not to argument but to force. The character, then,
must somehow be there already with a kinship to virtue, loving what is
noble and hating what is base.
But it is difficult to get from youth up a right training for virtue if
one has not been brought up under right laws; for to live temperately
and hardily is not pleasant to most people, especially when they are
young. For this reason their nurture and occupations should be fixed by
law; for they will not be painful when they have become customary. But
it is surely not enough that when they are young they should get the right
nurture and attention; since they must, even when they are grown up,
practise and be habituated to them, we shall need laws for this as well,Nicomachean Ethics/179
and generally speaking to cover the whole of life; for most people obey
necessity rather than argument, and punishments rather than the sense
of what is noble.
This is why some think that legislators ought to stimulate men to
virtue and urge them forward by the motive of the noble, on the assump-
tion that those who have been well advanced by the formation of habits
will attend to such influences; and that punishments and penalties should
be imposed on those who disobey and are of inferior nature, while the
incurably bad should be completely banished. A good man (they think),
since he lives with his mind fixed on what is noble, will submit to argu-
ment, while a bad man, whose desire is for pleasure, is corrected by
pain like a beast of burden. This is, too, why they say the pains inflicted
should be those that are most opposed to the pleasures such men love.
However that may be, if (as we have said) the man who is to be
good must be well trained and habituated, and go on to spend his time in
worthy occupations and neither willingly nor unwillingly do bad ac-
tions, and if this can be brought about if men live in accordance with a
sort of reason and right order, provided this has force,—if this be so, the
paternal command indeed has not the required force or compulsive power
(nor in general has the command of one man, unless he be a king or
something similar), but the law has compulsive power, while it is at the
same time a rule proceeding from a sort of practical wisdom and reason.
And while people hate men who oppose their impulses, even if they
oppose them rightly, the law in its ordaining of what is good is not
burdensome.
In the Spartan state alone, or almost alone, the legislator seems to
have paid attention to questions of nurture and occupations; in most
states such matters have been neglected, and each man lives as he pleases,
Cyclops-fashion, ‘to his own wife and children dealing law’. Now it is
best that there should be a public and proper care for such matters; but
if they are neglected by the community it would seem right for each man
to help his children and friends towards virtue, and that they should
have the power, or at least the will, to do this.
It would seem from what has been said that he can do this better if
he makes himself capable of legislating. For public control is plainly
effected by laws, and good control by good laws; whether written or
unwritten would seem to make no difference, nor whether they are laws
providing for the education of individuals or of groups—any more than
it does in the case of music or gymnastics and other such pursuits. For180/Aristotle
as in cities laws and prevailing types of character have force, so in
households do the injunctions and the habits of the father, and these
have even more because of the tie of blood and the benefits he confers;
for the children start with a natural affection and disposition to obey.
Further, private education has an advantage over public, as private
medical treatment has; for while in general rest and abstinence from
food are good for a man in a fever, for a particular man they may not be;
and a boxer presumably does not prescribe the same style of fighting to
all his pupils. It would seem, then, that the detail is worked out with
more precision if the control is private; for each person is more likely to
get what suits his case.
But the details can be best looked after, one by one, by a doctor or
gymnastic instructor or any one else who has the general knowledge of
what is good for every one or for people of a certain kind (for the sci-
ences both are said to be, and are, concerned with what is universal);
not but what some particular detail may perhaps be well looked after by
an unscientific person, if he has studied accurately in the light of expe-
rience what happens in each case, just as some people seem to be their
own best doctors, though they could give no help to any one else. None
the less, it will perhaps be agreed that if a man does wish to become
master of an art or science he must go to the universal, and come to
know it as well as possible; for, as we have said, it is with this that the
sciences are concerned.
And surely he who wants to make men, whether many or few, better
by his care must try to become capable of legislating, if it is through
laws that we can become good. For to get any one whatever—any one
who is put before us—into the right condition is not for the first chance
comer; if any one can do it, it is the man who knows, just as in medicine
and all other matters which give scope for care and prudence.
Must we not, then, next examine whence or how one can learn how
to legislate? Is it, as in all other cases, from statesmen? Certainly it was
thought to be a part of statesmanship. Or is a difference apparent be-
tween statesmanship and the other sciences and arts? In the others the
same people are found offering to teach the arts and practising them,
e.g., doctors or painters; but while the sophists profess to teach politics,
it is practised not by any of them but by the politicians, who would seem
to do so by dint of a certain skill and experience rather than of thought;
for they are not found either writing or speaking about such matters
(though it were a nobler occupation perhaps than composing speechesNicomachean Ethics/181
for the law-courts and the assembly), nor again are they found to have
made statesmen of their own sons or any other of their friends. But it
was to be expected that they should if they could; for there is nothing
better than such a skill that they could have left to their cities, or could
prefer to have for themselves, or, therefore, for those dearest to them.
Still, experience seems to contribute not a little; else they could not have
become politicians by familiarity with politics; and so it seems that those
who aim at knowing about the art of politics need experience as well.
But those of the sophists who profess the art seem to be very far
from teaching it. For, to put the matter generally, they do not even know
what kind of thing it is nor what kinds of things it is about; otherwise
they would not have classed it as identical with rhetoric or even inferior
to it, nor have thought it easy to legislate by collecting the laws that are
thought well of; they say it is possible to select the best laws, as though
even the selection did not demand intelligence and as though right judge-
ment were not the greatest thing, as in matters of music. For while people
experienced in any department judge rightly the works produced in it,
and understand by what means or how they are achieved, and what
harmonizes with what, the inexperienced must be content if they do not
fail to see whether the work has been well or ill made—as in the case of
painting. Now laws are as it were the ‘works’ of the political art; how
then can one learn from them to be a legislator, or judge which are best?
Even medical men do not seem to be made by a study of text-books. Yet
people try, at any rate, to state not only the treatments, but also how
particular classes of people can be cured and should be treated—distin-
guishing the various habits of body; but while this seems useful to expe-
rienced people, to the inexperienced it is valueless. Surely, then, while
collections of laws, and of constitutions also, may be serviceable to
those who can study them and judge what is good or bad and what
enactments suit what circumstances, those who go through such collec-
tions without a practised faculty will not have right judgement (unless it
be as a spontaneous gift of nature), though they may perhaps become
more intelligent in such matters.
Now our predecessors have left the subject of legislation to us
unexamined; it is perhaps best, therefore, that we should ourselves study
it, and in general study the question of the constitution, in order to com-
plete to the best of our ability our philosophy of human nature. First,
then, if anything has been said well in detail by earlier thinkers, let us try
to review it; then in the light of the constitutions we have collected let us182/Aristotle
study what sorts of influence preserve and destroy states, and what sorts
preserve or destroy the particular kinds of constitution, and to what
causes it is due that some are well and others ill administered. When
these have been studied we shall perhaps be more likely to see with a
comprehensive view, which constitution is best, and how each must be
ordered, and what laws and customs it must use, if it is to be at its best.
Let us make a beginning of our discussion.
THE END